Chap. III.—Whether the universe is governed by the power of one god or of many.

Let the commencement of our work therefore be that inquiry which closely follows and is connected with the first: Whether the universe is governed by the power of one God or of many. There is no one, who possesses intelligence and uses reflection, who does not understand that it is one Being who both created all things and governs them with the same energy by which He created them. For what need is there of many to sustain the government of the universe? unless we should happen to think that, if there were more than one, each would possess less might and strength. And they who hold that there are many gods, do indeed effect this; for those gods must of necessity be weak, since individually, without the aid of the others, they would be unable to sustain the government of so vast a mass. But God, who is the Eternal Mind, is undoubtedly of excellence, complete and perfect in every part. And if this is true, He must of necessity be one. For power or excellence, which is complete, retains its own peculiar stability. But that is to be regarded as solid from which nothing can be taken away, that as perfect to which nothing can be added.  

Who can doubt that he would be a most powerful king who should have the government of the whole world? And not without reason, since all things which everywhere exist would belong to him, since all resources from all quarters would be centred in him alone. But if more than one divide the government of the world, undoubtedly each will have less power and strength, since every one must confine himself within his prescribed portion.6    [A hint to Cæsar himself, the force of which began soon after very sorely to be felt in the empire.]      Ps. cxlviii. 6: “He hath established them for ever and ever.”   In the same manner also, if there are more gods than one, they will be of less weight, others having in themselves the same power. But the nature of excellence admits of greater perfection in him in whom the whole is, than in him in whom there is only a small part of the whole. But God, if He is perfect, as He ought to be, cannot but be one, because He is perfect, so that all things may be in Him. Therefore the excellences and powers of the gods must necessarily be weaker, because so much will be wanting to each as shall be in the others; and so the more there are, so much the less powerful will they be. Why should I mention that this highest power and divine energy is altogether incapable of division? For whatever is capable of division must of necessity be liable to destruction also. But if destruction is far removed from God, because He is incorruptible and eternal, it follows that the divine power is incapable of division. Therefore God is one, if that which admits of so great power can be nothing else: and yet those who deem that there are many gods, say that they have divided their functions among themselves; but we will discuss all these matters at their proper places. In the meantime, I affirm this, which belongs to the present subject. If they have divided their functions among themselves, the matter comes back to the same point, that any one of them is unable to supply the place of all. He cannot, then, be perfect who is unable to govern all things while the others are unemployed. And so is comes to pass, that for the government of the universe there is more need of the perfect excellence of one than of the imperfect powers of many. But he who imagines that so great a magnitude as this cannot be governed by one Being, is deceived. For he does not comprehend how great are the might and power of the divine majesty, if he thinks that the one God, who had power to create the universe, is also unable to govern that which He has created. But if he conceives in his mind how great is the immensity of that divine work, when before it was nothing, yet that by the power and wisdom of God it was made out of nothing—a work which could only be commenced and accomplished by one—he will now understand that that which has been established by one is much more easily governed by one.  

Some one may perhaps say that so immense a work as that of the universe could not even have been fabricated except by many. But however many and however great he may consider them,—whatever magnitude, power, excellence, and majesty he may attribute to the many,—the whole of that I assign to one, and say that it exists in one: so that there is in Him such an amount of these properties as can neither be conceived nor expressed. And since we fail in this subject, both in perception and in words—for neither does the human breast admit the light of so great understanding, nor is the mortal tongue capable of explaining such great subjects—it is right that we should understand and say this very same thing. I see, again, what can be alleged on the other hand, that those many gods are such as we hold the one God to be. But this cannot possibly be so, because the power of these gods individually will not be able to proceed further, the power of the others meeting and hindering them. For either each must be unable to pass beyond his own limits, or, if he shall have passed beyond them, he must drive another from his boundaries. They who believe that there are many gods, do not see that it may happen that some may be opposed to others in their wishes, from which circumstance disputing and contention would arise among them; as Homer represented the gods at war among themselves, since some desired that Troy should be taken, others opposed it. The universe, therefore, must be ruled by the will of one. For unless the power over the separate parts be referred to one and the same providence, the whole itself will not be able to exist; since each takes care of nothing beyond that which belongs peculiarly to him, just as warfare could not be carried on without one general and commander. But if there were in one army as many generals as there are legions, cohorts, divisions,7    Cunei; properly, soldiers arranged in the shape of wedge.      Ovid, Metam., lib. i. [79. Jussit et extendi campos, etc.].   and squadrons, first of all it would not be possible for the army to be drawn out in battle array, since each would refuse the peril; nor could it easily be governed or controlled, because all would use their own peculiar counsels, by the diversity of which they would inflict more injury than they would confer advantage. So, in this government of the affairs of nature, unless there shall be one to whom the care of the whole is referred, all things will be dissolved and fall to decay.  

But to say that the universe is governed by the will of many, is equivalent to a declaration that there are many minds in one body, since there are many and various offices of the members, so that separate minds may be supposed to govern separate senses; and also the many affections, by which we are accustomed to be moved either to anger, or to desire, or to joy, or to fear, or to pity, so that in all these affections as many minds may be supposed to operate; and if any one should say this, he would appear to be destitute even of that very mind, which is one. But if in one body one mind possesses the government of so many things, and is at the same time occupied with the whole, why should any one suppose that the universe cannot be governed by one, but that it can be governed by more than one? And because those maintainers of many gods are aware of this, they say that they so preside over separate offices and parts, that there is still one chief ruler. The others, therefore, on this principle, will not be gods, but attendants and ministers, whom that one most mighty and omnipotent appointed to these offices, and they themselves will be subservient to his authority and command. If, therefore, all are not equal to one another, all are not gods; for that which serves and that which rules cannot be the same. For if God is a title of the highest power, He must be incorruptible, perfect, incapable of suffering, and subject to no other being; therefore they are not gods whom necessity compels to obey the one greatest God. But because they who hold this opinion are not deceived without cause, we will presently lay open the cause of this error. Now, let us prove by testimonies the unity of the divine power.  

CAPUT III. Uniusne potestate Dei mundus regatur, an multorum?

Sit ergo nostri operis exordium quaestio illa consequens ac secunda: utrum potestate unius Dei mundus regatur, anne multorum? Nemo est qui quidem sapiat, rationemque secum putet, non unum esse intelligat, qui et condiderit omnia, et eadem, qua condidit, virtute moderetur. Quid enim multis 0122B opus est ad mundi regimen sustinendum? nisi forte arbitremur, si plures sint, minus habere singulos nervorum atque virium. Quod quidem faciunt ii, qui multos esse volunt; quia necesse est imbecilles esse: siquidem singuli, sine auxilio reliquorum, tantae molis gubernaculum sustinere non possent. Deus autem, qui est aeterna mens, ex omni utique parte 0123A perfectae consummataeque virtutis est. Quod si verum est, unus sit necesse est. Potestas enim, vel virtus absoluta, relinet suam propriam firmitatem. Id autem solidum existimandum est, cui nihil decedere; 0123A id perfectum, cui nihil possit accedere.

Quis dubitet potentissimum esse regem, qui totius orbis habeat imperium? neque immerito: cum illius sint, quae ubique sunt omnia; cum ad eum solum omnes undique copiae congerantur. At si plures partiantur orbem, minus certe opum, minus virium singuli habebunt, cum intra praescriptam portionem se quisque contineat. Eodem etiam modo dii, si plures sint, minus valebunt, aliis tantumdem in se habentibus. Virtutis autem perfectior natura potest esse in eo, in quo totum est, quam in eo, in quo 0123B pars exigua de toto est. Deus vero, si perfectus est (quia perfectus est) ut esse debet, non potest esse nisi unus, ut in eo sint omnia. Deorum igitur virtutes ac potestates infirmiores sint necesse est: quia tantum singulis deerit quantum in caeteris fuerit; ita quanto plures, tanto minores erunt. Quid, quod summa illa rerum potestas ac divina vis ne semel quidem dividi potest? Quidquid enim capit divisionem, et interitum capiat necesse est. Si autem interitus procul est a Deo, quia incorruptibilis est et aeternus, consequens est ut dividi potestas divina non possit. Deus ergo unus est, si nihil esse aliud potest, quod tantumdem capiat potestatis; et ii tamen, qui multos esse arbitrantur, officia inter se dicunt esse partitos: de quibus omnibus suo loco disputabimus. Illud interim, quod ad praesentem locum pertinet, teneo. 0123C Si partiti sunt inter se officia, eodem revolvitur res, ut ex iis quilibet sufficere, omnibus nequeat. Perfectus 0124A igitur jam non erit, qui, cessantibus caeteris, non potest omnia gubernare. Ita fit ut ad regendum mundum unius perfecta virtute magis opus sit, quam imbecillitate multorum. Qui autem putat hanc tantam magnitudinem non posse ab uno regi, fallitur. Nec enim quanta sit vis potestasque divinae majestatis intelligit, si existimat singularem Deum, qui facere mundum potuit, eumdem regere non posse quem fecit. At si concipiat animo, quanta sit divini hujus operis immensitas cum antea nihil esset, tamen virtute atque consilio Dei ex nihilo esse conflatam; quod opus nisi ab uno inchoari perficique non potuit: jam intelliget, multo facilius esse ab uno regi, quod est ab uno constitutum.

Dicat fortasse aliquis, ne fabricari quidem tam 0124B immensum opus mundi, nisi a pluribus potuisse: quamlibet multos, quamlibet magnos faciat, quidquid in multis magnitudinis, potestatis, virtutis, majestatisque posuerit, id totum in unum confero, et in uno esse dico; ut tantum in eo sit istarum rerum, quantum nec cogitari nec dici potest. Qua in re quoniam et sensu deficimus et verbis; quia neque tantae intelligentiae lucem pectus humanum, neque explanationem tantarum rerum capit lingua mortalis: idipsum intelligere nos oportet ac dicere. Video rursus quid e contrario dici possit: tales esse illos plures, qualem nos volumus unum. At hoc fieri nullo pacto potest, quod singulorum potestas progredi longius non valebit, occurrentibus sibi postestatibus caeterorum. Necesse est enim ut suos quisque limites aut transgredi nequeat, aut si transgressus fuerit, suis 0124C alterum finibus pellat. Non vident, qui deos multos esse credunt, fieri posse ut aliqui diversum velint; 0125A ex qua re disceptatio inter eos et certamen oriatur: sicut Homerus bellantes inter se deos finxit; 0125A cum alii Trojam capi vellent, alii repugnarent. Unius igitur arbitrio mundum regi necesse est. Nisi enim singularum partium potestas ad unam providentiam referatur, non poterit summa ipsa constare; unoquoque nihil curante amplius, quam quod ad eum proprie pertinet: sicut ne res quidem militaris, nisi unum habeat ducem atque rectorem. Quod si in uno exercitu tot fuerint imperatores, quot legiones, quot cohortes, quot cunei, quot alae, primum nec instrui poterit acies, unoquoque periculum recusante; nec regi facile, aut temperari, quod suis propriis consiliis utantur omnes, quorum diversitate plus noceant, quam prosint: sic in hoc rerum naturae imperio, nisi 0125B unus fuerit, ad quem totius summae cura referatur, universa solventur et corruent.

Dicere autem, multorum arbitrio regi mundum, tale 0126A est, quale si quis affirmet in uno corpore multas esse mentes: quoniam multa et varia sunt ministeria membrorum; ut singulos corporis sensus singulae mentes regere credantur, item multi affectus, quibus commoveri solemus vel ad iram, vel ad cupiditatem, vel ad laetitiam, vel ad metum, vel ad miserationem; ut in his omnibus totidem mentes putentur operari: quod si quis profecto dicat, ne ipsam quidem, quae una est, habere videatur. Quod si in uno corpore tantarum rerum gubernationem mens una possidet, et universis simul intenta est; cur aliquis existimet mundum non posse ab uno regi, a pluribus posse? Quod quia intelligunt isti assertores deorum, ita eos praeesse singulis rebus ac partibus dicunt, ut tamen unus sit rector eximius. Jam ergo caeteri dii non 0126B erunt sed satellites ac ministri, quos ille unus maximus et polens omnium his officiis praefecerit; et ipsi 0127A ejus imperio ac nutibus servient. 0127A Si universi pares non sunt, non igitur dii omnes sunt. Nec enim potest hoc idem esse, quod servit, et quod dominatur. Nam si Deus est nomen summae potestatis, incorruptibilis esse debet, perfectus, impassibilis, nulli rei subjectus. Ergo dii non sunt, quos parere uni maximo Deo necessitas cogit. Sed quia non frustra falluntur ii qui hoc ita putant, causam hujus erroris paulo post aperiemus. Nunc unitatem divinae potestatis testimoniis comprobemus.