Article V

THE fifth question is: Is there any created spiritual substance that is not united to a body?

And it would seem not. 1 For Origen says in I Peri Archon [VI, PG XI, 170]: "It is proper to God alone, that is, to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost that . . . He be understood to exist without any addition of a corporeal union." Therefore no created spiritual substance can exist that is not united to a body.

2 Furthermore, Pope Paschal says [Decret. II, 7, C. I, q. iii] that spiritual things cannot subsist apart from corporeal things. Therefore it is not possible for spiritual substances to exist that are not united to bodies.

3 Furthermore, Bernard in Super Canticum [sermo V, PL CLXXXIII, 800] says: "It is clear that every created spirit . . . needs bodily comfort." Now it is obvious that, since nature does not fall short in what is necessary, much less does God. Therefore no created spirit is found without a body.

4 Furthermore, if any created spiritual substance is entirely dissociated from a body, it must be above time, for time does not go beyond corporeal things. But created spiritual substances are not entirely above time. For since they have been created from nothingness and consequently take their beginning from change, they must be subject to change in such a way that they can lapse into non-being unless held together by some other being. Now that which can lapse into non-being is not wholly above time. For it can be at one time and not be at another. Therefore it is not possible for any created substances to be without bodies.

5 Furthermore, the angels assume certain bodies. Now the body assumed by an angel is moved by it. Since, then, being moved locally presupposes sensation and life, as is clear from II De Anima [2-3], it would seem that the bodies assumed by angels have sensation and life, and so they are naturally united to bodies; and yet as regards the angels it would seem that they especially are free from bodies. Therefore there is no created spiritual substance which is not united to a body.

6 Furthermore, an angel is naturally more perfect than a soul. Now that which lives and gives life is more perfect than that which merely lives. Since, then, the soul lives and gives life to the body by the fact that it is its form, for all the greater reason it would seem that an angel not only lives but is also united to the same body to which it gives life; and thus we reach the same conclusion as before.

7 Furthermore, it is obvious that angels know singular things; otherwise it would be pointless to assign them to men as guardians. Now they cannot know singular things through universal forms, because in that event their knowledge would be the same with reference to the past and to the future, and this in spite of the fact that to know the future belongs to God alone. Accordingly angels know singular things through particular forms, which require corporeal organs wherein they may be received. Therefore angels have corporeal organs united to themselves; and thus it would seem that no created spirit is entirely free from a body.

8 Furthermore, the principle of individuation is matter. Now angels are individuals of a sort; otherwise they would not have actions of their own; for to act is characteristic of particular individuals. Since, then, they do not have matter of which they are constituted, as was said above, they seem to have matter wherein they exist, namely, the bodies to which they are united.

9 Furthermore, since created spirits are finite substances, they must be in a definite genus and species. Accordingly there is to be found in them the universal nature of a species. Now they do not receive their individuation from this universal nature itself. Therefore there must be something additional whereby they are individuated. Now this cannot be anything material which would enter into the composition of an angel, since angels are immaterial substances, as was said above. It must be the case, therefore, that some corporeal matter is added to them, whereby they are individuated; and thus we reach the same conclusion as before.

10 Furthermore, created spiritual substances are not merely matter, because in that case they would be in potency only and would not have any action; and in the second place they are not composed of matter and form, as was shown above [Art. I]. The only remaining alternative then is that they are merely forms. Now it is essential to a form that it be an act of matter to which it is united. It would seem, therefore, that created spiritual substances are united to corporeal matter.

11 Furthermore, when things are alike the same judgment is passed on them. But some created spiritual substances are united to bodies. Therefore all are.

But on the other hand there is i what Dionysius says in the fourth chapter [lec. 1] of De Divinis Nominibus, that angels are "incorporeal and immaterial."

ii Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in VIII Physica [5, 256b 20], if any two things are found connected, one of which can be found without the other, the second also must be found without the first. Now we do find a moved thing that is a mover, and hence, if something is moved but is not a mover, there is also to be found something that is a mover but not moved. But there is to be found something composed of bodily and of spiritual substance. Since, then, a body can be found that is without a spirit, it would seem that some spirit can be found that is not united to a body.

iii Furthermore, Richard of St. Victor [De Trinitate III, 9, PL CXCVI, 921] argues as follows: in the divine order several persons are found in one nature, whereas in the human order one person is found in two natures, namely, in soul and in body. Therefore something intermediate is also to be found, namely, that one person is in one nature; and this would not be the case if a spiritual nature were united to a body.

iv Furthermore, an angel is in an assumed body. If, therefore, another body were naturally united to it, it would follow that two bodies would be in the same place at the same time, which is impossible. Therefore, there are some created spiritual substances which do not have bodies naturally united to themselves.

ANSWER. It must be said that, because our knowledge has its beginning from sensation and sensation belongs to corporeal things, from the beginning men searching out the truth were able to grasp only corporeal nature, to such an extent that the first natural philosophers used to think that nothing existed but bodies; and hence they also used to say that the soul itself is a body. The Manichaean heretics, who thought that God is a kind of corporeal light extended over infinite space, also seem to have followed them. So too the Anthropomorphites, who fabricated God as a being formed with the features of the human body, surmised that nothing existed beyond bodies.

But later philosophers, transcending corporeal things in a rational way through the intellect, arrived at a knowledge of incorporeal substance. First among these was Anaxagoras who, because he asserted that from the beginning all corporeal things were mixed together, was forced to assert, in addition to the corporeal, something incorporeal and unmixed, which would differentiate and move corporeal things. And this he used to call "mind", which differentiates and moves all things, and we call it God. Plato, however, employed another way of asserting incorporeal substances. For he thought that prior to being which participates, something abstract and unparticipated should be asserted. And hence, since all bodies that can be sensed participate in those things which are predicated of themselves, namely, generic and specific natures and the natures of the other predicates universally applied to them, he asserted natures of this sort, abstracted from what is sensible and self-subsistent, and these he called "separated substances."

Aristotle, however [Met. XII, 8, 1073a], proceeded to assert separated substances as a result of the perpetuity of the movement of the heavens. For one must assign some end for the movement of the heavens. Now, if the end of a given movement is not always constant in its mode of being, but it is moved of itself or accidentally, the movement must necessarily be lacking in uniformity. And hence the natural movement of heavy or of light bodies becomes stronger when it gets nearer to the state of "being in its proper place". Now we see that in the movements of heavenly bodies uniformity is always preserved, and from this he concluded to the perpetuity of the uniform movement. Accordingly he had to assert that the end of this particular movement was something that is not moved either of itself or accidentally. Now every body or anything else which is in a body is movable either of itself or accidentally. Thus, therefore, he had to posit some substance entirely separated from a body, which would be the end of the movement of the heavens.

Now the three positions mentioned above seem to differ in this respect: that Anaxagoras, on the basis of the principles laid down by him, did not consider it necessary to posit more than one incorporeal substance. Plato, however, considered it necessary to posit many substances that were mutually ordered according to the number and order of genera and species and of the other things which he posited as abstracts. For he posited a first abstract, which would be essentially the good and the one, and after that the different orders of intelligible things and of intellects. As for Aristotle, he posited several separated substances. For, since there appear in the heavens many movements of which he asserted that every one was uniform and perpetual and for each and every movement there had to be a proper end, and since the end of a movement of this sort ought to be an incorporeal substance, the consequence was that he posited many incorporeal substances, mutually ordered according to the nature and order of the movements of the heavens. Nor did he proceed further in asserting them, because it was characteristic of his philosophy not to depart from obvious data.

But those ways are not very suitable for us, because we do not assert with Anaxagoras the mixing of sensible things, nor with Plato the separateness of universals, nor with Aristotle the perpetuity of movement. Hence we must proceed by other ways to a demonstration of the point proposed.

First then it is apparent that there are some substances wholly free from bodies, in consequence of the perfection of the universe. For the perfection of the universe seems to be such that it does not lack any nature which can possibly exist, and this is why [Genesis I] each thing is said to be good, and all things together exceedingly good. Now it is obvious that if there are any two things, one of which does not depend on the other on the basis of its own character, it is possible for the one to be found apart from the other: thus, for instance, "animal" on the basis of its own character does not depend on "rational". And hence it is possible to find animals that are not rational. Now it is characteristic of substance to be self-subsistent, and it does not depend in any way on the character of "body", since the character of "body" is somehow related to certain accidents (namely, dimensions) by which subsistence is not caused. Therefore the only remaining alternative is that after God, Who is not included in any genus, there are to be found in the genus "substance" some substances which are free from bodies.

In the second place, the same consideration can be arrived at in consequence of the orderly arrangement of things, which is found to be such that we cannot go from one extreme to the other except through intermediates: thus, for instance, fire is found immediately beneath "heavenly body", and beneath this air, and beneath this water, and beneath this earth, following the sequence of the nobility and subtility of these bodies. Now at the topmost summit of things there is a being which is in every way simple and one, namely, God. It is not possible, then, for corporeal substance to be located immediately below God, for it is altogether composite and divisible, but instead one must posit many intermediates, through which we must come down from the highest point of the divine simplicity to corporeal multiplicity. And among these intermediates, some are corporeal substances that are not united to bodies, while others, on the contrary, are incorporeal substances that are united to bodies.

Thirdly, the same is apparent from the special character of the intellect. For understanding is obviously an activity which cannot take place by means of the body, as is proven in III De Anima [4, 429ab]. And hence the substance whereof this is an activity must have actual being that does not depend on the body, but is raised above the body, for the activity of each thing corresponds to its being. If, therefore, some understanding substance is united to a body, it will not be so united insofar as it understands, but on some other basis; thus it was said above that it is necessary for the human soul to be united with a body insofar as it lacks the activities which are exercised through the body to make its intellectual activity complete, seeing that it understands by abstracting from phantasms. Actually this latter is something accidental to intellectual activity, and it pertains to its imperfection to get knowledge from things which are intelligible only in potency; just as it pertains to the imperfection of the sight of the bat that it has need to see in the dark. Now whatever is accidentally connected with a thing is not found with it in all cases. Besides, it must be the case that, prior to an imperfect being in a given genus, there is to be found a perfect being in that genus, because the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, as act is prior to potency. The only remaining alternative, then, is that one must posit some incorporeal substances that are not united to a body, as not needing a body for intellectual activity.

As to the first argument, therefore, it must be said that on this point the quotation from Origen is not acceptable; because he makes many erroneous statements in that book, following the views of the ancient philosophers.

As to the second, it must be said that Paschal is speaking of spiritual things with which temporal things are connected, and with the buying or selling of these latter, spiritual things themselves are understood to be bought or sold. For spiritual rights or consecrations do not have a subsistence of their own apart from the corporeal or temporal things that are connected with them.

As to the third, it must be said that every created spirit needs bodily comfort: some for their own sake, such as rational souls; others for our sake, such as the angels, who appear to us in assumed bodies.

As to the fourth, it must be said that created spiritual substances, as regards their actual being, are said to be measured by eternity (aevo), although their movements are measured by time, according to Augustine's statement in IV Super Genesi ad Litteram [VIII, 22, 43], "that God moves the spiritual creation during time." And as for the statement that created spiritual substance can be changed into non-being (non esse), this has no reference to any potency existing in them, but to a power of the agent. For, just as before they existed they were able to exist only through the power of an agent, so, when they do exist, they can cease to exist only through the power of God, Who can take away His conserving hand. But in them there is no potency for non-being, such that they may be measured by time in the way in which things that can be moved, even though they are not moved, are measured by time.

As to the fifth, it must be said that to be moved locally by an intrinsic and conjoined moving power does presuppose sensation and life. But the bodies assumed by angels are not moved in this fashion; and hence the argument does not follow.

As to the sixth, it must be said that to live and give life as an efficient cause does is more noble than merely to live. But to give life as a formal cause does is characteristic of a substance less noble than one which lives with a subsistence of its own apart from a body. For the being of that intellectual substance which is the form of the body is rather something that is lowest and nearest to a corporeal nature, inasmuch as it can be communicated to it.

As to the seventh, it must be said that angels know particular things through universal forms, which are the likenesses of the ideal characters whereby God knows both universal things and singular things. Nevertheless they need not know the singulars which will exist, which have not yet participated in the nature and the form which is represented through the species of the angelic intellect. Now it is otherwise with the divine intellect, which, established in the eternal present, has a full view of all time in a single glance.

As to the eighth, it must be said that matter is the principle of individuation, inasmuch as it has not the natural capacity of being received in something else. But forms which have the natural capacity of being received in a subject cannot by themselves be individuated; because so far as their own character is concerned, it is a matter of indifference to them whether they are received in one or in many. But if there be a given form which is not able to be received in something, it has individuation from this very fact, because it cannot exist in many, but remains in itself by itself. And hence Aristotle in VII Metaphysica [14, 1039a 30] argues against Plato that if the forms of things are abstracts, they must be singular.

As to the ninth, it must be said that in things composed of matter and form the element of individuality adds to the specific nature a definite amount of matter and the individual accidents. But in the case of separated forms the element of individuality does not really add anything to the specific nature, because in such forms the essence of the form is the self-subsistent individual itself, as the Philosopher makes clear in VII Metaphysica [ibid.]. Nevertheless it does add something conceptually, namely, the character of not being able to exist in many.

As to the tenth, it must be said that substances which are separated from bodies are merely forms; yet they are not acts of any matter. For, although matter cannot exist without form, yet form can exist without matter, because matter has existence through a form, and not vice versa.

As to the eleventh, it must be said that a soul, because it is the lowest among spiritual substances, has a greater affinity than higher substances with corporeal nature, so that it is able to be its form.