OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative science, but defined what seemed right by conjecture. e. From the same discourse. But we say that for something to come to be from being or not-being, or for not-being or being to do or suffer something or to become some particular thing, in one way differs in no way from a physician doing or suffering something or from something being or becoming from a physician; so that since this is said in two or more ways, it is clear that also coming to be from being and being either doing or suffering. A physician, then, builds, not insofar as he is a physician but insofar as he is a builder, and he becomes white, not insofar as he is a physician but insofar as he is black; but he heals and becomes a non-physician, insofar as he is a physician. Since we say most properly that a physician does or suffers something, or becomes something from a physician, if he does or suffers these things insofar as he is a physician, it is clear that also 'to come to be from not-being' means this: 'insofar as it is not-being'. This they, not having made this distinction, abandoned, and through this ignorance they were further ignorant to such an extent that they thought nothing else comes to be or is, but they eliminated all generation. But we ourselves also say that nothing comes to be from not-being simply, but nevertheless that it does come to be from not-being, for instance, incidentally; for it comes to be from privation, which is in itself not-being, not being immanent. And this is marveled at and seems thus impossible, for something to come to be from not-being. And likewise, not from being nor does being come to be, except incidentally; and thus this also comes to be in the same way, as if an animal were to come to be from an animal, and a particular animal from a particular animal, for instance if a dog were to come to be from a horse. For the dog would come to be not only from a particular animal, but also from an animal, but not insofar as it is an animal; for this already exists; but if something is to become an animal not incidentally, it will not be from an animal, and if something is being, it will not be from being nor from not-being. For 'from not-being' has been said by us to mean this: 'insofar as it is not-being'. Furthermore, we do not eliminate everything being or not being. If 'it is possible for something to be generated neither from that which is simply nor from that which is simply not' is common both to those who eliminate generation out of inexperience and ignorance, and to him who corrected those who were mistaken, how has generation not been eliminated according to the one who made the correction, just as it was eliminated according to those who were mistaken? If it is impossible for something to be generated incidentally from being and from not-being, without the generation of that which is generated in itself being preconceived—for instance, it is impossible for the physician to become white unless the black becomes white, and it is impossible for the physician to build unless the builder builds, if the physician is black and a builder—how does something come to be incidentally from being and from not-being, when nothing preceding it is generated in itself? If first there is the animal, and later the animal from an animal and the particular animal from a particular animal, and for the generation of the animal from an animal there underlies the seed, which is an animal in potentiality, but not

·ηθέντος περὶ τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι φιλοσόφων, ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην περὶ τῶν ὄντων τοὺς λόγους μὴ πεποιηκότων, ἀλλ' εἰκασμῷ τὸ δοκοῦν διορισαμένων. ε. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τὸ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ μὴ ὄντος γίνε σθαι, ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἢ τὸ ὂν ποιεῖν τι ἢ πάσχειν ἢ ὁτιοῦν τόδε γίγνεσθαι, ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ τὸ τὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖν τι ἢ πάσχειν ἢ ἐξ ἰατροῦ εἶναί τι ἢ γίνεσθαι· ὥστε ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο διχῶς ἢ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἐξ ὄντος καὶ τὸ ὂν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Oἰκοδομεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁ ἰατρός, οὐχ ᾗ ἰατρὸς δὲ ἀλλ' ᾗ οἰκοδόμος, καὶ λευκὸς γίνεται, οὐχ ᾗ ἰατρὸς ἀλλ' ᾗ μέλας· ἰατρεύει δὲ καὶ ἀνία τρος γίνεται, ᾗ ἰατρός. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μάλιστα λέγομεν τὸν ἰα τρὸν κυρίως ποιεῖν τι ἢ πάσχειν ἢ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἰατροῦ, ἐὰν ᾗ ἰατρὸς ταῦτα ποιῇ ἢ πάσχῃ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὄντος γίγνεσθαι τοῦτο σημαίνει, τὸ ᾗ μὴ ὄν. Ὅπερ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐ διελόντες ἀπέστησαν, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιαν τοσοῦτον προσηγνόησαν, ὥστε μηθὲν οἴεσθαι γίγνε σθαι μήτ' εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἀνελεῖν πᾶσαν τὴν γέ νεσιν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ αὐτοί φαμεν γίνεσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ὅμως μέντοι γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς στερήσεως, ὅ ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ ἐνυπάρχοντος γίνεται. Θαυμάζεται δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀδύνατον οὕτω δοκεῖ, γίγνεσθαί τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. Ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἐξ ὄντος οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν γίγνεσθαι, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, οἷον εἰ ἐκ ζώου ζῶον ἂν γίνοιτο καὶ ἐκ τινὸς ζώου τι ζῶον, οἷον εἰ κύων ἐξ ἵππου γίγνοιτο. Γίγνοιτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν οὐ μόνον ἐκ τινὸς ζώου ὁ κύων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ ζώου, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ζῶον· ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο· εἰ δέ τι μέλλοι γίγνεσθαι ζῶον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐκ ἐκ ζώου ἔσται, καὶ εἴ τι ὄν, οὐκ ἐξ ὄντος οὐδὲ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. Τὸ γὰρ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἴρηται ἡμῖν τί σημαίνει, ὅτι ᾗ μὴ ὄν. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἅπαν ἢ μὴ εἶναι οὐκ ἀναιροῦμεν. Eἰ τὸ Μήτε ἐκ τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὄντος μήτε ἐκ τοῦ ἁπλῶς μὴ ὄντος δυνατόν ἐστι γενέσθαι τι κοινόν ἐστι τῶν ἐξ ἀπειρίας τε καὶ ἀγνοίας ἀναιρούντων τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ τούτου τοῦ τοὺς σφαλλομένους διορθωσαμένου, πῶς οὐκ ἀνῄρηται ἡ γένεσις κατὰ τὸν διορθωσάμενον, ὡς ἀνῄρηται κατὰ τοὺς σφαλλομέ νους; Eἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι γενέσθαι τι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐξ ὄντος καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, μὴ προεπινοουμένης τῆς γενέσεως τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ γιγνομένου, οἷον ἀδύνατον τὸν ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι λευκὸν μὴ τοῦ μέλανος λευκοῦ γιγνομένου, καὶ ἀδύνατον τὸν ἰατρὸν οἰκοδομεῖν μὴ τοῦ οἰκοδόμου οἰκοδομοῦντος, ἐὰν ᾖ μέλας καὶ οἰκοδόμος ὁ ἰατρός, πῶς γίνεταί τι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐξ ὄντος καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, μηδενὸς προηγουμένως καθ' αὑτὸ γιγνομένου; Eἰ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ζῶον, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ ζῶον ἐκ ζώου καὶ τό τι ζῶον ἐκ τινὸς ζώου, καὶ τῇ μὲν γενέσει τοῦ ζώου ἐκ ζώου ὑπόκειται τὸ σπέρμα, τῇ δυνάμει μὲν ζῶον, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐ