is prone also to other evils, unless right reason, having strengthened it, should turn back its course toward the better. Behold, the famous maxim has also been demonstrated: that the gift of free will to men is necessary for virtue, and that things that are truly evil exist from choice and free will alone; but the other things, whatever evils there are, coming from God, are for the instruction of men, guiding them rather to virtue. Therefore these should not be called truly evil; for how can evil be the cause of any good? 22. But perhaps they say: “Let it be that sin comes to be and does not come to be by choice, and that each is a possibility. Whence then do the thoughts of wicked deeds arise in us, if some evil power did not suggest them to us?” To whom it may be said in brief that it is a property of rational nature to have knowledge of things that are opposed and different from one another, as has already been demonstrated by many proofs. For prudence is nothing other than a rational power, discerning of things that are not alike. It is necessary, therefore, that the mind instantly grasp through thought those things of which we have received the knowledge for the purpose of distinguishing them. For knowledge is necessary for discerning the nature of opposites, and the things known are tested, as the mind moves them within itself through thought; for the thought of sin is not sown from without and imprinted on the mind by the devil, but from the motions within us he brings temptation to us, using the motion of our nature as his collaborator in this. 23. The motion of the flesh is not in itself sin, as has been shown; for the flesh is irrational, and nothing done by an irrational thing is sin. But through the soul's connection with the flesh, the sin of the composite being comes about, with the inferior ruling the superior, not through any weakness of the superior, but because we devote all our energy to the well-being of the body, while despising the rational and superior part. But if someone through the practice of | virtue, caring for the flesh little and only as is necessary, allots the greater part to the governing reason, this person will steer his life without stumbling, as far as is possible for a human, regulating the appetites of the flesh toward what is right and well-pleasing to God; so that the motion of the flesh is not sin, but the irrational action of the composite being, whenever the presiding reason entrusts the reins to spirit and appetite, the irrational pair, submitting itself, choosing not to lead according to its dignity, but rather to be led. 24. But to this they say: “Why then did God make the flesh to have motion at all?” To you who ask about this, I will expand the argument and, as far as I can, I will make clear what was intended. God made us rational, having adorned us with reason, the greatest gift. Wishing, then, for this to be active in us, He made most of what appears to be opposed to each other, such as night to day, and the turns of the year to each other, and the qualities of the elements, so that in these things a kind of exercise of the rational faculty might be afforded us, being able to make a discernment of them by comparison. Thus, then, also through the bodily creation of the rest, God created not one kind, but very many differences for the exercise of reason. For some bodies He adorned with bulk and shape and a variety of colors; others He made, in addition to what has been said, to possess nourishment by drawing up the nearby moisture of the earth, and to grow and to bear fruit and to sprout kindred plants. Still others He makes to transcend the nature of these, by adding irrational sensation, such as happen to be the genera of oysters and sponges, and whatever is of that sort. He was not satisfied with so many differences, but also appetitive and locomotive motion He lavishly granted to others, the all-wise

ἐπιρρεπὴς τυγχάνει καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας κακίας, εἰ μὴ λογισμὸς ὀρθὸς αὐτὴν νευρώσας ἀνακρούσειεν τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον φορᾶς. Ἰδοὺ καὶ τὸ θρυλλούμενον ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι τε ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὸ τῆς αὐτεξουσιότητος δώρημα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ὅτι ἐκ μόνης προαιρέσεως καὶ αὐτεξουσιότητος ὑπάρχει τὰ κυρίως κακά· τὰ δὲ ἕτερα, ὅσα κακὰ ὑπάρχει, παρὰ θεοῦ γινόμενα, παιδευτικὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσί, παιδαγωγοῦντα μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀρετήν. ∆ιὸ οὔτε κυρίως κακὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον· πῶς γὰρ τὸ κακὸν αἴτιον ἔσται τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ; 22. Ἀλλ' ἴσως φασίν· Ἔστω καθ' αἵρεσιν γίνεσθαι τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ μὴ γίνεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἑκάτερον εἶναι. Πόθεν οὖν ἡμῖν αἱ ἐνθυμήσεις τῶν φαύλων πράξεων ἐπανίσταν- ται, εἰ μὴ πονηρά τις δύναμις ταύτας ἡμῖν ὑπετίθετο; Πρὸς οὓς συντόμως ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τῆς τῶν λογικῶν φύσεως ἴδιον γνῶσιν ἔχειν τῶν ἐναντιότητα καὶ διαφορὰν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς ἤδη διὰ πλειόνων ἀποδέδεικται. Φρόνησις γὰρ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ δύναμις λογική, διακριτικὴ τῶν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐχόντων. Ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ὧν τὴν ἐπιστήμην εἰλήφαμεν πρὸς διάκρισιν τούτων δι' ἐνθυμήσεως ἀκαριαίως τὸν νοῦν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνῶσις ἀναγκαία τοῦ διειδέναι τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν φύσιν, δοκιμάζεται δὲ τὰ ἐγνωσμένα, κινοῦντος τοῦ νοῦ ταῦτα ἐν ἑαυτῷ διὰ τῆς ἐνθυμήσεως· οὐ γὰρ ἔξωθεν ὑποσπείρεται καὶ ἀνατυποῦ- ται τῷ νῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἡ ἐνθύμησις, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν κινημάτων τὴν πεῖραν ἡμῖν προσάγει, συνεργῷ πρὸς τοῦτο κεχρημένος τῇ κινήσει τῆς φύσεως. 23. Ἡ δὲ τῆς σαρκὸς κίνησις οὐχ ἁμαρτία καθ' ἑαυτήν, ὡς ἀποδέδεικται· ἄλογος γὰρ ἡ σάρξ, οὐδὲν δὲ ὑπὸ ἀλόγου γινόμενον ἁμαρτία. Τῇ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν σάρκα συναφείᾳ γίνεται τοῦ συναμφοτέρου ἡ ἁμαρτία, τοῦ χείρονος κρατοῦντος τοῦ κρείττονος, οὐκ ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ κρείττονος, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν περὶ τὴν εὐεξίαν τοῦ σώματος πᾶσαν σπουδὴν τιθεμένων, ὑπερορώντων δὲ τὴν λογικὴν καὶ κρείττονα μοῖραν. Εἰ δέ τις δι' ἀσκήσεως | ἀρετῆς μικρὰ τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ ὅσον ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιμελόμενος τὸ πλέον ἀπονέμει τῷ καθηγεμόνι λογισμῷ, οὗτος ἄπταιστον, ὡς ἔστιν ἐφικτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, διακυβερνήσει τὸν βίον, ῥυθμίζων τὴς σαρκὸς τὰς ὀρέξεις ἐπὶ τὸ εὖ ἔχον καὶ εὐάρεστον τῷ θεῷ· ὥστε οὐχ ἡ κίνησις τῆς σαρκὸς ἁμαρτία, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου παράλογος πρᾶξις, ὅταν ὁ ἐφεστηκὼς λόγος τὰς ἡνίας ἐπιτρέψειε θυμῷ τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῇ ἀλόγῳ συνωρίδι ἑαυτὸν ὑποκλίνας, οὐκ ἄγειν κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, ἄγεσθαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑλόμενος. 24. Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτό φασιν· Τί δὲ ὅλως κίνησιν ἔχειν τὴν σάρκα πεποίηκεν ὁ θεός; Ἐγώ σοι περὶ τούτου πυνθανομένῳ διευρύνων τὸν λόγον, ὡς οἷόν τε δια- σαφήσω τὸ βουληθέν. Λογικοὺς ἡμᾶς πεποίηκεν ὁ θεός, μεγίστῃ δωρεᾷ τῷ λόγῳ διακοσμήσας. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐνεργὸν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι βουλόμενος, ἐναντίως ἔχειν πρὸς ἑαυτὰ πλεῖστα τῶν φαινομένων πεποίηκεν, ὡσπεροῦν τὴν νύκτα πρὸς τὴν ἡμέραν, τάς τε τροπὰς τοῦ ἔτους πρὸς ἑαυτὰς καὶ τῶν στοιχείων τὰς ποιότητας, ἵνα ἐν τούτοις ὥσπερ τις ἡμῖν γυμνασία τοῦ λογικοῦ προσγένηται τὴν διάγνωσιν αὐτῶν δυναμένοις κατὰ παράθεσιν ποιεῖσθαι. Οὕτω δῆτα καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λοιπῶν σωματικῆς δημιουργίας οὐδ' ἓν εἶδος, πλείστας δὲ διαφορὰς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λόγου γυμνασίαν ἐδημιούργησεν ὁ θεός. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων ὄγκῳ καὶ σχήματι καὶ ποικιλίᾳ χρωμάτων διεκόσμησεν· τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἔχειν πεποίηκε τὸ τρέφεσθαι τὴν πλησίον ἰκμάδα τῆς γῆς ἐπισπώμενα, αὔξειν τε καὶ τίκτειν καρποὺς καὶ ὁμογενῆ βλαστάνειν φυτά. Ἕτερα πάλιν τὴν τούτων φύσιν ἐπαναβεβηκέναι ποιεῖ, προσθεὶς αἴσθησιν ἄλογον, οἷα τυγχάνει τῶν ὀστρέων καὶ σπογγίων τὰ γένη καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. Οὐκ ἠρκέσθη ταῖς τοσαύταις διαφοραῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κίνησιν ὀρεκτικήν τε καὶ μεταβατικὴν ἑτέροις προσεφιλοτιμήσατο, τὴν πάνσοφον