is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and is moved, or as a whole it moves but is moved in part, or the reverse. But if the moving part is one thing, and the moved part is another, it will not be self-moved in itself, subsisting from non-self-moved parts, but seeming to be self-moved while not being such in essence. But if it moves as a whole and is moved in part, or the reverse, there will be some part in both that is at once moving and being moved as one, and this is what is primarily self-moved. And if one and the same thing moves and is moved, it will have the activity of moving directed toward itself, being self-motive. And toward that which it acts, to this it has returned. Therefore, everything that primarily moves itself is revertive to itself. 18 Everything that provides being to others is itself primarily that which it imparts to those it provides for. For if it gives by its very being and makes the impartation from its own essence, what it gives is a subordinate form of its own essence, but what it is, it is more greatly and more perfectly, since everything that gives subsistence to something is superior to the nature of that which subsists. Therefore, that which pre-exists in the giver is superior to what is given; and that which it is, is not the same as it; for the one is primary, the other secondary. For it is necessary either that each be the same and there be one principle for both, or that there be nothing common or the same in both, or that the one be primary, the other secondary. But if the principle is the same, the one would no longer be the cause and the other the effect; nor the one in itself, and the other in the participant; nor the one the agent, and the other the patient. But if they had nothing the same, the one would not subsist by the being of the other, having nothing in common with its being. It remains, therefore, that what it gives, it is primarily, but what is given is secondarily, in those things where being is supplied to the one from the other. 19 Everything that inheres primarily in some nature of beings is present to all those ordered according to that nature in a single principle and in the same way. For if not to all in the same way, but to some and not to others, it is clear that it was not in that nature primarily, but in some primarily, and in others secondarily, those that sometimes participate. For that which sometimes exists and sometimes does not, does not exist primarily nor in itself, but is adventitious and comes from elsewhere to those in which it so exists. 20 Beyond all bodies is the essence of the soul, and beyond all souls is the intellectual nature, and beyond all intellectual hypostases is the One. For every body is movable by another, and is not by nature able to move itself, but by participation in soul it is moved from itself, and lives through soul; and when soul is present, it is in a way self-moved, but when it is absent, it is moved by another, as having this nature in itself, and as soul has obtained a self-moved essence. For to whatever it is present, to this it imparts self-motion; and that which it imparts by its very being, it is itself this much more previously. Therefore it is beyond bodies, as being self-moved in essence, while they become self-moved by participation. Again, the soul, being moved by itself, holds a second rank to the immovable nature and that which subsists immovably in activity; because the self-moved leads all things that are moved, but the immovable leads all things that move. If, therefore, the soul, being moved by itself, moves other things, there must be before it that which moves immovably. But Intellect moves while being immovable and always acting in the same ways. For the soul through Intellect participates in always thinking, just as the body through the soul participates in moving itself. For if always thinking were primarily in the soul, it would belong to all souls, just as moving itself does. Therefore this does not belong primarily to the soul; therefore there must be before it that which is primarily intellectual; therefore before souls is Intellect. But indeed, before Intellect is the One. For Intellect, though immovable, is not one; for it thinks itself and acts concerning itself. And all things that exist in any way participate in the One, but not all participate in Intellect; for to whatever the participation of Intellect is present, these must participate in knowledge, because intellectual knowledge is the first principle and cause of knowing. Therefore the One is beyond Intellect. And beyond the One there is nothing else. For the One and the Good are the same; it is therefore the principle of all things, as has been shown. 21 Every order

ἑαυτό ἐστι, καὶ ἓν ἅμα τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον. ἢ γὰρ μέρει μὲν κινεῖ, μέρει δὲ κινεῖται, ἢ ὅλον κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται, ἢ ὅλον μὲν κινεῖ, μέρει δὲ κινεῖται, ἢ ἔμπαλιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μέρος μὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ κινοῦν, μέρος δὲ ἄλλο τὸ κινούμενον, οὐκ ἔσται καθ' ἑαυτὸ αὐτοκίνητον, ἐκ μὴ αὐτοκινήτων ὑφεστός, ἀλλὰ δοκοῦν μὲν αὐτοκίνητον, οὐκ ὂν δὲ κατ' οὐσίαν τοιοῦτον. εἰ δὲ ὅλον κινεῖ, μέρος δὲ κινεῖται, ἢ ἔμπαλιν, ἔσται τι μέρος ἐν ἀμφοτέροις καθ' ἓν ἅμα κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πρώτως αὐτοκίνητον. εἰ δὲ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται, τὴν τοῦ κινεῖν ἐνέργειαν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἕξει, κινητικὸν ἑαυτοῦ ὄν. πρὸς ὃ δὲ ἐνεργεῖ, πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπέστραπται. πᾶν ἄρα τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν πρώτως πρὸς ἑαυτό ἐστιν ἐπιστρεπτικόν. 18 Πᾶν τὸ τῷ εἶναι χορηγοῦν ἄλλοις αὐτὸ πρώτως ἐστὶ τοῦτο, οὗ μεταδίδωσι τοῖς χορηγουμένοις. εἰ γὰρ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι δίδωσι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας ποιεῖται τὴν μετάδοσιν, ὃ μὲν δίδωσιν ὑφειμένον ἐστὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας, ὃ δέ ἐστι, μειζόνως ἐστὶ καὶ τελειότερον, εἴπερ πᾶν τὸ ὑποστατικόν τινος κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῆς τοῦ ὑφισταμένου φύσεως. τοῦ δοθέντος ἄρα τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ δεδωκότι προ υπάρχον κρειττόνως ἔστι· καὶ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνο μέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ· πρώτως γὰρ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ δευτέρως. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἑκάτερον καὶ ἕνα λόγον ἀμφοτέρων, ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι κοινὸν μηδὲ ταὐτὸν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ἢ τὸ μὲν πρώτως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ δευτέρως. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὸ μὲν αἴτιον εἴη, τὸ δὲ ἀποτέλεσμα· οὐδ' ἂν τὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτό, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ μετασχόντι· οὐδὲ τὸ μὲν ποιοῦν, τὸ δὲ γινόμενον. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἔχοι ταὐτόν, οὐκ ἂν τῷ εἶναι θάτερον ὑφίστατο τὸ λοιπόν, μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἐκείνου κοινωνοῦν. λείπεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν εἶναι πρώτως ὃ δίδωσι, τὸ δὲ δευτέρως ὃ τὸ διδόν ἐστιν, ἐν οἷς αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι θάτερον ἐκ θατέρου χορηγεῖται. 19 Πᾶν τὸ πρώτως ἐνυπάρχον τινὶ φύσει τῶν ὄντων πᾶσι πάρεστι τοῖς κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν φύσιν τεταγμένοις καθ' ἕνα λόγον καὶ ὡσαύτως. εἰ γὰρ μὴ πᾶσιν ὡσαύτως, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μέν, τοῖς δ' οὔ, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει πρώτως, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις μὲν πρώτως, ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ δευτέρως, τοῖς ποτε μετέχουσι. τὸ γὰρ ποτὲ μὲν ὑπάρχον, ποτὲ δὲ μή, οὐ πρώτως οὐδὲ καθ' αὑτὸ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἐπεισοδιῶδές ἐστι καὶ ἀλλαχόθεν ἐφῆκον, οἷς ἂν οὕτως ὑπάρχῃ. 20 Πάντων σωμάτων ἐπέκεινά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχῆς οὐσία, καὶ πασῶν ψυχῶν ἐπέκεινα ἡ νοερὰ φύσις, καὶ πασῶν τῶν νοερῶν ὑποστάσεων ἐπέκεινα τὸ ἕν. πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα κινητόν ἐστιν ὑφ' ἑτέρου, κινεῖν δὲ ἑαυτὸ οὐ πέφυκεν, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μετουσίᾳ κινεῖται ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ζῇ διὰ ψυχήν· καὶ παρούσης μὲν ψυχῆς αὐτοκίνητόν πώς ἐστιν, ἀπούσης δὲ ἑτεροκίνητον, ὡς ταύτην ἔχον καθ' αὑτὸ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ὡς ψυχῆς τὴν αὐτοκίνητον οὐσίαν λαχούσης. ᾧ γὰρ ἂν παραγένηται, τούτῳ μεταδίδωσιν αὐτοκινησίας· οὗ δὲ μετα δίδωσιν αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι, τοῦτο πολλῷ πρότερον αὐτή ἐστιν. ἐπ έκεινα ἄρα σωμάτων ἐστίν, ὡς αὐτοκίνητος κατ' οὐσίαν, τῶν κατὰ μέθεξιν αὐτοκινήτων γινομένων. πάλιν δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ κινουμένη ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς δευτέραν ἔχει τάξιν τῆς ἀκινήτου φύσεως καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀκινήτου ὑφεστώσης· διότι πάντων μὲν τῶν κινουμένων ἡγεῖται τὸ αὐτοκίνητον, πάν των δὲ τῶν κινούντων τὸ ἀκίνητον. εἰ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ κινουμένη ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς τὰ ἄλλα κινεῖ, δεῖ πρὸ αὐτῆς εἶναι τὸ ἀκινήτως κινοῦν. νοῦς δὲ κινεῖ ἀκίνητος ὢν καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐνεργῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ διὰ νοῦν μετέχει τοῦ ἀεὶ νοεῖν, ὥσπερ σῶμα διὰ ψυχὴν τοῦ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἐν ψυχῇ τὸ ἀεὶ νοεῖν πρώτως, πάσαις ἂν ὑπῆρχε ψυχαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἑαυτὴν κινεῖν. οὐκ ἄρα ψυχῇ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει πρώτως· δεῖ ἄρα πρὸ αὐτῆς εἶναι τὸ πρώτως νοητικόν· πρὸ τῶν ψυχῶν ἄρα ὁ νοῦς. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ τὸ ἕν. νοῦς γὰρ εἰ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕν· νοεῖ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ἑαυτόν. καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἑνὸς πάντα μετέχει τὰ ὁπωσοῦν ὄντα, νοῦ δὲ οὐ πάντα· οἷς γὰρ ἂν παρῇ νοῦ μετουσία, ταῦτα γνώσεως ἀνάγκη μετέχειν, διότι ἡ νοερὰ γνῶσίς ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία πρώτη τοῦ γινώσκειν. ἐπέκεινα ἄρα τὸ ἓν τοῦ νοῦ. καὶ οὐκέτι τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄλλο ἐπέκεινα. ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἓν καὶ τἀγαθόν· ἀρχὴ ἄρα πάντων, ὡς δέδεικται. 21 Πᾶσα τάξις