4.  Well, then, if it is evident from whom persecution proceeds, we are able at once to satisfy your doubts, and to decide from these introductory remarks alone, that men should not flee in it.  For if persecution proceeds from God, in no way will it be our duty to flee from what has God as its author; a twofold reason opposing; for what proceeds from God ought not on the one hand to be avoided, and it cannot be evaded on the other.  It ought not to be avoided, because it is good; for everything must be good on which God has cast His eye.  And with this idea has perhaps this statement been made in Genesis, “And God saw because it is good;” not that He would have been ignorant of its goodness unless He had seen it, but to indicate by this expression that it was good because it was viewed by God.  There are many events indeed happening by the will of God, and happening to somebody’s harm.  Yet for all that, a thing is therefore good because it is of God, as divine, as reasonable; for what is divine, and not reasonable and good?  What is good, yet not divine?  But if to the universal apprehension of mankind this seems to be the case, in judging, man’s faculty of apprehension does not predetermine the nature of things, but the nature of things his power of apprehension.  For every several nature is a certain definite reality, and it lays it on the perceptive power to perceive it just as it exists.  Now, if that which comes from God is good indeed in its natural state (for there is nothing from God which is not good, because it is divine, and reasonable), but seems evil only to the human faculty, all will be right in regard to the former; with the latter the fault will lie.  In its real nature a very good thing is chastity, and so is truth, and righteousness; and yet they are distasteful to many.  Is perhaps the real nature on this account sacrificed to the sense of perception?  Thus persecution in its own nature too is good, because it is a divine and reasonable appointment; but those to whom it comes as a punishment do not feel it to be pleasant.  You see that as proceeding from Him, even that evil has a reasonable ground, when one in persecution is cast out of a state of salvation, just as you see that you have a reasonable ground for the good also, when one by persecution has his salvation made more secure.  Unless, as it depends on the Lord, one either perishes irrationally, or is irrationally saved, he will not be able to speak of persecution as an evil, which, while it is under the direction of reason, is, even in respect of its evil, good.  So, if persecution is in every way a good, because it has a natural basis, we on valid grounds lay it down, that what is good ought not to be shunned by us, because it is a sin to refuse what is good; besides that, what has been looked upon by God can no longer indeed be avoided, proceeding as it does from God, from whose will escape will not be possible.  Therefore those who think that they should flee, either reproach God with doing what is evil, if they flee from persecution as an evil (for no one avoids what is good); or they count themselves stronger than God:  so they think, who imagine it possible to escape when it is God’s pleasure that such events should occur.

CAPUT IV.

0106D

Igitur si constat a quo persecutio eveniat, possumus 0107A jam consultationem tuam inducere, et determinare ex hoc ipso praetractatu, fugiendum in persecutione non esse. Si enim persecutio a Deo evenit, nullo modo fugiendum erit quod a Deo evenit. Sicut duplex ratio defendit , quia neque debeat devitari, neque evadi possit quod a Deo evenit. Non debet devitari, quia bonum. Necesse est enim bonum esse omne quod Deo visum est. Et numquid ideo in Genesi sic positum est: Et vidit Deus quia bonum est (Gen. I, pass.); non quod ignoraret bonum esse, nisi vidisset; sed ut hoc sono portenderet bonum esse, quod Deo visum est? Multa quidem sunt, quae a Deo eveniant, et alicujus malo eveniant. Imo bonum est ideo, quia a Deo evenit, ut divinum et rationale. Quid enim divinum non rationale, non bonum? 0107B Quid bonum non divinum? Si autem sensui cujusque videtur, non sensus hominis praejudicat statui, sed status sensui. Status enim uniuscujusque certum quid est, et dat sensui legem, ita sentiendi statum, sicuti est. Si autem statu quidem bonum quod a Deo venit (nihil enim a Deo non bonum, quia divinum, quia rationale), sensui vero malum videtur, erit status in tuto , sensus in vitio. Statu optima res pudicitia, et veritas, et justitia, quae a multorum sensu displicent. Nunquid ideo status sensui addicitur? Ita et persecutio statu bona est, quia divina et rationalis dispositio; sensui eorum vero quorum malo venit, displicet. Vides etiam illud malum rationem apud Deum habere, cum quis in persecutione evertitur de salute, sicut et illud bonum 0107C ratione contingere, cum quis ex persecutione proficit in salute? Nisi si irrationaliter quis aut perit apud Dominum, aut salvus est: is non poterit persecutionem malum dicere, quae etiam in mali parte bonum est , dum ratione administratur. Ita si bonum persecutio quoquo modo, quia de statu constat, merito definimus, quod bonum est, vitari non oportere: quia delictum sit, quod bonum est recusare; eo amplius, quod Deo visum est: jam vero nec posse vitari, quia a Deo evenit, cujus voluntas non poterit evadi. Igitur qui putant fugiendum, aut malum exprobrant Deo, si persecutionem uti malum fugiant; bonum enim nemo devitat; aut fortiores se Deo existimant, qui putant se evadere posse, si Deus tale aliquid voluerit evenire.