ARTICLE 5

In this article the question is: Whether the will is the subject of virtue.

It would seem that it is.

             OBJECTIONS:

1. A greater perfection is required in one who commands, that he may do so rightly, than in one who obeys, that he may rightly fulfill a command. The reason for this is that the one who carries out a command is ordered by the one who commands. But the will is related to a virtuous act as commanding it, whereas the irascible and concupiscible powers are the faculties which obey its command and perform the act. Since there is virtue in the irascible and concupiscible powers, as in a subject, it would seem that, a fortiori, there should be virtue in the will.

             2. It might be objected that the natural inclination of the will to good suffices for its rectitude. We naturally desire the end; hence there is no need of our being rectified by an added virtuous habit.--On the contrary, the will is concerned, not only with the ultimate end, but with other ends as well. As regards these other ends, the will can desire them either rightly or wrongly: Good men present good ends to themselves; bad man seek evil ends. Thus we read in the Ethics; "Such as each man is, so does the end seem to him." Therefore, for the rectitude and perfection of the will, a virtuous habit is required.

             3. Further, in the cognitive part of the soul there is natural knowledge, namely, of principles; and with respect to this knowledge there is in us the intellectual virtue of understanding, which is the habit of first principles. Consequently, there should be some virtue in the will with respect to that to which it is naturally inclined.

             4. Further, just as there is moral virtue to regulate the passions, as temperance and fortitude; so also there is virtue with regard to operations, namely, justice. Now the will acts without any passion, while the irascible and concupiscible powers operate from passion. Therefore, just as there is moral virtue in the irascible and concupiscible appetites, so also in the will.

             5. Further, in the Ethics, the Philosopher says that love or friendship arises from a passion. But friendship is the result of choice, and the love which is without passion is an act of the will. Since, therefore, friendship may be either with or without passion, according to the Ethics, it would seem that there is virtue in the will, as in a subject.

             6. Further, charity is the most excellent (potissima) of the virtues, as the Apostle declares, in 1 Cor. 13:13. But only the will can be the subject of charity, for the lower concupiscible appetite, which extends only to sensible goods, cannot be its subject. Therefore, the will is the subject of virtue.

             7. Further, according to Augustine, we are immediately united to God especially by our will. But that which unites us to God is virtue. Therefore, it would seem that there is virtue in the will as in a subject.

             8. Further, happiness is in the will, according to Hugh of St. Victor. Now virtues are certain dispositions to happiness. But since a disposition to and the perfection of anything reside in the same subject, it would seem that virtue resides in the will, as in a subject.

             9. Further, according to Augustine, it is the will by which we sin or live righteously. But a righteous life derives from virtue. Hence Augustine remarks in Contra Iulianum, that virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously. Therefore, there is virtue in the will.

             10. Further, contraries refer naturally to the same subject. Now the contrary of virtue is sin. Therefore, since every sin lies in the will, as Augustine says, it would seem that virtue is in the same faculty.

             11. Further, human virtue should be assigned to that part of the soul which is proper to man. But the will is proper to man, as also the reason, as being closer to reason than are the irascible and concupiscible powers. But since the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subjects of virtue, it would seem that, a fortiori, so is the will.

             ON THE CONTRARY

1. Every virtue is either intellectual or moral, as we learn from the Philosopher, at the end of I Ethics. Moral virtue has for its subject that which is rational, not by its essence, but by participation; whereas intellectual virtue has for its subject what is rational in its essence. Since the will falls under neither type of subject: because it is neither a cognitive power, which is rational in its essence, nor does it belong in the irrational part of the soul, which is rational only by participation; it would seem that the will can in no way be the subject of virtue.

             2. Further, there should not be many virtues ordered to the same act. But this would be the case, if the will were the subject of virtue; because it has been shown (in the preceding Art.) that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers; and, since in some sense the will is concerned with the acts of these powers, it would have to follow that there were certain virtues in the will which ordered these same acts. Therefore, it must be admitted that the will is not the subject of virtue.

             I reply: By a virtuous habit the power which possesses it acquires the perfection of its act. Hence no virtuous habit is necessary for an act to which a power is inclined by its very nature. For virtue ordains powers to good; it is virtue which makes one who possesses it good and renders his operation good.

             Now what virtue effects in other powers, the will enjoys by its very nature: for its object is the good. The will tends towards good in the same manner as the concupiscible appetite tends towards what is pleasurable, and as hearing is keyed to sound. Hence the will does not need any virtuous habit, inclining it to the good which is proportionate to it, because it tends towards this by its very nature as a power. However, it does need a virtuous habit to pursue the good which exceeds its proportions as a power.

             Since the appetite of every subject tends to the good proper to that subject, a good can exceed the proportion of the will in two ways: first, by reason of the species, secondly, by reason of the individual.

             A good may exceed the proportion of the will to its object by reason of the species of man, so that the will must be elevated to tend to this good, which exceeds the limits of human good: and by human I mean what man is capable of by his own natural powers. Now the Divine good is above human good, and to this Divine good the will of man is elevated by charity and by hope.

             A good may also exceed a man's natural capacity by reason of the man as an individual, in this sense, that he seeks that which is good for another man, although his will is not carried beyond the limits of human good. Thus justice and all the virtues which regard a man's dealings with others, as liberality and the rest, perfect the will. For justice is "another's good," as the Philosopher says in the Ethics.

             Consequently, there are two virtues which have the will as their subject, and these are charity and justice. A sign of this is that, although these virtues pertain to the appetite, still they do not regard the passions, as do temperance and fortitude, from which it is clear that they do not reside in the sense appetite, where the passions are found, but in the rational appetite, which is the will, and in which there are no passions. For every passion is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in the Physics. For the same reason, those virtues which control the passions, as fortitude with respect to fear and daring, and temperance as regards the concupiscible pleasures, must be in the sensitive appetite. Nor is it necessary that there be any virtue in the will as regards those passions, because the good in them is what is according to reason. Now the will is naturally ordained to this good, by its very constitution as a power, since the good of reason is the proper object of the will.

             REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. The judgment of reason is sufficient for the will's commands; for the will naturally desires what is good according to reason, as the concupiscible appetite desires sensible pleasure.

             2. The natural inclination of the will tends not only towards the ultimate end, but also to good presented to it by reason. For the object of the will is understood good, to which this faculty is naturally ordered, as any power is to its object, which is the good proper to it, as was said above (in the body of the Art.). Yet a man may sin as regards this very object, insofar as the judgment of reason is clouded by passion.

             3. Knowledge is had through an intentional species. The intellectual power is not sufficient by itself for knowing, but must receive a species from sensible objects. Consequently, we need a habit even for those things which we know naturally, a habit which in some way begins in the senses, as it says at the end of II Posterior Analytics. But the will is unlike the intellect in this respect, because it does not need any species in order to will.

             4. The virtues which regulate the passions are in the lower appetite. No virtue is required in the higher appetite for these passions, for the reason already stated (in the body of the Art.).

             5. Friendship is not properly a virtue, but consequent upon virtue. From the fact that a man is virtuous, it follows that he loves those like himself. But it is otherwise with charity, which is a certain friendship with God, elevating man to what surpasses his natural good. Hence charity is in the will, as we have said (in the body of the Art.).

             From what has been said, the answer to the sixth and seventh objections is evident, for the virtue which unites the will to God is charity.

             8. Certain things are required as dispositions for happiness, such as acts of the moral virtues, by which impediments to happiness are removed: impediments such as mental disquietude, resulting from the passions and from external disturbances.

             Complete beatitude consists essentially in an act of the reason or intellect. For the happiness of contemplation is nothing other than the perfect contemplation of supreme Truth; whereas the happiness of the active life is an act of prudence by which a man governs himself and those around him.

             In beatitude there is an added perfection, namely delight, which perfects happiness as beauty graces youth, as we are told in the Ethics. This added perfection pertains to the will. If we are speaking of heavenly beatitude, which is promised to the saints, it is charity which perfects the will and orders it to the perfection of happiness.

             But if we are speaking of the happiness of contemplation, which the philosophers have treated, the will is ordered to this sort of delight by natural desire. Thus it is evident that all the virtues need not reside in the will.

             9. It is by the will, which commands all our acts, both virtuous and vicious, that we both live righteously and sin; but not as though it were the will which elicited all of these acts. Hence it is not necessary that the will be the proximate subject of every virtue.

             10. Every sin is traceable to the will as to its cause insofar as every sin is committed with the will's consent. But it need not follow that every sin be in the will as in its subject, for gluttony and lust are in the concupiscible appetite, while pride is in the irascible.

             11. From the propinquity of the will to reason, it happens that the will is in harmony with reason by its very nature as a power. Hence it does not need an added virtue for this, as do the inferior powers, namely, the irascible and concupiscible.

             In reply to the first objection raised On the Contrary, it must be said that charity and hope, which are in the will, are not included in this division of the Philosopher's; for they are of another class of virtues, called the theological virtues. But justice is one of the moral virtues; for the will, like other appetites, participates in reason insofar as it is directed by reason. Although the will belongs to the same nature as the intellective part, still, it does not pertain to the power of reason itself.

             To the second objection On the Contrary, it must be replied that there need be no virtue in the will as regards those acts for which there is virtue in the irascible and concupiscible parts, for the reason given above (in the body of the Art.).