animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature? If before the thing coming to be came to be, the matter existed, but the thing coming to be from it did not exist, what was the matter? For example, if the matter of the horse existed before the horse came to be, if all things observed in the substance of the horse are generated, how was the matter, from which the horse has come to be, ungenerated? If in itself neither privation is being nor matter, but the accidental happens to that which is being in itself, how is it possible for something to come to be from privation accidentally, since it exists neither in itself nor accidentally? When these are disjoined, it is impossible for something to come to be from neither of them, nor is it possible for something to come to be when they are conjoined; for example, it is not possible for something to come to be from that which simply is, likewise also from that which simply is not, to use the language of Aristotle. How have both become possible, both coming to be from that which is and coming to be from that which is not? If the substrate, from which the thing coming to be comes to be, must underlie the contraries, does not something therefore come to be from privation accidentally, since it does not underlie the contraries? He who does not deny that the all either is or is not, but concedes that the all is and is not, how can he speak truly when he says that matter is neither substance nor a this-something nor being? If the thing coming to be does indeed come to be, but not from what simply is not nor from what simply is, but from both, it comes to be, therefore, also from matter as from that which is and from that which is not, and as from a this-something that is and a this-something that is not. But if these things are so, false therefore is what was said concerning matter, that it is neither substance nor a this-something nor being. Just as matter is formless, so also is form matterless. But if matter and its formlessness are two principles, then form and its matterlessness will also be two principles. How then, when there are four principles, were only three principles posited. . From the same argument. For we say that matter and privation are different, and of these, the one, matter, is not-being accidentally, but privation is so also in itself, and the one is near and somehow substance, but the other is in no way. But they say that not-being is, the great and the small likewise, one thing both together or each separately. So that this way of the triad and that one are completely different. If it belongs to matter to be not-being accidentally, it is clear that accidentally matter is neither matter nor a principle; for to be matter and to be a principle belongs to being. And if it belongs to matter to be not-being accidentally because of privation, it is clear that it is being accidentally because of form. Therefore, for matter there will never be being in itself, but always accidentally, sometimes to be not-being, sometimes to be being. How then is it not absurd to say that that which is never being in itself is near to substance and somehow substance? If it is one thing to be matter and another to be matter of something,

ζῶον, τῇ δὲ γενέσει τοῦ ἁπλῶς ζώου τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐκ ἦν σπέρμα, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ φύσιν γιγνόμενον τὸ ζῶον ἐκ μὴ ζώου; Eἰ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἡ μὲν ὕλη ἦν, τὸ δὲ γιγνόμενον ἐξ αὐτῆς οὐκ ἦν, τί ἦν ἡ ὕλη; Oἷον εἰ ὕλη ἦν τοῦ ἵππου πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὸν ἵππον, εἰ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ ἵππου θεωρούμενά ἐστι γενητά, πῶς ἦν ἀγένητος ἡ ὕλη, ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν ἵππος; Eἰ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν οὔτε ἡ στέρησις ὄν ἐστιν οὔτε ἡ ὕλη, τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς τῷ καθ' αὑτὸ ὄντι συμβαίνει, πῶς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τι ἐκ τῆς στερήσεως, μήτε καθ' αὑτὸ μήτε κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὔσης; Ὧν διεζευγμένων ὄντων ἀδύνατόν ἐστι γενέσθαι τι ἐξ οὐ δενὸς αὐτῶν, τούτων οὔτε συμπεπλεγμένων δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τι· οἷον ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἁπλῶς οὐ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τι, ὡσαύ τως καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἁπλῶς μὴ ὄντος, ἵνα ταῖς Ἀριστοτέλους χρη σώμεθα φωναῖς. Πῶς ἀμφότερα γέγονε δυνατά, καὶ τὸ γε νέσθαι ἐξ ὄντος καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος; Eἰ τὸ ὑποκεί μενον, ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον, τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἀνάγκη ὑποκεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἄρα γίγνεταί τι ἐκ τῆς στερήσεως κατὰ συμ βεβηκὸς τοῖς ἐναντίοις μὴ ὑποκειμένης; Ὁ τὸ πᾶν μὴ ἀναι ρῶν μήτε εἶναι μήτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶν τὸ πᾶν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, πῶς δύναται ἀληθεύειν λέγων τὴν ὕλην μὴ εἶναι μήτε οὐσίαν μήτε τόδε τι μήτε ὄν; Eἰ γίγνεται μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενον, οὐκ ἐξ ἁπλῶς δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὔτ' ἐξ ἁπλῶς ὄντος, ἀλλὰ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, γίγνεται ἄρα καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης ὡς ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, καὶ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ τόδε τι ὄντος καὶ τόδε τι μὴ ὄντος. Ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, ψευδὲς ἄρα τὸ ·ηθὲν περὶ τῆς ὕλης, τὸ μήτε αὐτὴν εἶναι οὐσίαν μήτε τόδε τι μήτε ὄν. Ὥσπερ ἡ ὕλη ἐστὶν ἄμορφος, οὕτως καὶ τὸ εἶδός ἐστιν ἄϋλον. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον αὐτῆς εἰσι δύο ἀρχαί, καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἄϋλον αὐτοῦ δύο ἔσον ται ἀρχαί. Πῶς οὖν τεσσάρων οὐσῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν τρεῖς μό ναι ἐτέθησαν ἀρχαί. . Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἡμεῖς γὰρ ὕλην καὶ στέρησιν ἕτερον εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν οὐκ ὂν εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν καὶ καθ' αὑτήν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ οὐσίαν πως, τὴν δὲ οὐδαμῶς. Oἱ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναί φασι, τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ὁμοίως, ἓν τὸ συναμφότερον ἢ τὸ χωρὶς ἑκάτερον. Ὥστε παντελῶς ἕτερος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς τριάδος κἀκεῖνος. Eἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ ὂν εἶναι τῇ ὕλῃ ἐστί, δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ ὕλη οὔτε ὕλη ἐστὶν οὔτε ἀρχή· ὄντος γάρ ἐστι τὸ εἶναι ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή. Καὶ εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ ὂν εἶναί ἐστι τῇ ὕλῃ διὰ τὴν στέρησιν, δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄν ἐστι διὰ τὸ εἶδος. Ἔσται ἄρα τῇ ὕλῃ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν οὐδέποτε ὄν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ ἀεί, ποτὲ μὲν οὐκ ὂν εἶναι, ποτὲ δὲ ὂν εἶναι. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτοπον τὸ λέγειν ἐγγὺς εἶναι οὐσίας καὶ οὐσίαν πως τὸ μηδέποτε καθ' αὑτὸ ὄν; Eἰ ἄλλο τὸ ὕλην εἶναι καὶ ἄλλο τὸ τινὸς εἶναι ὕλην,