OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, according to the faith of the orthodox, of those who have known God here and according to the testimony of the respondent. Therefore the respondent, making his argument against what is for us the greatest evil, should not have extended it to what is for the Manichaeans the greatest evil; for this is a sign of ignorance and a lack of proof, as has been said. But he allows us to do the evils which we voluntarily choose, not because of the weakness of his power, but so that our free will and his long-suffering might be shown, without which neither we could be human nor he good in the present state of affairs. But if it is God himself who made the things here, it is clear that with the same God remaining both hereafter and always, the same things will be. For what he was able to do long ago, he is also able to do now. But if he is now able to do something more than before, such power of his will be temporal, which is absurd; for what is temporal is perishable. Of those things of which is said 'having made,' of these is also said 'he has made' and 'he will make,' and as they are equivalent to each other, their interchange is unhindered; but 'having made' precedes 'he will make' by natural necessity, which things are indicative of the two extremes of time. And he who has the two extremes of time, that is, the past and the future, must also have that which is between the extremes of time, that is, the present. And since 'having made' has a temporal emphasis, of necessity God too, 'having made' the things here according to the word of the respondent, has made them in time. But God, having made the things here, made the imperishable and the perishable; for these are parts of the things here. Therefore it is clear that the respondent reasonably applied 'having made' to God, but unreasonably distinguished the perishable from the imperishable by what is temporal, since they are not distinguished from each other by the word 'having made,' if indeed he made the perishable and the imperishable. If, then, he who says concerning God that 'he will make' the new creation says this in terms of an acquisition of temporal power, then he who says concerning him 'having made' will also be saying it in terms of an acquisition of temporal power, if indeed 'having made' everywhere precedes 'he will make'; but if, 'having made,' he did not make it through an acquisition of temporal power, then neither will 'he make' it through an acquisition of temporal power. But if, being able long ago to prevent this greatest evil, he did not prevent it, he would be envious; which it is impious even to imagine. Therefore it is necessary for the same one, remaining over the same things, to do the same things. That on account of ignorance of God men are impious in many ways, if they are ignorant of the truly existing God, we have shown in the preceding. For either they reject God, depriving him of his own glory, and falsely honor gods who do not exist with his names and realities, or they suppose the creation and providence of the world to belong to creators warring with one another, or with the name of the unbegotten, which alone is fitting for the

δημιουργὸς καὶ θεὸς ἔταξε τὴν ἡμέραν, καθ' ἣν πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐξ ἀπιστίας τε καὶ ἀπειθείας τοῦ θεοῦ κα κῶν ποιεῖ τὴν ἀναίρεσιν κατὰ τὴν πίστιν τῶν ὀρθοδόξων, τῶν ἐνταῦθα ἐπεγνωκότων τὸν θεὸν καὶ κατὰ τὴν μαρτυρίαν τοῦ ἀποκριναμένου. Oὐκ ἐχρῆν οὖν τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον, πρὸς τὸ καθ' ἡμᾶς μέγιστον κακὸν ἔχοντα τὸν λόγον, πρὸς τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Μανιχαίους μέγιστον κακὸν ἀποτείνεσθαι· ἀγνοίας γὰρ τοῦτο σημεῖον καὶ ἀπορίας ἐλέγχου, καθὰ εἴρηται. Συγχωρεῖ δὲ ἡμᾶς πράττειν ἃ ἑκουσίως αἱρούμεθα κακά, οὐ διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως, ἀλλ' ἵνα τὸ ἡμῶν αὐθαίρετον καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ μακρόθυμον δειχθῇ, ὧν χωρὶς οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἄν θρωποι οὔτε αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἐνεδέχετο εἶναι ἐπὶ τῆς παρούσης καταστάσεως. Eἰ δὲ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὰ τῇδε, δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ μένοντος καὶ ἐς ὕστερον καὶ ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ ἔσται. Ἂ γὰρ πάλαι ἠδύνατο καὶ νῦν δύναται. Eἰ δὲ νῦν πλέον τι δύναται παρὰ τὸ πρὸ τοῦ, ἔγχρονος αὐτοῦ ἔσται ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· τὸ γὰρ ἔγχρονον φθαρτόν. Ἐφ' ὧν λέγεται τὸ ποιήσας, ἐπὶ τούτων λέγεται καὶ τὸ πεποίηκε καὶ τὸ ποιήσει, καὶ ὡς ἰσοδυναμούντων ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ μετάληψις ἀκώλυτος· προηγεῖται δὲ τὸ ποιήσας τοῦ ποιήσει φυσικῇ ἀνάγκῃ, ἅτινά ἐστι σημαντικὰ τῶν δύο ἄκρων τοῦ χρό νου. Τὸν δὲ ἔχοντα τὰ δύο ἄκρα τοῦ χρόνου, τουτέστι τὸ παρεληλυθὸς καὶ τὸ μέλλον, ἀνάγκη ἔχειν καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν ἄκρων τοῦ χρόνου, τουτέστι τὸ ἐνεστώς. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ χρονικὴν ἔχει ἔμφασιν τὸ ποιήσας, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ὁ θεός, ποιήσας τὰ τῇδε κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ ἀποκριναμένου, ἐν χρόνῳ αὐτὰ πε ποίηκεν. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσας ὁ θεὸς τὰ τῇδε τὰ ἄφθαρτα καὶ τὰ φθαρτὰ ἐποίησε· μέρη γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν τῇδε. ∆ιὸ δῆλον ὅτι εὐλόγως μὲν ἔθηκεν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ ποιήσας, ἀλόγως δὲ τῷ ἐγχρόνῳ τὰ φθαρτὰ τῶν ἀφθάρτων διέστειλε, τῶν τῇ τοῦ ποιήσας φωνῇ ἀλλήλων μὴ διαστελλομένων, εἴγε ἐποίησε τὰ φθαρτὰ καὶ τὰ ἄφθαρτα. Eἰ τοίνυν ὁ λέγων περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ ποιήσει τὴν ἀνάκτισιν κατὰ πρόσληψιν λέγει τῆς ἐγχρόνου δυνάμεως, ἔσται ἄρα καὶ ὁ λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ ποιή σας κατὰ πρόσληψιν λέγων τῆς ἐγχρόνου δυνάμεως, εἴγε ἡγεῖται πανταχοῦ τὸ ποιήσας τοῦ ποιήσει· εἰ δὲ ποιήσας οὐ κατὰ πρόσ ληψιν ἐποίησε τῆς ἐγχρόνου δυνάμεως, οὐδ' ἄρα ποιήσει κατὰ πρόσληψιν τῆς ἐγχρόνου δυνάμεως. Eἰ δέ, δυνάμενος καὶ πάλαι κωλῦσαι τοῦτο τὸ μέγιστον κακόν, οὐκ ἐκώλυσε, φθονερὸς ἂν εἴη· ὅπερ ἀσεβὲς καὶ φαν τάζεσθαι. ∆εῖ οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μένοντα τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν. Ὅτι ἕνεκεν ἀγνοίας θεοῦ πολυτρόπως ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, εἰ τὸν ὄντως ὄντα θεὸν ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ἐδείξαμεν. Ἢ γὰρ ἀθετοῦσι τὸν θεόν, ἀποστεροῦντες αὐτὸν τῆς ἰδίας δόξης, καὶ τοὺς οὐκ ὄντας θεοὺς τοῖς ἐκείνου ὀνό μασι καὶ πράγμασι ψευδῶς τιμῶσιν, ἢ τὴν δημιουργίαν τε καὶ πρόνοιαν τοῦ κόσμου ὑποτιθέασιν εἶναι μαχομένων ἀλλήλοις δημιουργῶν, ἢ τῷ τοῦ ἀγενήτου ὀνόματι, μόνῳ πρέποντι τῷ