Appendix Two Questions From Lectures On Bk. I Of The Sentences

[Question One: Does an infinite being exist?] The first question raised in connection with the second distinction is this: "In the realm of beings is there some being which is actually infinite?" [Pro et Contra] It would seem not, for: [Arg. I] If one of two contraries were actually infinite, it would be incompatible with anything other than itself. But good and evil are contraries. Hence, if some good were actually infinite, nothing would be actually evil, which is false. 2 In answer to this some say that the evil in the universe is not a true contrary to God or the infinite good, because he has no true contrary. But this is no solution, for whether the contrariety be formal or only virtual between two things, if one of the two be infinite, it will tolerate nothing contrary either to itself or to its effect. If the sun, for instance, possessed infinite heat either formally or virtually, nothing would be cold. Consequently, if some good were actually infinite either virtually or formally, then throughout the universe evil, as the contrary of some good, would be simply non-existent. 3 [Arg. II] An infinite body would not allow another body to coexist; therefore an infinite spirit will not allow another spirit to coexist. The antecedent is evident from Bk. IV of the Physics. The consequence is thus proved: just as two bodies cannot coexist in one place because of their opposed dimensions, so neither does it seem possible for two spirits because their actualizations are opposed. 4 Another proof of the same consequence is this: if another body could coexist with an infinite body, then there would be something larger than an infinite body. It would seem then that if another spirit existed in addition to the infinite, there would be something virtually greater than the infinite. 5 [Arg. III] Furthermore, whatever is here and nowhere else is limited in its whereabouts; what exists now but not then is of limited time; and what acts by this action and no other is limited in action, and so on. But whatever exists is a "this" in such a way that it is no other; therefore it is finite, whatever it be. 6 [Arg. IV] Furthermore, if some power were infinite, it would cause movement instantaneously, as Bk. VIII of the Physics proves. Motion, therefore, would occur instantaneously, which is impossible. 7 To the contrary: In Bk. VIII of the Physics, the Philosopher says that the first mover is infinite. And therefore his power does not reside in any magnitude—not in an infinite magnitude, because there is no such thing, nor in a finite magnitude, because something of greater magnitude would have a greater power. But this argument is not valid unless it be understood of something that is infinite in power, because a body, like the sun, would be infinite in duration.