LESSON I

[iii. 1. 1274b32-2. 1275b33]

             348 After having examined the forms of government according to the teaching of others in Book II, the Philosopher begins to treat of them according to his own opinion. This section is divided into two parts. In the first, he manifests the diversity of regimes. In the second, he teaches how to set up the best regime, in the beginning of Book VII. The first part is divided into two parts. In the first, he distinguishes the regimes. In the second, he treats of each one in particular, in Book IV. The first part is divided into two parts. In the first, he determines what pertains to the regime in general. In the second, he divides the regimes. The first part is divided into two parts. In the first, he states his intention. In the second, he carries out his proposal. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he shows that, in order to treat of regimes, one must first deal with the city. Secondly, he shows that, in order to treat of the city, one must consider what a citizen is.

             349 He says then, first of all, that he who wishes to study the regime and determine what each regime is according to its proper nature, and what kind of regime it is, namely, whether it is good or bad, just or unjust, must first consider what a city is. He proves this by two reasons, the first of which is that there may be some doubt concerning this point. For some people are in doubt whether certain transactions were effected by the city when, for example, they were accomplished by a tyrant or by the rich men of the city; in which case some say that the city acted, while others say that it was not the city but the rich rulers or even the tyrant. Thus there seems to be a question whether the rich rulers alone constitute the city; and because there is a question, it must be elucidated. The second reason is that the whole aim of those who treat of regimes and legislation revolves around the city, for the regime is nothing other than the order of the inhabitants of the city.

             350 Then he shows that we must treat of the citizen for two reasons, the first of which is as follows. In everything that is composed of a multiplicity of parts, one must first consider the parts. The city is a certain whole made up of citizens who are, as it were, its parts, since the city is nothing other than a certain [122] multiplicity of citizens. Hence in order to arrive at a knowledge of the city, one must consider what a citizen is. The second reason is that concerning this point, too, there happens to be a difficulty; for not everyone is in agreement as to what a citizen is. Sometimes a common man, who is a citizen in a popular regime, where the people govern, is not reckoned a citizen under a rule of the few, where the rich govern, because it is often such that the people have no role to play in it. Hence it is evident that there is a controversy concerning the citizen, who is a citizen, and who should be called a citizen.

             351 Then he carries out his aim. This section is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows what a citizen is. In the second, he shows what virtue makes a good citizen. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he determines what a citizen is. Secondly, he raises certain difficulties in this connection. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he shows what a citizen is according to virtue. Secondly, he rules out a certain false notion. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he sets down certain ways according to which some people are citizens in a qualified sense but not absolutely. Secondly, he shows what a citizen is absolutely speaking.

             352 He says then, first of all, that for the present we must exclude those who are called citizens in a certain way, that is to say, metaphorically or by comparison, for these are not really citizens.

             The first way is by residence. People are not said to be truly citizens by the fact that they reside in a city, for foreigners and slaves reside in a city and yet they are not citizens absolutely speaking.

             The second way is that some people may be called citizens because they are subject to the jurisdiction of the city. Thus they share in the justice of the city in that at times they obtain a favorable verdict and at other times they are judged, that is to say, condemned. But this is also true of people who are bound by contracts and who are not citizens of the same city. In certain cities, however, foreigners do not share perfectly in this justice, like the citizens, but must present a sponsor, that is to say, someone who vouches for their obedience to the law, if they wish to litigate. Hence it is clear that outsiders share imperfectly in the interchange of justice and so, in this respect, they are not citizens absolutely speaking but can be called citizens in a qualified sense.

             Likewise also, in a third sense, we call children citizens, even though they have not yet been enlisted among the ranks of the citizens, and we call old men citizens, even though they have already been dropped from the rolls since they can no longer discharge the functions of citizens. We do not refer to either group as citizens absolutely speaking but only with some qualification: to the children as imperfect citizens, and to old men as people who have gone beyond the limit required by the condition of citizens. Or if some other such qualification is added, it makes no difference, for what we are trying to say is obvious: we are now asking what a citizen is absolutely and without any qualification that would be needed in order to set forth correctly the meaning of the word "citizen."

             There is a fourth way, in which we encounter the same difficulty and the same solution, and that concerns fugitives and disreputable persons, who are citizens in a qualified sense but not absolutely.

             353 Then he shows what a citizen is absolutely speaking; and in this connection he does three things. First, he sets down a certain definition of the citizen. Secondly, he shows that this definition is not common to any regime. Thirdly, he shows how it may be amended so that it will become common.

             He says then, first of all, that there is no better way of defining the citizen absolutely speaking than by the fact that he shares in the administration of justice in the city, so that he has the power to judge in certain matters and possesses some authority in the affairs of the city.

             We must bear in mind, however, that there are two kinds of rules. Some rules are limited to a definite period of time. Thus in certain cities the same man is not allowed to hold the same office twice, or else he may hold it for a limited time, exercising a certain office for one year, for example, after which he may not be appointed to the same office for another three or four years. The other rule is that which is not limited to a certain period of time but can be exercised by one man for any length of time, as, for example, that of the praetor, who has the authority to judge certain cases, and that of the speaker, who has the authority to express his opinion in the public assembly. It may happen, however, that some such judges or speakers are not called rulers and, for this reason, it may be argued that they do not have any authority by which they may judge or address the assembly. But this is irrelevant, for the difficulty is one of words only. We do not find any name common to the judge and to the member of the assembly. Let us then give their office a name and call it "indeterminate office." Thus we assert that the men who share in this rule are citizens. This seems to be a better definition of the citizen absolutely speaking.

             354 Then he shows that this definition of the citizen is not common to all regimes. He says that it must be made clear that in all matters where individual subjects differ [123] according to species and where one of them is first by nature, another second, and so on, either nothing is common to them absolutely, in so far as they are such, as in the case of equivocal names, or else there is something common, but only faintly and obscurely, that is to say, in some small measure. Now regimes, as we shall see later, differ according to species. Some of them are prior and others posterior; for those that are ordered according to right reason take precedence over the others, while those that are corrupt and violate the right order of the regime are by nature posterior to noncorrupt regimes, just as in any genus the perfect is by nature prior to the corrupt. Just how some regimes are perversions of the right order will become clear later on.

             Hence the notion of citizen must necessarily vary with different regimes. For that reason, the definition of the citizen given above applies above all to the popular state, in which anyone among the people has the authority to judge in certain matters and to address the assembly. In other regimes, however, it sometimes happens that any citizen has this authority, but this is not necessarily so, for in some of them the people do not have any authority, nor is the assembly of the people taken into account but only others who have been especially summoned and these alone, divided into groups, judge certain cases. In Sparta, for example, the ephors judge the cases that arise among fellow-citizens and others pass sentence on other matters, and different groups judge different cases. The elders rule on homicide and other magistrates used to rule on other matters. This is also the case among the Carthaginians, for all matters are judged by certain magistrates and so the common citizens have no part in the judgment. Hence in such regimes the notion of citizen proposed above does not apply.

             355 Then he amends the aforesaid definition of the citizen. He says that this definition can be rectified so as to become common, for in regimes other than the popular state the member of the assembly and the praetor do not hold office for an indeterminate period; rather, these two functions pertain only to those who hold office for a determinate period; for it belongs to some of them or even to all of them to judge and to deliberate either in some matters or in all matters.

             From this one can see clearly what a citizen is. He is not the one who participates in the administration of justice or in the assembly but the one upon whom the deliberative or judicial function can be conferred. For those who cannot be appointed to such offices seem to have no share in the government and hence do not appear to be citizens.

             Finally, he infers from this that a city is nothing other than a large number of persons such as these, who are called citizens, [associated] in such a way that they can live self-sufficiently in an absolute sense. For a city is a self-sufficient society, as was said in Book I.

             356 Then he rejects a certain definition of the citizen that has some currency. He says that some people, in accordance with their custom, define the citizen as he who is born of parents both of whom are citizens, and not one only, whether it be the father or the mother. Others further require that, in order to be a citizen, one trace his ancestry back to the second or third generation and even beyond. If a citizen is so defined politically, that is to say, in accordance with the custom of certain cities, and summarily, and prior to any proper investigation, there arises a problem as to how this third or fourth ancestor was a citizen. For, according to this definition, one will not be able to call him a citizen unless his ancestry, too, is traced back to a citizen of the third or fourth generation, and so we would have an infinite regress. But this is impossible because a regime does not regress to infinity. Hence it is obvious that we must arrive at such citizens who were not born of citizens.

             In this connection, he reports a saying of Gorgias, a Sicilian of Leontini, who said something regarding the aforesaid definition, either because he was not sure of the truth or because he was speaking ironically, namely, that just as mortars are things that are made by craftsmen who are mortar-makers, so Larissaeans are persons who are made, that is to say, begotten, by other Larissaeans, who are makers of Larissaeans. But this statement is naive and senseless, for if some people share in the regime according to the definition that we have given, we have to say that they are citizens even if they were not born of citizens. Otherwise, this definition that they give could not be applied to the first men who built or settled the city and who were clearly not born of citizens of that city. Hence it would follow that neither they nor, consequently, their descendants were citizens, which is absurd.