OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so that I may omit the other kinds of the greatest evils among men, which have an impiety equal to or even greater than the impiety of those who imagine God to be envious. But if these and such things are the greatest evils among men, and the respondent disbelieves the re-creation preached by Christians, in which there is an abolition of all evils among men pertaining to the soul and to the body, how, according to him, is God not envious, who, being able to prevent the greatest evils among men, does not prevent them, but, remaining ever the same, makes them impious towards himself and towards one another? And for what reason does the respondent disbelieve the re-creation of the world? Because of the inability of the maker, or because of the unseemliness of the work? But if it is because of the inability of the maker, God will not even be a maker. For of those things which God does not have the power to remake, of these he does not even have the power to make; for these follow one another, being affirmed or denied. But if it is because of the unseemliness of the work, then the better work will be unfitting for him; which is absurd, to say that it is fitting for him to make corruptible men, but not fitting for him to make incorruptible men. A second Christian question to the Greeks. If it is impossible for one who has made nothing to be God, how is he God, if the world is uncreated, as it seems to some? A Greek response to the Christians. To say that it is impossible for one who has made nothing to be God is absurd. For here again the same argument applies, that nothing temporal exists with God. And if nothing temporal exists with God, it is clear that it is not fitting to attribute the past of time to God. And if this is not fitting, it is not fitting to say that God has made anything whatsoever. What then? Would you say we err in saying God is inactive? But we do not say this, but that God has not made, nor does he make, nor will he make in time; for he has no more made than he makes, nor again does he make than he will make; but with God the past is in the present and the future is in what has already come to be, as God has nothing transient, but always does the same things through his perfect and immutable power and energy. He makes the world, therefore, in that very thing which he is, providing it with ceaseless motion, by illuminating it through eternity. So that he has made nothing nor will he make anything. But being the same he always makes the same, having no beginning of making, that there may be no end; since, if his energies have a beginning and an end, God will be corruptible in his energy; which is absurd. For his power will also be changeable, as at different times using different energies; and his substance will be shaken, at different times generating different powers and not remaining in the same ones. So that, if these things are through all, it is clear that God will be changeable in substance, in power

δημιουργῷ τοῦ κόσμου θεῷ, ὀνομάζουσι τὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ δημιουργεῖν προσριπτοῦσι τῷ θεῷ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, ἵνα παραλείψω τὰ ἄλλα ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἴδη τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν, τὰ ἴσην ἢ καὶ μείζονα ἔχοντα ἀσέβειαν τῆς ἀσεβείας τῶν φθονερὸν τὸν θεὸν φανταζομένων. Ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγιστα κακά, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ Χριστιανῶν κηρυττομένην ἀνάκτισιν, ἐν ᾗ γίνεται πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα κακῶν ἡ ἀναίρεσις, ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος ἀπιστεῖ, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς φθονερός, ὅς, δυνάμενος κωλῦσαι τὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγιστα κακά, οὐ κωλύει, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν αὐ τῶν μένων ἀεὶ ποιεῖ τοὺς εἰς αὐτόν τε καὶ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀσε βοῦντας; Τίνος δὲ ἕνεκεν ἀπιστεῖ ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ἀνάκτισιν; ∆ιὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀπρεπὲς τοῦ ἔργου; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ποι οῦντος, ἔσται ὁ θεὸς οὐδὲ ποιητής. Ὧν γὰρ τῆς μεταποιή σεως ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν, τούτων οὐδὲ τῆς ποιήσεως ἔχει· ἑπόμενα γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, τιθέμενα ἢ ἀναιρού μενα. Eἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀπρεπὲς τοῦ ἔργου, ἔσται ἄρα τὸ κρεῖττον ἔργον μὴ πρέπον αὐτῷ· ὅπερ ἄτοπον, τὸ λέγειν φθαρτοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους πρέπειν αὐτῷ ποιεῖν, ἀφθάρτους δὲ μὴ πρέ πειν αὐτῷ ποιεῖν. ∆ευτέρα ἐρώτησις χριστιανικὴ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Eἰ ἀδύνατον εἶναι θεὸν τὸν μηδὲν πεποιηκότα, πῶς ἔστι θεός, εἰ ὁ κόσμος ἀγένητος, καθά τισι δοκεῖ; Ἀπόκρισις ἑλληνικὴ πρὸς τοὺς Χριστιανούς. Τὸ λέγειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι θεὸν τὸν μηδὲν πεποιηκότα ἄτο πόν ἐστι. Πάλιν γὰρ κἀνταῦθα ὁ αὐτὸς ἐφαρμόζει λόγος, ὡς οὐδὲν ἔγχρονόν ἐστι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ. Eἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἔγχρονόν ἐστι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, δῆλον ὡς οὔτε τὸ παρεληλυθὸς τοῦ χρό νου ἁρμόζει ἐπιφέρειν τῷ θεῷ. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἁρμόζει, καὶ τὸ πεποιηκέναι τὸν θεὸν τὸ ὁτιοῦν οὐχ ἁρμόττει λέγειν. Τί οὖν; Φαίης ἀνενέργητον τὸν θεὸν ἡμᾶς λέγοντας ἁμαρτάνειν; Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτό φαμεν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ πεποίηκε μὲν ὁ θεὸς οὔτε ποιεῖ οὔτε ποιήσει ἐν χρόνῳ· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον πεποίηκεν ἢ ποιεῖ, οὐδ' αὖ ποιεῖ ἢ ποιήσει· ἀλλὰ τό τε παρελθὸν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐν τῷ ἤδη γεγονέναι, ὡς οὐδὲν μὲν ῥευστὸν ἔχοντος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀεὶ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ ποιοῦντος διὰ τὴν τελείαν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον δύναμίν τε καὶ ἐνέρ γειαν. Ποιεῖ τοίνυν τὸν κόσμον ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ ὅπερ ἐστί, τὴν κίνησιν αὐτῷ ἄπαυστον παρέχων, τῷ ἐλλάμπειν αὐτὸν δι' αἰῶνος. Ὥστε πεποίηκε μὲν οὐδὲν οὔτε ποιήσει. Ποιεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ αὐτό, μὴ ἔχων ἀρχὴν τῆς ποιήσεως, ἵνα μὴ καὶ τέλος· ὡς, εἴγε ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι καὶ τελευτὴν αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ, φθαρτὸς ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. Ἔσται γὰρ καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ μεταβλητή, ὡς ἄλλοτε ἄλλαις κεχρημένη ἐνεργείαις· καὶ ἡ οὐσία σαλευθήσεται, ἄλλοτε ἄλλας γεννῶσα δυνάμεις καὶ μὴ μένουσα ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς. Ὥστε, εἰ ταῦτα διὰ πάντων, δῆλον ὡς ὁ θεὸς ἔσται μεταβλητὸς οὐσίᾳ, δυνάμει