ARTICLE 4

In this article the question is: Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites can be the subject of virtue.

It would seem that they cannot.

             OBJECTIONS:

1. Contraries refer naturally to one and the same subject. But the contrary of virtue is mortal sin, which cannot reside in sensuality, the parts of which are the irascible and concupiscible appetites. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible appetites cannot be the subject of virtue.

             2. Further, habits and their acts belong to the same power. But the principle act of virtue is choice, according to the Philosopher, in the Ethics, which cannot be the act of the irascible or concupiscible appetites. Neither then can virtuous habits dwell in the irascible and concupiscible appetites.

             3. Further, no corruptible thing is the subject of what is enduring or everlasting: thus Augustine proves that the soul is immortal because it is the subject of virtue, which is eternal. But the irascible and concupiscible powers, like the other sense powers, do not remain after the dissolution of the body, as some hold; whereas the virtues remain. For justice is perpetual and immortal, as we are told in Wisd. 1:15, and the same may be said of all the virtues. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible parts cannot be the subject of virtues.

             4. Further, the irascible and concupiscible powers have a bodily organ. If, then, there be virtues in these powers, they must reside in a bodily organ. Hence they could be grasped by the imagination or phantasy: and so would not be perceptible only to the mind. But Augustine says of justice that it is a righteousness perceptible to the mind alone.

             5. But it might be objected that the irascible and concupiscible appetites can be the subject of virtue insofar as they participate to some extent in reason.--On the contrary, the irascible and concupiscible appetites are said to participate in reason inasmuch as by reason they may be ordered. But the order of reason cannot support virtue, since this order is not a subsisting thing. Therefore, neither can the irascible and concupiscible parts, insofar as they participate in reason, be the subject of virtue.

             6. Further, just as the irascible and concupiscible powers, which constitute the sense appetite, are subservient to reason; so also are the sense apprehensive powers. But in no sensitive apprehensive power can virtue reside. Therefore, neither can virtue be found in the irascible and concupiscible powers.

             7. Further, if the order of reason can be participated by the irascible and concupiscible powers, the rebellion against reason of sensuality, which contains these two powers, could be diminished to some extent. But this rebellion is not infinite, for sensuality is a finite power, and there cannot be an infinite act of a finite power. Therefore, this same rebellion could be completely suppressed; for every finite thing will eventually be consumed, if a part of it is taken away a number of times, as the Philosopher states, in the Physics. Thus sensuality could be totally suppressed in this life--which is impossible.

             8. But it might be objected that God, Who infuses virtue, could completely overcome the aforesaid rebellion, and that it is from our part that it may not be totally suppressed.--On the contrary, man is what he is by the fact that he is rational, since by rationality his species is determined. Hence the more what is in man is subject to reason, so much the more does it belong to human nature. Now the lower powers of the soul would be especially subject to reason, if the aforesaid rebellion were completely put down. This would be most agreeable to human nature, and so there is on our part no hindrance to the total suppression of the rebellion under discussion.

             9. Further, for the ratio of virtue it is not sufficient that sin be avoided. For the perfection of justice consists in what the Psalmist urges, Ps. 33:15: "Turn away from evil and do good." But it pertains to the irascible appetite only to detest evil, as we are told in the book De Spiritu et Anima. Therefore, in the irascible part, at least, there can be no virtue.

             10. In the same book (De Spiritu et Anima) we read that by reason the virtues are desired, whereas by the irascible appetite the vices are hated. But the desire for virtue and virtue itself are in the same subject, since each thing desires its own perfection. Therefore, all virtue is in the reason, and not in the irascible and concupiscible parts.

             11. Further, in no power can there be a habit which is merely acted on, and does not act, from the fact that a habit is that by which a man acts when he wills, as the Commentator says, in De Anima. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not act, but are acted upon, because the senses are master of no act, as it says in the Ethics Therefore, there can be no virtuous habit in the irascible and concupiscible appetites.

             12. Further, a proper subject is proportionate to its proper passion. But virtue is proportionate to reason, and not to the irascible and concupiscible parts, which we share in common with the brutes. Therefore, virtue, like reason, is in men alone; hence every virtue is in the rational and not in the irascible and concupiscible parts.

             13. Further, on Rom. 7, the Gloss says: "The law is good, which, when it forbids concupiscence, forbids all evil." Hence all vices pertain to the concupiscible part, wherein concupiscence arises. But virtues and vices claim the same subject. Therefore, virtues are not in the irascible part, although they may be in the concupiscible.

             ON THE CONTRARY:

1. The Philosopher says of fortitude and temperance that they belong to the irrational powers. Now these powers, i.e. the sense appetites, are the irascible and concupiscible, as stated in De Anima. Therefore there can be virtue in the irascible and concupiscible powers.

             2. Further, venial sin disposes to mortal. But the perfection of and the disposition to something are in the same subject. Since, therefore, there may be venial sin in the irascible and concupiscible parts (for the act of sensuality is the first to be aroused, as the Gloss on Rom. 8 notes), so mortal sin can be found there, and consequently, virtue also, which is the contrary of mortal sin.

             3. Further, means and extremes are in the same subject. But virtue is a certain mean between contrary passions; for example, fortitude is a mean between fear and rashness, while temperance is a mean between excess and defect in concupiscible pleasures. Therefore, since these passions are in the concupiscible and irascible appetites, it would seem that virtue may also reside in them.

             I reply: All authorities are in partial agreement on this question, but also in partial conflict among themselves.

             Everyone concedes that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, as temperance in the concupiscible, and fortitude in the irascible appetite. But in this very agreement, there are shades of different opinions.

             Some authors distinguish a two-fold irascible and concupiscible part: one in the higher, and another in the lower part of the soul. For they say that the irascible and concupiscible powers which are in the superior part of the soul, since they pertain to man's nature, can be the subject of virtue; not, however, those powers which reside in the inferior part, because these belong to sensual and brute nature.

             But this position is the subject of another inquiry: whether in the higher part of the soul two powers may be distinguished, one the irascible and the other the concupiscible, properly speaking. Nevertheless, no matter how this question may be answered, we must admit certain virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, which are in the lower appetite, according to what the Philosopher says, in the Ethics. Others also admit this, for it is evidently true.

             Since virtue, as was said above (Art. 1 and 2), denotes the actualization (complementum) of a power, and since a power is ordered to act, human virtue must be assigned to whatever power is a principle of a human act. Now we call an act human, not which may be performed by man in any way whatsoever--for in some acts, plants, brutes, and men share--but which is proper to man. Now among other things, it is proper to man that he be master of his own acts. Consequently, any act of which man is the master is properly a human act; but not those acts over which man has no control, even though they may take place in a man, for example, digestion, and growth, and others of this sort. Therefore, in whatever power there is a principle of an act such as man is master of, human virtue can reside.

             It must be observed that there are three types of principles of acts of this kind. The first is as the primary mover and source of command: this is reason or free will. The second is a moved mover, as the sense appetite, which is moved by the higher appetite when it obeys the latter, and then it in turn moves the external members by its command. The third is a type of principle which is purely passive, in this regard, viz, the external members.

             Both the external member and the lower appetite are moved by the higher part of the soul, but each in a different way. For the external member obeys at the nod of the superior commanding faculty, without any resistance according to the natural order of things, unless there be some impediment: this is evident in the hand and foot. However, the inferior appetite has an inclination proper to its own nature, so that it does not obey at the mere nod of the superior appetite, but sometimes rebels. Hence Aristotle says, in the Politics, that the soul rules the body (the external members) as a despot, as a master rules a slave who has not the power of resisting any command of his master. On the contrary, reason rules the inferior parts of the soul (the lower, sense appetites) with a royal and political sway, i.e. as kings and princes rule over cities of free men, who have the right and power to rebel against some of the precepts of their king or prince.

             It follows then that there is no need in an external member for anything to perfect a human act, besides the (innate) dispositions whereby such a member is, of its very nature, ordered to be moved by reason. But in the lower appetite, which can refuse to obey reason, something is required whereby it may perform without resistance the act which reason commands.

             For if the immediate principle of an act be imperfect, the operation will necessarily be imperfect, no matter how perfect any higher principle may be. Therefore, if the inferior appetite were not perfectly disposed to follow the command of reason, an act proceeding from this appetite, as from its proximate principle, would not be perfectly good, since there would be a certain revolt on the part of the sense appetite. As a result, sadness would overcome the lower appetite because of the violent movement inflicted on it by the higher faculty, as is the case with one who has vehement passion which, nevertheless, he does not indulge, because reason forbids it.

             When, therefore, man has to encounter in his actions objects of the sense appetite, in order that his actions may be good, he needs some disposition or perfection in his sense appetite, whereby it may easily obey reason and this we call virtue.

             Consequently, any virtue which regards those objects which pertain properly to the irascible power, as fortitude concerns fear and daring, magnaminity concerns arduous, hoped-for goods, meekness concerns anger, this virtue is said to reside in the same irascible part as in its subject. When a virtue has to do with the proper objects of the concupiscible appetite it is said to be in the concupiscible appetite as in its subject: as chastity, which regards sexual pleasures, and sobriety and abstinence, which regulate pleasures of food and drink.

             REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Virtue and mortal sin can be considered in two ways: according to the act and according to the habit.

             An act of the concupiscible and irascible powers, if it be looked at in itself, is not a mortal sin; and yet it does concur in an act of mortal sin when, under the movement or consent of reason, it goes after what is contrary to Divine Law. Similarly, the same acts (of the sense appetites) cannot be called virtuous acts, if taken merely in themselves; but only when they concur in obeying the command of reason, are they virtuous. Thus acts of mortal sin and acts of virtue do pertain, in some way, to the irascible and concupiscible powers. Hence habits of the same may be found in both these powers.

             The truth is that, just as a virtuous act consists in the irascible and concupiscible powers' obeying reason; so an act of sin consists in this, that reason is drawn to follow the inclination of the irascible and concupiscible appetite. Hence, frequently, sins of the irascible and concupiscible parts are attributed to reason as to their proximate cause; and, by the same token, virtues of the lower appetites may also be attributed to reason.

             2. There can be no virtuous act on the part of the irascible or concupiscible power independently of reason, as has been pointed out. For the chief element in a virtuous act, namely, choice, belongs to reason; as in any operation the action of the agent is of greater importance than its counterpart (passio) in the patient. Thus, reason commands the irascible and concupiscible powers. Thence we do not say that there is virtue in the irascible or concupiscible appetites to such an extent that the entire virtuous act, or even a greater part of it, is due to them; but only insofar as by a virtuous habit the final perfection of goodness (ultimum complementum bonitatis) is conferred on the virtuous act from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible powers follow the order of reason without any difficulty.

             3. Granted that the irascible and concupiscible parts do not remain actually in the separated soul; still, they do remain radically (radice): for the essence of the soul is the root (radix) of its powers. Similarly, the virtues which are ascribed to the irascible and concupiscible powers remain in the reason radically; for reason is the root of all the virtues, as will be shown later.

             4. There is a certain gradation in forms. Some forms and powers are totally confined to matter, so that every action of theirs is material. This is exemplified in the forms of the elements. But the intellect is completely free of matter, hence its operation is not shared by the body. Finally, the irascible and concupiscible powers stand mid-way between these two extremes. That they make use of a bodily organ is clear from the bodily mutation which accompanies their acts. Again, that they are to some degree above the purely material state is evidenced by the fact that they are moved by the act of command (imperium), and that they obey reason. And so there is virtue in them, insofar as they are elevated above matter and obey reason.

             5. Although the order of reason, in which the irascible and concupiscible powers participate, is not a subsisting thing, nor can it be a subject per se; nevertheless, it can be the reason why something is a subject.

             6. The sense cognitive powers are prior in nature to reason, seeing that reason receives its primary forms from them. However, the sense appetitive powers naturally follow the order of reason, since the inferior appetite is naturally constituted to obey the superior. Thus the order in each instance is the reverse.

             7. The complete rebellion of the irascible and concupiscible appetites against reason cannot be suppressed by virtue, because by their very nature the irascible and concupiscible powers tend to a sensible good, and this is sometimes contrary to the dictate of reason. However this total suppression could be accomplished by Divine power, which is mighty enough even to change natures. Nevertheless, this rebellion is lessened by virtue inasmuch as the aforesaid appetites are trained to be subject to reason. Thus, from the dominion of reason over them, they may enjoy extrinsically that which pertains to reason intrinsically. Yet of themselves they may retain something of their own proper inclinations, which are at times contrary to reason.

             8. Although it is true that in man the principal element is what pertains to reason; still, for the integrity of human nature, there are required, not only reason, but also the lower powers of the soul, and the body itself. Thus, from the condition of human nature left to itself, something rebelling against reason arises in the inferior powers of the soul, because these powers have their own proper tendencies. It was otherwise in the state of innocence, and is otherwise too in the state of glory, where reason enjoys the power, from union with God, of holding perfectly under its sway the lower powers.

             9. To detest evil, as it is said to pertain to the irascible part, implies not only a turning away from evil, but also a certain movement of the irascible power towards the destruction of evil. Such is the case with one who not only flees evil, but is moved to punish evil by destroying it: for this is to do something good. Although the detestation of evil may belong to the irascible and concupiscible powers, this is not the only act which they can elicit. For it also pertains to the irascible power to pursue the arduous good; in which pursuit there are the passions, not only of anger and daring, but also of hope.

             10. We must accept these words, not as they may sound literally, but with a certain allowance. For in every power of the soul there is a desire for its proper good: thus the irascible appetite desires victory, as the concupiscible appetite seeks pleasure. But because the concupiscible appetite is moved towards what is good for the whole animal, simply or absolutely, all desire for good is appropriated to it.

             11. Although, considered in themselves, the irascible and concupiscible powers are acted on and not active; nevertheless, insofar as in man they participate to some extent in reason, they also act, in a certain sense, and are not completely acted upon. So the Philosopher says, in the Politics, that the dominion of reason over these powers is political, for powers of this sort have their own proper movements, wherein they do not entirely obey reason. On the other hand, the rule of the soul over the body is not royal but despotic; because the bodily members obey the mere nod of the soul, as regards movement.

             12. Although these powers are found in brutes, nevertheless, in them they do not participate in reason. Hence in brutes the same powers cannot have moral virtues.

             13. All evils pertain to concupiscence as to their primary fount, but not as to their first principle. For all the passions arise from the irascible and concupiscible parts, as is shown in the tract on the passions of the soul. Even perversity of reason and will often result from passion. Or we might answer that by concupiscence the Apostle means, not only what is proper to the concupiscible appetite, but what is common to the entire appetitive part, in each power of which some concupiscence is found, about which sin can be committed. Nor is it possible to sin otherwise than by concupiscence or desire.