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15 For one must know that both good and evil are spoken of in two ways; for good in the proper sense is said to be that which has been gifted from the God who is good by nature. Just as all light is illuminated by the sun or fire, so every good thing has its existence from the indefinite and incomprehensible ocean of goodness and, whatever is from God, is good in the proper and true sense. But that which appears pleasant to our sense and our desire is called good not in the proper sense, but improperly and according to our custom, which for a time pleases, but later yields a bitter fruit, coming into being contrary to the law of the creator and seeming to be good, which is not good, but properly evil. And evil likewise; for evil in the proper sense is and is said to be that which comes into being contrary to the law of the creator. That which is painful and grievous according to our perception is called evil not in the proper sense, but according to our custom, which for the present brings pains, but later gives forth the fruit of salvation and everlasting joy. 16 But say: Is the principle of everything one or two, for example, is the principle and cause of the soul one or two? Manichaean: One. For if there were two, how could one and the same thing proceed from two contraries? For things that are complete contraries have an incommunicable activity; for how can the immaterial soul be from the immaterial and matter? Or how could contraries that are not in agreement produce the same thing? For things contrary by nature are completely incommunicable. Orthodox: You have spoken well; is there one principle for each of all existing things? Manichaean: In every way. Orthodox: Is 'to be' the principle of the two principles according to you, or are the two principles the principles of 'to be'? Manichaean: For to what does this lead? Orthodox: If 'to be' is the principle of the two principles according to you, behold, there is one principle and not two. For if 'to be' is the principle of being, then it is in one principle; for I do not mean being of such a kind, that is, being evil or good, but simply 'to be' itself. If, therefore, 'to be' is the principle of the two principles according to you, there is one principle and not two. But if the principles according to you are the principles of 'to be', there will be two contraries of the same thing. For just as substance, simply speaking, being one, is receptive of different qualities, and on this account many substances are spoken of, so also 'to be' simply is one, even if, being observed in different things, it paronymously causes many existing things to be named from itself. I define, therefore, that the activity of contraries is completely incommunicable, not from two principles is 'to be', especially contrary ones, but from one. For 'to be' is not the cause of that which is; for 'to be' did not pre-exist that which is. For in what was it observed? But 'to be', being observed in the unoriginated being, subsists in it and from it as from a cause. There is, therefore, one principle of 'to be', and its contrary does not exist. 17 And again: Is the principle of the motion of each existing thing one or two—existential, temporal, local, and active—existential, that is, of the genesis of each thing, -temporal, that is, from what time it began, -local, that is, from what place things that begin from a place began, - active, that is, from which activity the thing being activated acts, for instance, the first existence of man, and from what time he came to be and from what place he began to move, to walk for example, and of the activity of walking? Manichaean: One. Orthodox: You have spoken truly; for it is impossible for there to be two principles for the existence of one thing. Manichaean: It is so. Orthodox: Is this observed in each of the existing things or not? Manichaean: In each of all existing things. Orthodox: Therefore, what is observed in each of all things, will also be observed in all things in common, for example, what each man has, all humanity also has, such as to live and to reason, and what each substance has, the common substance also has, such as being self-subsistent and not having its being in another. Thus, therefore, if each of the existing things is constituted from one principle, all existing things are also constituted from one principle and not from two, and there will not be two principles, but one.

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15 Χρὴ γὰρ εἰδέναι, ὡς διττῶς λέγεται τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ κυρίως λέγεται τὸ ἐκ τοῦ φύσει ἀγαθοῦ θεοῦ δεδωρημένον. Ὥσπερ πᾶν φῶς ἐξ ἡλίου ἤτοι πυρὸς φωτίζεται, οὕτω πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀορίστου καὶ ἀκαταλήπτου πελάγους τῆς ἀγαθότητος τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχει καί, ὅσα παρὰ θεοῦ, ἀγαθὰ κυρίως καὶ ἀληθῶς. Λέγεται δὲ ἀγαθὸν οὐ κυρίως, ἀλλὰ καταχρηστικῶς καὶ καθ' ἡμετέραν συνήθειαν τὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡμῶν καὶ τῇ ἐφέσει φαινόμενον ἡδύ, ὃ πρὸς καιρὸν μὲν τέρπει, ὕστερον δὲ πικρὸν καρπὸν ἀποδίδωσι, παρὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ κτίσαντος γινόμενον καὶ δοκοῦν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ κυρίως κακόν. Καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὁμοίως· κυρίως μὲν κακὸν ἔστι καὶ λέγεται τὸ παρὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ κτίσαντος γινόμενον. Λέγεται κακὸν οὐ κυρίως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν συνήθειαν τὸ καθ' ἡμετέραν αἴσθησιν ἐπίπονον καὶ ἀλγεινόν, ὅπερ πρὸς μὲν τὸ παρὸν ὀδύνας, ὕστερον δὲ καρπὸν σωτηρίας καὶ ἀεννάου εὐφροσύνης ἀναδίδωσιν. 16 Εἰπὲ δέ· Ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγματος μία ἢ δύο, οἷον ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τῆς ψυχῆς μία ἢ δύο; Μανιχαῖος· Μία. Εἰ γὰρ δύο, πῶς ἐκ δύο ἐναντίων ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ προέρχεται; Τὰ γὰρ παντελῶς ἐναντία ἀκοινώνητον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐνέργειαν· πῶς γὰρ ἡ ἄυλος ψυχὴ ἐξ ἀύλου καὶ ὕλης ἔσται; Ἢ πῶς τὸ αὐτὸ τὰ ἐναντία παρήγαγον μὴ ὁμονοήσαντα; Παντελῶς γὰρ ἀκοινώνητα τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἐναντία. Ὀρθόδοξος· Καλῶς ἔφης· ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων πάντων μία ἀρχή; Μανιχαῖος· Παντὶ τρόπῳ. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τὸ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν δύο ἀρχῶν τῶν κατὰ σέ ἐστιν ἢ αἱ δύο ἀρχαὶ ἀρχαὶ τοῦ εἶναι; Μανιχαῖος· Πρὸς τί γὰρ συντείνει τοῦτο; Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ μὲν τὸ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν κατὰ σὲ δύο ἀρχῶν, ἰδοὺ μία ἀρχὴ καὶ οὐ δύο. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τοῦ εἶναι, ἐν μιᾷ οὖν ἀρχῇ· οὐ γὰρ τὸ τοιῶσδε εἶναί φημι, τουτέστι κακὸν εἶναι ἢ καλόν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι. Εἰ οὖν τὸ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν κατὰ σὲ δύο ἀρχῶν, μία ἀρχὴ καὶ οὐ δύο. Εἰ δὲ αἱ κατὰ σὲ ἀρχαὶ ἀρχαὶ τοῦ εἶναι, ἔσονται δύο ἐναντία τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἁπλῶς οὐσία μία οὖσα δεκτική ἐστι διαφόρων ποιοτήτων καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο λέγονται πολλαὶ οὐσίαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι ἕν ἐστι, εἰ καὶ ἐν διαφόροις θεωρούμενον πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα παρωνύμως ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ κατονομάζεσθαι. Ὁρίσω οὖν ἀκοινώνητον παντελῶς εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἐκ δύο ἀρχῶν τὸ εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναντίων, ἀλλ' ἐκ μιᾶς. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι αἴτιον τοῦ ὄντος· οὐ γὰρ προῆν τὸ εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος. Ἐν τίνι γὰρ ἐθεωρεῖτο; Ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἀνάρχῳ ὄντι τὸ εἶναι θεωρούμενον, ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὡς αἰτίου ὑφέστηκε. Μία οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ταύτης οὐκ ἔστι. 17 Καὶ πάλιν· Ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων κινήσεως μία ἢ δύο, ὑπαρκτική τε καὶ χρονικὴ καὶ τοπικὴ καὶ ἐνεργητική-ὑπαρκτικὴ μὲν τῆς ἑκάστου γενέσεως, -χρονικὴ δέ, ἀφ' οὗ χρόνου ἤρξατο, -τοπικὴ δέ, ἀφ' οὗ τόπου ἤρξατο τὰ ἀπὸ τόπου ἀρχόμενα, - ἐνεργητικὴ δέ, ἐξ ἧς ἐνεργείας ἐνεργεῖ τὸ ἐνεργούμενον, οἷον ἡ πρώτη ὕπαρξις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἀφ' οὗ χρόνου ἐγένετο καὶ ἀφ' οὗ τόπου ἤρξατο κινεῖσθαι, βαδίζειν τυχόν, καὶ τῆς βαδιστικῆς ἐνεργείας; Μανιχαῖος· Μία. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ἀληθῶς ἔφης· ἀδύνατον γὰρ δύο ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ὑπάρξεως. Μανιχαῖος· Οὕτως ἔχει. Ὀρθόδοξος· Τοῦτο ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων θεωρεῖται ἢ οὔ; Μανιχαῖος· Ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων. Ὀρθόδοξος· Ὅπερ οὖν ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ἁπάντων θεωρεῖται, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων κοινῶς θεωρηθήσεται, οἷον, ὅπερ ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχει, καὶ πᾶσα ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἔχει, ὡς τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ λογίζεσθαι, καὶ ὅπερ ἑκάστη οὐσία ἔχει, καὶ ἡ κοινὴ οὐσία ἔχει, ὡς τὸ αὐθύπαρκτον καὶ μὴ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ εἰ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐκ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς συνέστηκε, καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐκ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς συνέστηκε καὶ οὐκ ἐκ δύο, καὶ οὐκ ἔσονται δύο ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ μία.