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but that man is to be seen in almost all opposites. For where is the God-like quality of the soul? Where is the impassibility of the body? Where is the eternity of life? Short-lived, subject to passion, mortal, prone to every form of suffering in both body and soul, by saying these and similar things and running down our nature, he will think to overthrow the account given concerning man. But so that the argument may in no way be diverted from its sequence, we will also briefly discuss these matters. That human life is now in a wretched state is not sufficient proof that man was never among good things; for since man is the work of God, who through goodness brought this creature into being, no one could reasonably suspect that this one, the cause of whose constitution is goodness, was created in evil by his Maker; but there is another cause for our present circumstances and for our being deprived of more precious things. And again, our starting point for this argument is not outside the consent of our opponents. For He who made man for participation in His own good things and furnished his nature with the starting points for all that is beautiful, so that by each of these the desire might be borne fittingly towards its like, would not have deprived him of the most beautiful and precious of good things, I mean the grace of being without master and self-determining. For if some necessity presided over human life, the image would have been falsified in that respect, having been alienated by its unlikeness to the archetype; for how could that which is yoked and enslaved to certain necessities be called an image of the reigning nature? Therefore, that which is in all respects made like the divine had to have in its nature that which is self-ruling and masterless, so that the participation in good things might be the prize of virtue. Whence then, you will say, did he who was in all things honored with the most beautiful things, take the worse things in exchange for the good? The account of this is also clear. No genesis of evil had its beginning from the divine will; for otherwise vice would be beyond blame, claiming God as its maker and father. But evil somehow arises from within, being constituted by choice at the time when a withdrawal of the soul from the good occurs. For just as sight is an activity of nature, and blindness is a privation of the natural activity, so also is virtue opposed to vice. For it is not possible to conceive of the genesis of vice otherwise than as the absence of virtue. For just as when the light is removed, darkness follows, but is not present when it is there, so, as long as the good is present in nature, vice is something non-existent in itself; but the withdrawal of the better becomes the genesis of its opposite. Since, therefore, this is the property of self-determination, to choose according to one's power what is pleasing, God is not the cause of your present evils, having made your nature masterless and unrestrained, but your thoughtlessness which preferred the worse instead of the better.

6 But you seek, perhaps, also the cause of the error in counsel; for to this the sequence of the argument leads. Therefore again some reasonable starting point will be found for us, which will also clarify this question. We have received such an account from the fathers; and the account is not a mythical narrative, but one that draws its credibility from our very nature. There is a certain two-fold conception among existing things, with contemplation being divided into the intelligible and the sensible. And nothing beyond these could be comprehended in the nature of beings that falls outside of this division. But these are divided from one another by a great interval, so that neither are there sensible marks in intelligible things, nor intelligible ones in sensible things, but each is characterized by its opposites. For the intelligible nature is something bodiless and intangible and formless; while the sensible, according to its very name, is within the scope of comprehension through the senses. But just as in the sensible world itself, although there is much opposition of the elements to one another, a certain harmony has been devised through the

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ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι σχεδὸν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ὁρᾶσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ποῦ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ θεοειδές; ποῦ δὲ ἡ ἀπάθεια τοῦ σώματος; ποῦ τῆς ζωῆς τὸ ἀίδιον; ὠκύμορον, ἐμπαθές, ἐπίκηρον, πρὸς πᾶσαν παθημάτων ἰδέαν κατά τε σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν ἐπι τήδειον, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγων καὶ κατατρέχων τῆς φύσεως, ἀνατρέπειν τὸν ἀποδοθέντα περὶ τοῦ ἀν θρώπου λόγον οἰήσεται. ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν μηδαμοῦ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ὁ λόγος παρατραπείη, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐν ὀλίγοις διαληψόμεθα. τὸ νῦν ἐν ἀτόποις εἶναι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ζωὴν οὐχ ἱκανός ἐστιν ἔλεγχος τοῦ μηδέποτε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐν ἀγαθοῖς γεγενῆσθαι· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ θεοῦ ἔργον ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τοῦ δι' ἀγαθότητα τὸ ζῷον τοῦτο παραγαγόντος εἰς γένεσιν, οὐκ ἄν τις εὐλόγως, οὗ ἡ αἰτία τῆς συστάσεως ἀγαθότης ἐστί, τοῦτον ἐν κακοῖς γεγενῆσθαι παρὰ τοῦ πεποιηκότος καθυποπτεύσειεν· ἀλλ' ἕτερόν ἐστιν αἴτιον τοῦ ταῦτά τε νῦν περὶ ἡμᾶς εἶναι καὶ τῶν προτιμοτέρων ἐρημωθῆναι. ἀρχὴ δὲ πάλιν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἔξω τῆς τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων ἐστὶ συγκαταθέσεως. ὁ γὰρ ἐπὶ μετουσίᾳ τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν ποιήσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ πάντων αὐτῷ τῶν καλῶν τὰς ἀφορμὰς ἐγκατασκευάσας τῇ φύσει, ὡς ἂν δι' ἑκάστου καταλλήλως πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον ἡ ὄρεξις φέροιτο, οὐκ ἂν τοῦ καλλίστου τε καὶ τιμιωτάτου τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπεστέρησε, λέγω δὴ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἀδέσποτον καὶ αὐτεξούσιον χάριτος. εἰ γάρ τις ἀνάγκη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐπεστάτει ζωῆς, διεψεύσθη ἂν ἡ εἰκὼν κατ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος, ἀλλοτριωθεῖσα τῷ ἀνομοίῳ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον· τῆς γὰρ βασιλευούσης φύσεως ἡ ἀνάγκαις τισὶν ὑπεζευγμένη τε καὶ δουλεύουσα πῶς ἂν εἰκὼν ὀνομάζοιτο; οὐκοῦν τὸ διὰ πάντων πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὡμοιωμένον ἔδει πάντως ἔχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸ αὐτο κρατὲς καὶ ἀδέσποτον, ὥστε ἆθλον ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετουσίαν. πόθεν οὖν, ἐρεῖς, ὁ διὰ πάντων τοῖς καλλίστοις τετιμημένος τὰ χείρω τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀντηλ λάξατο; σαφὴς καὶ ὁ περὶ τούτου λόγος. οὐδεμία κακοῦ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ θείου βουλήματος τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔσχεν· ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἔξω μέμψεως ἦν ἡ κακία, θεὸν ἑαυτῆς ἐπιγραφομένη ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα· ἀλλ' ἐμφύεταί πως τὸ κακὸν ἔνδοθεν, τῇ προαιρέσει τότε συνιστάμενον, ὅταν τις ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ γένηται τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναχώρησις. καθάπερ γὰρ ἡ ὅρασις φύσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ πήρωσις στέρησίς ἐστι τῆς φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κακίαν ἀντικαθέστηκεν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως κακίας γένεσιν ἐννοῆσαι, ἢ ἀρετῆς ἀπουσίαν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῦ φωτὸς ὑφαιρεθέντος ὁ ζόφος ἐπηκολούθησε, παρόντος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὕτως, ἕως ἂν παρῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν τῇ φύσει, ἀνύπαρκτόν τί ἐστι καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἡ κακία· ἡ δὲ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀναχώρησις τοῦ ἐναντίου γίνεται γένεσις. ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦτο τῆς αὐτεξουσιότητός ἐστι τὸ ἰδίωμα, τὸ κατ' ἐξουσίαν αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ καταθύμιον, οὐχ ὁ θεός σοι τῶν παρόντων ἐστὶν αἴτιος κακῶν, ἀδέσποτόν τε καὶ ἄνετόν σοι κατασκευάσας τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀβουλία τὸ χεῖρον ἀντὶ τοῦ κρείττονος προελομένη.

6 Ζητεῖς δὲ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τυχὸν τῆς κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν διαμαρτίας· εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ ἀκολουθία τὸν λόγον φέρει. οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἀρχή τις ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ εὔλογον εὑρεθήσεται, ἣ καὶ τοῦτο σαφηνίσει τὸ ζήτημα. τοιοῦτόν τινα λόγον παρὰ τῶν πατέρων διεδεξάμεθα· ἔστι δὲ ὁ λόγος οὐ μυθώδης διήγησις, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν τὸ πιστὸν ἐπαγόμενος. διπλῆ τίς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἡ κατανόησις, εἰς τὸ νοητόν τε καὶ αἰσθητὸν τῆς θεωρίας διῃρημένης. καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν παρὰ ταῦτα καταληφθείη ἐν τῇ τῶν ὄντων φύσει τῆς διαιρέσεως ταύτης ἔξω φερόμενον. διῄρηται δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα πολλῷ τῷ μέσῳ, ὡς μήτε τὴν αἰσθητὴν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς εἶναι γνωρίσμασι, μήτε ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐκείνην, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἑκατέραν χαρακτηρίζεσθαι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ νοητὴ φύσις ἀσώματόν τι χρῆμά ἐστι καὶ ἀναφὲς καὶ ἀνείδεον· ἡ δὲ αἰσθητὴ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα ἐντός ἐστι τῆς διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατανοήσεως. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ αἰσθητῷ κόσμῳ, πολλῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν στοιχείων οὔσης ἐναντιώσεως, ἐπινενόηταί τις ἁρμονία διὰ τῶν