Chapter I.—Design of the Treatise. Disavowal of Personal Motives in Writing It.
Chapter II.—Marriage Lawful, But Not Polygamy.
Chapter III.—Marriage Good: Celibacy Preferable.
Chapter IV.—Of the Infirmity of the Flesh, and Similar Pleas.
Chapter V.—Of the Love of Offspring as a Plea for Marriage.
Chapter VI.—Examples of Heathens Urged as Commendatory of Widowhood and Celibacy.
Chapter II.—Of the Apostle’s Meaning in 1 Cor. VII. 12–14.
Chapter III.—Remarks on Some of the “Dangers and Wounds” Referred to in the Preceding Chapter.
Chapter IV.—Of the Hindrances Which an Unbelieving Husband Puts in His Wife’s Way.
Chapter V.—Of Sin and Danger Incurred Even with a “Tolerant” Husband.
Chapter VI.—Danger of Having to Take Part in Heathenish Rites, and Revels.
Chapter III.—Marriage Good: Celibacy Preferable.
But let it not be thought that my reason for premising thus much concerning the liberty granted to the old, and the restraint imposed on the later time, is that I may lay a foundation for teaching that Christ’s advent was intended to dissolve wedlock, (and) to abolish marriage talons; as if from this period onward23 “Jam hinc,” i.e., apparently from the time of Christ’s advent. Prævaricationem. Comp. de Pæn., c. iii.: “Dissimulator et prævaricator perspicaciæ suæ (Deus) non est.” I were prescribing an end to marrying. Let them see to that, who, among the rest of their perversities, teach the disjoining of the “one flesh in twain;”24 Matt. xix. 5, 6. 1 Cor. vii. 12–14, in sense, not verbatim. denying Him who, after borrowing the female from the male, recombined between themselves, in the matrimonial computation, the two bodies taken out of the consortship of the self-same material substance. In short, there is no place at all where we read that nuptials are prohibited; of course on the ground that they are “a good thing.” What, however, is better than this “good,” we learn from the apostle, who permits marrying indeed, but prefers abstinence; the former on account of the insidiousnesses of temptations, the latter on account of the straits of the times.25 1 Cor. vii. Mulieris. Now, by looking into the reason thus given for each proposition, it is easily discerned that the ground on which the power of marrying is conceded is necessity; but whatever necessity grants, she by her very nature depreciates. In fact, in that it is written, “To marry is better than to burn,” what, pray, is the nature of this “good” which is (only) commended by comparison with “evil,” so that the reason why “marrying” is more good is (merely) that “burning” is less? Nay, but how far better is it neither to marry nor to burn? Why, even in persecutions it is better to take advantage of the permission granted, and “flee from town to town,”26 Matt. x. 23; perhaps confused with xxiii. 34. Femina. than, when apprehended and racked, to deny (the faith).27 Comp. de Idol., c. xxiii., and the note there on “se negant.” Comp. Eph. ii. 12, 19. And therefore more blessed are they who have strength to depart (this life) in blessed confession of their testimony.28 i.e., in martyrdom, on the ground of that open confession. Comp. 1 Cor. vii. 15, 16 and Phil. iii. 8, in Vulg., for the word “lucrifieri.” I may say, What is permitted is not good. For how stands the case? I must of necessity die (if I be apprehended and confess my faith.) If I think (that fate) deplorable, (then flight) is good; but if I have a fear of the thing which is permitted, (the permitted thing) has some suspicion attaching to the cause of its permission. But that which is “better” no one (ever) “permitted,” as being undoubted, and manifest by its own inherent purity. There are some things which are not to be desired merely because they are not forbidden, albeit they are in a certain sense forbidden when other things are preferred to them; for the preference given to the higher things is a dissuasion from the lowest. A thing is not “good” merely because it is not “evil,” nor is it “evil” merely because it is not “harmful.”29 Non obest. 1 Cor. vii. 17, inexactly given, like the two preceding citations. Further: that which is fully “good” excels on this ground, that it is not only not harmful, but profitable into the bargain. For you are bound to prefer what is profitable to what is (merely) not harmful. For the first place is what every struggle aims at; the second has consolation attaching to it, but not victory. But if we listen to the apostle, forgetting what is behind, let us both strain after what is before,30 Phil. iii. 13, 14. 1 Cor. vii. 39, not verbatim. and be followers after the better rewards. Thus, albeit he does not “cast a snare31 Laqueum = βρόχον (1 Cor. vii. 35), “a noose,” “lasso” (“snare,” Eng. ver.). “Laqueo trahuntur inviti” (Bengel). i.e., St. Paul, who, as inspired by the Holy Spirit, is regarded by Tertullian as merged, so to speak, in the Spirit. upon us,” he points out what tends to utility when he says, “The unmarried woman thinks on the things of the Lord, that both in body and spirit she may be holy; but the married is solicitous how to please her husband.”32 See note 13. “Exemplum,” a rarer use of the word, but found in Cic. The reference is to 1 Cor. vii. 7. But he nowhere permits marriage in such a way as not rather to wish us to do our utmost in imitation of his own example. Happy the man who shall prove like Paul!
CAPUT III.
Sed non ideo praemiserim de libertate vetustatis et 1278A posteritatis castigatione, aut praestruam Christum separandis matrimoniis et delendis conjunctionibus advenisse, quasi jam hinc finem nubendi praescribam. Viderint, qui inter caetera perversitatum suarum disjungere docent , carnem de duobus unam, negantes eum, qui foeminam de masculo mutuatus, duo corpora ex ejusdem materiae consortio sumpta, rursus in se matrimonii compactione compegit. Denique prohiberi nuptias nusquam omnino legimus, ut bonum scilicet: quid tamen bono isto melius sit, accipimus ab Apostolo, permittente quidem nubere , sed abstinentiam praeferente: illud propter insidias tentationum, hoc propter angustias temporum: qua ratione utriusque pronuntiationis inspecta facile dinoscitur, necessitate nobis concessam esse nubendi potestatem: 1278B quod autem necessitas praestat, depretiat ipsa. Quod denique scriptum est, Melius est nubere quam uri (I Cor., VII, 9), quale hoc bonum est, oro te, quod mali comparatio commendat? Ut ideo melius sit nubere, quia deterius est uri. Atenim quanto melius est neque nubere neque uri! [Sed] etiam in persecutionibus melius est ex permissu fugere de oppido in oppidum, quam comprehensum et distortum negare. Atque ideo beatiores, qui valent beata testimonii confessione excedere. Possum dicere: 1279A quod permittitur bonum non est. Quid enim? Necesse est mori mihi. Si ploro, bonum est, quod si timeo, quod permittitur, suspectam habet permissionis suae caussam: quod autem melius est, nemo permisit, ut indubitatum et sua sinceritate manifestum. Non propterea appetenda sunt quaedam, quia non vetantur, etsi quodammodo vetantur, cum alia illis praeferuntur: praelatio enim superiorum dissuasio est infirmorum . Non ideo quid bonum est, quia malum non est: nec ideo malum non est , quia non obest. Porro plane bonum hoc antecedet, quod non modo non obest, sed insuper prodest. Itaque malle debes, quod prodest, quam quod non obest. Ad primum enim locum certamen omne contendit: secundus solatium habet, victoriam non habet. 1279B Quod si Apostolo auscultamus, obliti posteriorum, extendamur in priora, et meliorum donationum sectatores simus. Si nobis laqueum non imponit, quid utilitatis sit, ostendit, dicens (I Cor., VII, 94): Innupta de dominicis cogitat, uti corpore et spiritu sancta sit. Nupta vero, sollicita est quomodo conjugi suo placeat. Caeterum nusquam ita nuptias permittit, ut non potius ad suum exemplum nos eniti malit. Felicem illum qui Pauli similis extiterit .