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a self-determining appetitive movement of the mind. For irrational creatures are not moved toward appetite by free choice; for since the appetite is moved naturally in them, and they do not have reason to govern, they are led by nature, being overcome by its appetite. Wherefore it immediately rushes toward the act, unless it is hindered by another. Therefore they are not self-determining, but are under authority. But the rational nature has the power to yield to the natural appetite and not to yield but to conquer it, and nature shows this, since the desire for life, though natural, yields to reason; for many, having conquered this by the ruling reason, voluntarily went toward death and put off the appetite for food and for sleep and for the rest, leading nature by the self-determining reason, not being led by it. Just as, therefore, the natural appetite is inherent in every sentient nature, so self-determination is inherent in every rational nature; for everything rational is self-determining, and this is what is according to the image of God. Will, therefore, is a natural or rational and self-determining appetitive power and movement. The things subject to the will, which the will desires, are called objects of volitional choice; for by its own choice the mind, being self-determining, moves toward the use of these things. And these are such as to eat—not to eat, to drink—not to drink, to travel—not to travel, to marry—not to marry and such things, which are in our power, which things we can do and their opposites.

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αὐτεξούσιος ὀρεκτικὴ τοῦ νοῦ κίνησις. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλογα οὐκ αὐτεξουσίως κινεῖται πρὸς ὄρεξιν· φυσικῶς γὰρ κινουμένης ἐν αὐτοῖς τῆς ὀρέξεως μὴ ἔχοντα ἐπιστατοῦντα τὸν λόγον ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, τῇ ταύτης ὀρέξει ἡττώμενα. Ὅθεν εὐθέως ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν, εἰ μὴ ὑφ' ἑτέρου κωλυθῇ. ∆ιὸ οὐκ αὐτεξούσιά εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπεξούσια. Ἡ δὲ λογικὴ φύσις ἐξουσίαν ἔχει ὑποκύψαι τῇ φυσικῇ ὀρέξει καὶ μὴ ὑποκύψαι ἀλλὰ νικῆσαι, καὶ δηλοῖ ἡ φύσις ζωῆς ἔφεσις φυσικὴ οὖσα καὶ ὑποκύπτουσα τῷ λόγῳ· πολλοὶ γὰρ ταύτην τῷ ἡγεμόνι λόγῳ νικήσαντες ἑκουσίως ἐχώρησαν πρὸς τὸν θάνατον καὶ τροφῆς ὄρεξιν ἀνεβάλοντο καὶ ὕπνου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, ἄγοντες τὴν φύσιν τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ λόγῳ, οὐχ ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι. Ὥσπερ οὖν ἡ φυσικὴ ὄρεξις πάσῃ αἰσθητικῇ φύσει ἔγκειται, οὕτως ἡ αὐτεξουσιότης πάσῃ λογικῇ φύσει ἔγκειται· πᾶν γὰρ λογικὸν αὐτεξούσιον, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ. Θέλησις οὖν ἐστι φυσικὴ ἢ λογικὴ καὶ αὐτεξούσιος ὀρεκτικὴ δύναμίς τε καὶ κίνησις. Τὰ δὲ τῇ θελήσει ὑποκείμενα, ὧν ἐφίεται ἡ θέλησις, λέγονται θελήματα γνωμικά· οἰκείᾳ γὰρ γνώμῃ ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τούτων χρῆσιν ὁ νοῦς αὐτεξούσιος ὤν. Ταῦτα δέ εἰσιν οἷον φαγεῖν-μὴ φαγεῖν, πιεῖν-μὴ πιεῖν, ὁδεῦσαι-μὴ ὁδεῦσαι, γῆμαι- μὴ γῆμαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἅτινα ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσιν, ἅτινα καὶ αὐτὰ δυνάμεθα καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα αὐτοῖς.