LESSON 3

The Nature and Goal of Metaphysics

Chapter 2: 982b 11-983a 23

             27. That this is not a practical science is evident from those who first philosophized. For it is because of wonder that men both now and formerly began to philosophize, wondering at first about less important matters, and then progressing little by little, they raised questions about more important ones, such as the phases of the moon and the courses of the sun and the stars and the generation of the universe. But one who raises questions and wonders seems to be ignorant. Hence the philosopher is also to some extent a lover of myth, for myths are composed of wonders. If they philosophized, then, in order to escape from ignorance, they evidently pursued their studies for the sake of knowledge and not for any utility.

             28. And what has happened bears witness to this; for when nearly all the things necessary for life, leisure and learning were acquired, this kind of prudence began to be sought. It is evident, then, that we do not seek this knowledge for the sake of any other necessity.

             29. But just as we say that a man is free who exists for himself and not for another, in a similar fashion this is the only free science, because it alone exists for itself.

             30. For this reason, too, it might rightly be thought that this science is not a human possession, since in many respects human nature is servile.

             31. Hence, according to Simonides, "Only God has this honor," and it is unfitting that a man should not seek a knowledge which befits him. Some poets accordingly say that the deity is naturally envious; and it is most likely that it should happen in this case, and that all those who are imperfect are unfortunate. But it is not fitting that the deity should be envious, for as the proverb says: "The poets tell many lies."

             32. Nor must we think that any other science is more honorable than this. For what is most divine is most honorable. But then it alone will be such, and in two ways. For of all knowledge that which God most properly has is divine; and if there is any such knowledge, it is concerned with divine matters. But this science alone has both of these characteristics; for God seems to be a cause and in some sense a principle according to all men; and such [knowledge as this] God either alone has, or has in the highest degree. Therefore, all the other sciences are more necessary, but none is more excellent.

             33. But it is necessary in a sense to bring to a halt the progression of this science at the contrary of our original questions. Indeed, as we have said, all men begin by wondering whether things are as strange as chance occurrences appear to those who do not yet know the cause; or by wondering about the changes in the course of the sun, or about the incommensurability of the diagonal [of a square]. For it would seem an object of wonder to all if something having the nature of number were immeasurable. But it is necessary to advance to the contrary view and, as the proverb says, the worthier one, as also happens in a sense in these matters when men have learned them. For nothing would surprise a geometrician more than if the diagonal [of a square] should become commensurable [with a side]. It has been stated, then, what the nature is of the science which we are seeking, and what its goal is for which our search and whole method must be undertaken.

COMMENTARY

             52. Having indicated the things with which this science deals, Aristotle now shows what kind of science it is. In regard to this he does two things. First (27:C 53), he reveals the dignity of this science; and second (33:C 66), the goal which it attempts to reach ("But it is necessary").

             In regard to the first he does four things. First, he shows that this is not a practical science but a speculative one; second (29:C 58), that it is free in the highest degree ("But just as we say"); third (30:C 60), that it is not a human [possession] ("For this reason"); and fourth (32:C 64), that it is the most honorable science ("Nor must we think that").

             He proves the first in two ways. First, by an argument, and second (28:C 57), by an example ("And what has happened").

             53. First (27), he gives this argument. No science in which knowledge itself is sought for its own sake is a practical science, but a speculative one. But that science which is wisdom, or philosophy as it is called, exists for the sake of knowledge itself. Hence it is speculative and not practical. He proves the minor premise in this way. Whoever seeks as an end to escape from ignorance tends toward knowledge for itself. But those who philosophize seek as an end to escape from ignorance. Therefore they tend towards knowledge for itself.

             54. That they seek to escape from ignorance is made clear from the fact that those who first philosophized and who now philosophize did so from wonder about some cause, although they did this at first differently than now. For at first they wondered about less important problems, which were more obvious, in order that they might know their cause; but later on, progressing little by little from the knowledge of more evident matters to the investigation of obscure ones, they began to raise questions about more important and hidden matters, such as the changes undergone by the moon, namely, its eclipse, and its change of shape, which seems to vary inasmuch as it stands in different relations to the sun. And similarly they raised questions about the phenomena of the sun, such as its eclipse, its movement and size; and about the phenomena of the stars, such as their size, arrangement, and so forth; and about the origin of the whole universe, which some said was produced by chance, others by an intelligence, and others by love.

             55. Further, he points out that perplexity and wonder arise from ignorance. For when we see certain obvious effects whose cause we do not know, we wonder about their cause. And since wonder was the motive which led men to philosophy, it is evident that the philosopher is, in a sense, a philomyth, i.e., a lover of myth, as is characteristic of the poets. Hence the first men to deal with the principles of things in a mythical way, such as Perseus and certain others who were the seven sages, were called the theologizing poets. Now the reason why the philosopher is compared to the poet is that both are concerned with wonders. For the myths with which the poets deal are composed of wonders, and the philosophers themselves were moved to philosophize as a result of wonder. And since wonder stems from ignorance, they were obviously moved to philosophize in order to escape from ignorance. It is accordingly evident from this that "they pursued" knowledge, or diligently sought it, only for itself and not for any utility or usefulness.

             56. Now we must note that, while this science was first designated by the name wisdom, this was later changed to the name philosophy, since they mean the same thing. For while the ancients who pursued the study of wisdom were called sophists, i.e., wise men, Pythagoras, when asked what he professed himself to be, refused to call himself a wise man as his predecessors had done, because he thought this was presumptuous, but called himself a philosopher, i.e., a lover of wisdom. And from that time the name "wise man" was changed to "philosopher," and "wisdom" to "philosophy." This name also contributes something to the point under discussion, for that man seems to be a lover of wisdom who seeks wisdom, not for some other reason, but for itself alone. For he who seeks one thing on account of something else, has greater love for that on whose account he seeks than for that which he seeks.

             57. And what has happened (28).

             Here he proves the same point by means of an example. The statement (he says) that wisdom or philosophy is not sought for any utility but for knowledge itself is proved by "what has happened," i.e., by what has occurred in the case of those who have pursued philosophy. For when nearly all those [arts] were discovered which are necessary for life, "leisure" (i.e., for the sort of pleasure which consists in a life of ease), and learning, such as the logical sciences, which are not sought for themselves but as introductions to the other arts, then man began for the first time to seek this kind of prudence, namely, wisdom. And from this it is clear that wisdom is not sought because of any necessity other than itself but for itself alone; for no one seeks something which he already possesses. Hence, because wisdom was sought after all other knowledge had been discovered, it is evident that it was not sought for some reason other than itself but for itself.

             58. But just as (29).

             Here he proves the second attribute, namely, that wisdom is free; and he uses the following argument: that man is properly said to be free who does not exist for someone else but for himself. For slaves exist for their masters, work for them, and acquire for them whatever they acquire. But free men exist for themselves inasmuch as they acquire things for themselves and work for themselves. But only this science exists for itself; and therefore among all the sciences only this science is free.

             59. Now we must note that this can be understood in two ways. In one way, the expression "only this" may indicate every speculative science as a class. And then it is true that only this class of science is sought for itself. Hence, only those arts which are directed to knowing are called free [or liberal] arts, whereas those which are directed to some useful end attained by action are called mechanical or servile arts. Understood in another way, the expression may specifically indicate this philosophy or wisdom which deals with the highest causes; for the final cause is also one of the highest causes, as was stated above (26:C 51). Therefore this science must consider the highest and universal end of all things. And in this way all the other sciences are subordinated to it as an end. Hence only this science exists in the highest degree for itself.

             60. For this reason (30).

             Here he proves the third attribute, namely, that this science is not a human [possession]. In regard to this he does two things. First (30:C 60), he proves his thesis. Second (31:C 61), he criticizes an erroneous view held by certain men ("Hence, according to Simonides").

             He proves his thesis by the following argument. A science which is free in the highest degree cannot be a possession of that nature which is servile and subordinate in many respects. But human nature is servile "in many respects," i.e., in many ways. Therefore this science is not a human possession. Now human nature is said to be servile insofar as it stands in need of many things. And on this account it happens that man sometimes neglects what should be sought for its own sake because of the things necessary for life. Thus it is said in Book III of the Topics that it is better to philosophize than to become wealthy, although sometimes becoming wealthy is more desirable, that is, to one lacking life's necessities. From this it is clear that that wisdom is sought for itself alone which does not belong to man as his proper possession. For man has as his possession what he can have at his command and use freely. But that science which is sought for itself alone, man cannot use freely, since he is often kept from it because of the necessities of life. Nor again is it subject to man's command, because man cannot acquire it perfectly. Yet that very small part of it which he does have outweighs all the things known through the other sciences.

             61. Hence, according to Simonides (31).

             Here he rejects the error of a certain poet, Simonides, who said that it is proper to God alone to have the honor of desiring that knowledge which ought to be sought for its own sake and not for the sake of something else. But it is not fitting that man should not seek that knowledge which is in keeping with his own condition, namely, that which is directed to the necessities of life required by man.

             62. Now Simonides' error came from that of certain poets who said that the Deity is envious, and that since He is envious He does not desire that the things which pertain to His honor should be shared by all. And if God is envious of men in other things, He is rightly more so in this case, i.e., in the case of the science which is sought for its own sake, which is the most honorable of all the sciences. And according to the opinion of these men it follows that all who are imperfect are unfortunate, for they said that men are fortunate as a result of the providence of the gods, who communicate their goods to men. Hence as a result of the envy of the gods, who are unwilling to communicate their goods, it follows that men, who remain outside the perfection of this science, are unfortunate.

             63. But the basis of this opinion is most false, because it is not fitting that any divine being should be envious. This is evident from the fact that envy is sadness at someone else's prosperity. But this can occur only because the one who is envious thinks that someone else's good diminishes his own. Now it is impossible that God should be sad, because He is not subject to evil of any kind. Nor can His goodness be diminished by someone else's goodness, since every good flows from His goodness as from an unfailing spring. Hence Plato also said that there is no envy of any kind in God. But the poets have lied not only in this matter but in many others, as is stated in the common proverb.

             64. Nor must we think (32).

             Here he proves the fourth attribute, namely, that this is the most honorable science, by the following argument. That science which is most divine is most honorable, just as God Himself is also the most honorable of all things. But this science is the most divine, and is therefore the most honorable. The minor premise is proved in this way: a science is said to be divine in two ways, and only this science is said to be divine in both ways. First, the science which God has is said to be divine; and second, the science which is about divine matters is said to be divine. But it is evident that only this science meets both of these requirements, because, since this science is about first causes and principles, it must be about God; for God is understood in this way by all inasmuch as He is one of the causes and a principle of things. Again, such a science which is about God and first causes, either God alone has or, if not He alone, at least He has it in the highest degree. Indeed, He alone has it in a perfectly comprehensive way. And He has it in the highest degree inasmuch as it is also had by men in their own way, although it is not had by them as a human possession, but as something borrowed from Him.

             65. From these considerations he draws the further conclusion that all other sciences are more necessary than this science for use in practical life, for these sciences are sought least of all for themselves. But none of the other sciences can be more excellent than this one.

             66. But it is necessary (33).

             He now gives the goal toward which this science moves. He says that its progression comes to rest, or is terminated, in the contrary of what was previously found in those who first sought this science, as also happens in the case of natural generations and motions. For each motion is terminated in the contrary of that from which the motion begins. Hence, since investigation is a kind of movement towards knowledge, it must be terminated in the contrary of that from which it begins. But, as was stated above (27:C 53), the investigation of this science began with man's wonder about all things, because the first philosophers wondered about less important matters and subsequent philosophers about more hidden ones. And the object of their wonder was whether the case was like that of strange chance occurrences, i.e., things which seem to happen mysteriously by chance. For things which happen as if by themselves are called chance occurrences. For men wonder most of all when things happen by chance in this way, supposing that they were foreseen or determined by some cause. For chance occurrences are not determined by a cause, and wonder results from ignorance of a cause. Therefore when men were not yet able to recognize the causes of things, they wondered about all things as if they were chance occurrences; just as they wondered about changes in the course of the sun, which are two in number, namely, the solstices, that of winter and that of summer. For at the summer solstice the sun begins to decline toward the south, after previously declining toward the north. But at the winter solstice the opposite occurs. And they wondered also that the diagonal of a square is not commensurable with a side. For since to be immeasurable seems to belong to the indivisible alone (just as unity alone is what is not measured by number but itself measures all numbers), it seems to be a matter of wonder that something which is not indivisible is immeasurable, and consequently that what is not a smallest part is immeasurable. Now it is evident that the diagonal of a square and its side are neither indivisible nor smallest parts. Hence it seems a matter of wonder if they are not commensurable.

             67. Therefore, since philosophical investigation began with wonder, it must end in or arrive at the contrary of this, and this is to advance to the worthier view, as the common proverb agrees, which states that one must always advance to the better. For what that opposite and worthier view is, is evident in the case of the above wonders, because when men have already learned the causes of these things they do not wonder. Thus the geometrician does not wonder if the diagonal is incommensurable with a side. For he knows the reason for this, namely, that the proportion of the square of the diagonal to the square of a side is not as the proportion of the square of a number to the square of a number, but as the proportion of two to one. Hence it follows that the proportion of a side to the diagonal is not as the proportion of number to number. And from this it is evident that they cannot be made commensurable. For only those lines are commensurable which are proportioned to each other as number to number. Hence the goal of this science to which we should advance will be that in knowing the causes of things we do not wonder about their effects.

             68. From what has been said, then, it is evident what the nature of this science is, namely, that it is speculative and free, and that it is not a human possession but a divine one; and also what its aim is, for which the whole inquiry, method, and art must be conducted. For its goal is the first and universal causes of things, about which it also makes investigations and establishes the truth. And by reason of the knowledge of these it reaches this goal, namely, that there should be no wonder because the causes of things are known.