On “Not Three Gods.” To Ablabius.

 Ye that are strong with all might in the inner man ought by rights to carry on the struggle against the enemies of the truth, and not to shrink from t

 In truth, the question you propound to us is no small one, nor such that but small harm will follow if it meets with insufficient treatment. For by th

 The argument which you state is something like this:—Peter, James, and John, being in one human nature, are called three men: and there is no absurdit

 What, then, is the reason that when we count one by one those who are exhibited to us in one nature, we ordinarily name them in the plural and speak o

 We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural, a

 Most men think that the word “Godhead” is used in a peculiar degree in respect of nature: and just as the heaven, or the sun, or any other of the cons

 But some one will say that the proof of our argument does not yet regard the question. For even if it were granted that the name of “Godhead” is a com

 As we have to a certain extent shown by our statement that the word “Godhead” is not significant of nature but of operation, perhaps one might reasona

 Since, then, the character of the superintending and beholding power is one, in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as has been said in our previous argumen

 If, then, every good thing and every good name, depending on that power and purpose which is without beginning, is brought to perfection in the power

 It does not seem to me absolutely necessary, with a view to the present proof of our argument, to contend against those who oppose us with the asserti

 But if it pleases our adversaries to say that the significance of the term is not operation, but nature, we shall fall back upon our original argument

 As, then, the golden staters are many, but the gold is one, so too those who are exhibited to us severally in the nature of man, as Peter, James, and

 Indeed, it would be a lengthy task to set out in detail from the Scriptures those constructions which are inexactly expressed, in order to prove the s

 If, however, any one cavils at our argument, on the ground that by not admitting the difference of nature it leads to a mixture and confusion of the P

 But in speaking of “cause,” and “of the cause,” we do not by these words denote nature (for no one would give the same definition of “cause” and of “n

 Thus, since on the one hand the idea of cause differentiates the Persons of the Holy Trinity, declaring that one exists without a Cause, and another i

We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided3    Reading τοὺς μὴ διηρημένούς, as Sifanus seems to have read. The Paris Edit. of 1615 reads τοὺς διηρημένους, which Oehler leaves uncorrected. in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural, and saying they are “many men,” is a customary abuse of language, and that it would be much the same thing to say they are “many human natures.” And the truth of this we may see from the following instance. When we address any one, we do not call him by the name of his nature, in order that no confusion may result from the community of the name, as would happen if every one of those who hear it were to think that he himself was the person addressed, because the call is made not by the proper appellation but by the common name of their nature: but we separate him from the multitude by using that name which belongs to him as his own;—that, I mean, which signifies the particular subject. Thus there are many who have shared in the nature—many disciples, say, or apostles, or martyrs—but the man in them all is one; since, as has been said, the term “man” does not belong to the nature of the individual as such, but to that which is common. For Luke is a man, or Stephen is a man; but it does not follow that if any one is a man he is therefore Luke or Stephen: but the idea of the persons admits of that separation which is made by the peculiar attributes considered in each severally, and when they are combined is presented to us by means of number; yet their nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate in it. And as we speak of a people, or a mob, or an army, or an assembly in the singular in every case, while each of these is conceived as being in plurality, so according to the more accurate expression, “man” would be said to be one, even though those who are exhibited to us in the same nature make up a plurality. Thus it would be much better to correct our erroneous habit, so as no longer to extend to a plurality the name of the nature, than by our bondage to habit to transfer4    Reading with Oehler μεταβιβάζειν, for the μὴ μεταβιβάζειν of the Paris Edit. to our statements concerning God the error which exists in the above case. But since the correction of the habit is impracticable (for how could you persuade any one not to speak of those who are exhibited in the same nature as “many men”?—indeed, in every case habit is a thing hard to change), we are not so far wrong in not going contrary to the prevailing habit in the case of the lower nature, since no harm results from the mistaken use of the name: but in the case of the statement concerning the Divine nature the various use5    Sifanus seems to have read ἡ ἀδιάφορος χρῆσις, as he translates “promiscuus et indifferens nominum usus.” of terms is no longer so free from danger: for that which is of small account is in these subjects no longer a small matter. Therefore we must confess one God, according to the testimony of Scripture, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord,” even though the name of Godhead extends through the Holy Trinity. This I say according to the account we have given in the case of human nature, in which we have learnt that it is improper to extend the name of the nature by the mark of plurality. We must, however, more carefully examine the name of “Godhead,” in order to obtain, by means of the significance involved in the word, some help towards clearing up the question before us.

Φαμὲν τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν κατάχρησίν τινα συνηθείας εἶναι τὸ τοὺς μὴ διῃρημένους τῇ φύσει κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα πληθυντικῶς ὀνομάζειν καὶ λέγειν ὅτι πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὅπερ ὅμοιόν ἐστι τῷ λέγειν ὅτι πολλαὶ φύσεις ἀνθρώπιναι. καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ἂν ἡμῖν ἐντεῦθεν γένοιτο: προσκαλούμενοι γάρ τινα, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως αὐτὸν ὀνομάζομεν, ὡς ἂν μή τινα πλάνην ἡ κοινότης τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐμποιήσειεν, ἑκάστου τῶν ἀκουόντων ἑαυτὸν εἶναι τὸν προσκληθέντα νομίζοντος, ὅτι μὴ τῇ ἰδιαζούσῃ προσηγορίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς φύσεως ὀνόματος ἡ κλῆσις γίνεται: ἀλλὰ τὴν ἰδίως ἐπικειμένην αὐτῷ (τὴν σημαντικὴν λέγω τοῦ ὑποκειμένου) φωνὴν εἰπόντες, οὕτως αὐτὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀποκρίνομεν, ὥστε πολλοὺς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς μετεσχηκότας τῆς φύσεως, φέρε εἰπεῖν μαθητὰς ἢ ἀποστόλους ἢ μάρτυρας, ἕνα δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἴπερ, καθὼς εἴρηται, οὐχὶ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς φύσεώς ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ὁ Λουκᾶς ἢ ὁ Στέφανος, οὐ μήν, εἴ τις ἄνθρωπος, πάντως καὶ Λουκᾶς ἐστιν ἢ Στέφανος. Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τῶν ὑποστάσεων λόγος διὰ τὰς ἐνθεωρουμένας ἰδιότητας ἑκάστῳ τὸν διαμερισμὸν ἐπιδέχεται καὶ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἐν ἀριθμῷ θεωρεῖται: ἡ δὲ φύσις μία ἐστίν, αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡνωμένη καὶ ἀδιάτμητος ἀκριβῶς μονάς, οὐκ αὐξανομένη διὰ προσθήκης, οὐ μειουμένη δι' ὑφαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν οὖσα καὶ ἓν διαμένουσα κἂν ἐν πλήθει φαίνηται, ἄσχιστος καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ ὁλόκληρος καὶ τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον οὐ συνδιαιρουμένη. καὶ ὥσπερ λέγεται λαὸς καὶ δῆμος καὶ στράτευμα καὶ ἐκκλησία μοναχῶς πάντα, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων ἐν πλήθει νοεῖται: οὕτω κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβέστερον λόγον καὶ ἄνθρωπος εἷς κυρίως ἂν ῥηθείη, κἂν οἱ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ αὐτῇ δεικνύμενοι πλῆθος ὦσιν, ὡς πολὺ μᾶλλον καλῶς ἔχειν τὴν ἐσφαλμένην ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐπανορθοῦσθαι συνήθειαν εἰς τὸ μηκέτι τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα πρὸς πλῆθος ἐκτείνειν ἢ ταύτῃ δουλεύοντας τὴν ὧδε πλάνην καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ θεῖον δόγμα μεταβιβάζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀμήχανος τῆς συνηθείας ἡ ἐπανόρθωσις (πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις πεισθείη μὴ πολλοὺς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους τοὺς ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ αὐτῇ δεικνυμένους; δυσμετάθετον γὰρ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἡ συνήθεια), ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς κάτω φύσεως τῇ κρατούσῃ συνηθείᾳ μὴ ἀντιβαίνοντες οὐδὲν ἂν τοσοῦτον ἁμάρτοιμεν, μηδεμιᾶς οὔσης ζημίας ἐκ τῆς ἡμαρτημένης τῶν ὀνομάτων χρήσεως: ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ θείου δόγματος οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἀκίνδυνος ἡ ἀδιάφορος χρῆσις τῶν ὀνομάτων: οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν ἐνταῦθα τὸ παρὰ μικρόν. Οὐκοῦν εἷς ἡμῖν ὁμολογητέος θεὸς κατὰ τὴν γραφικὴν μαρτυρίαν Ἄκουε, Ἰσραήλ: κύριος ὁ θεός σου κύριος εἷς ἐστι, κἂν ἡ φωνὴ τῆς θεότητος διήκῃ διὰ τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος. ταῦτα δὲ λέγω κατὰ τὸν ἀποδοθέντα ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως λόγον, ἐν ᾧ μεμαθήκαμεν μὴ δεῖν πληθυντικῷ χαρακτῆρι τὴν προσηγορίαν πλατύνειν τῆς φύσεως. ἀκριβέστερον δὲ ἡμῖν αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα τῆς θεότητος ἐξεταστέον, ὅπως ἂν διὰ τῆς ἐγκειμένης τῇ φωνῇ σημασίας γένοιτό τις συνεργία πρὸς τὴν τοῦ προκειμένου σαφήνειαν.