7

18 Manichaean: Why is God without beginning? Orthodox: Because that which is not does not have its being from itself. Therefore, how can that which does not have its being from itself exist from itself? And so it is necessary for that which is not to receive its being from something that is; but the first thing that imparts being, having being from itself, will always be without beginning. 19 Manichaean: Why is there one principle and not two? Orthodox: Because a dyad proceeds from a monad as the offspring of a monad, and the principle of a dyad is a monad, and before the dyad there is always a monad, and because the principle of every thing is one, and, if the principle of each of the beings is one, the principle of all will also be one; for the reason given for each of the beings will also be given for all. 20 And again: If there are two principles, there is polyarchy; if there is polyarchy, there is strife; if strife is the principle of beings, evil is the principle of beings; for strife is evil. It is fitting, therefore, for God to be and to possess something greater than all things said and conceived. What, then, is greater, to create substances from non-beings in a manner befitting God, or to be occupied with matter in a human way with a creative, or rather, a constructive art? Manichaean: By all means, that which is from non-beings. Orthodox: Therefore, it is fitting for God to create substances from non-beings, and there was no matter, but it came to be by God. 21 Manichaean: Is God without beginning in all respects, or in some respects yes, and in some respects no? Orthodox: If He is not without beginning in all respects, He is both without beginning and not without beginning. But if He is without beginning in all respects, He is truly without beginning and without beginning by nature. And that which is without beginning is also without end; for the end is one form of a beginning. Everything, therefore, that has a beginning also has an end according to its own nature, and everything that has an end also has a beginning. And so the angels, having a beginning, also have an end according to their own nature, even if by divine grace they begin to be again and are renewed. For just as a motionless body, having begun to be moved, started from a place, that is, the circular one, and reaching the place from which it started, completed the circumference and the circle, and again begins the motion and makes a new beginning of motion and so remains in motion, as long as the one commanding it to be moved wishes, so also the angels, being moved vitally and reaching the natural end of their own existence, begin the vital motion, until again by the command of the one who made them they will cease from motion. For they always receive their being and their being moved vitally and intellectually from God, not having this from themselves. And just as a wheel, having been set in motion, moves and stops—but if it possesses perpetual motion, it is always moved not having the motion from itself—, so also the angels, not having their being from themselves, are moved as much as their creator moves them; but if he does not move them, they cease from motion. So that which has a beginning certainly has an end, and that which has an end certainly has a beginning. And that which is without beginning by nature is without beginning in all respects, in terms of cause and time and place and authority. 22 The two, therefore, will either be in each other or will be circumscribed by place and are not without beginning. How then are light and darkness in each other? For light is destructive of darkness. If there are no boundaries of light and boundaries of darkness, neither is the light uncircumscribed as not being everywhere, nor the darkness. And they are not entirely without beginning, having a local beginning. For it is impossible, without some partition and dividing wall, for light and darkness to be completely unmixed. For if we light a lamp at night, the place around the lamp will be brighter, but at a short distance it will be darker, until the light completely fails and pure darkness unmixed with light comes to be. For either from the beginning darkness was mixed with the light, and these are not entirely contrary and immiscible, or there was some other dividing wall from the beginning separating them, and no longer are there two principles, but three. That which exists by nature does not change, and that which is changed does not exist by nature. If therefore by nature

7

18 Μανιχαῖος· ∆ιὰ τί ἄναρχος ὁ θεός; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔχει ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ εἶναι. Τὸ οὖν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ μὴ ἔχον τὸ εἶναι, πῶς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔσται; Καὶ χρὴ οὖν ἔκ τινος ὄντος τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ εἶναι λαβεῖν· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον μεταδοτικὸν τοῦ εἶναι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον τὸ εἶναι, ἄναρχον ἀεὶ ἔσται. 19 Μανιχαῖος· ∆ιὰ τί μία ἀρχὴ καὶ οὐ δύο; Ὀρθόδοξος· Ὅτι δυὰς ἐκ μονάδος προέρχεται ὡς μονάδος γέννημα καὶ ἀρχὴ δυάδος μονὰς καὶ πρὸ τῆς δυάδος πάντως μονὰς καὶ ὅτι παντὸς πράγματος ἀρχὴ μία καί, εἰ ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων μία ἀρχή, καὶ πάντων ἔσται ἀρχὴ μία· ὁ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων ἀποδεδομένος λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀποδοθήσεται. 20 Καὶ πάλιν· Εἰ δύο ἀρχαί, πολυαρχία· εἰ δὲ πολυαρχία, στάσις· εἰ δὲ στάσις ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων, κακία τῶν ὄντων ἀρχή· στάσις γὰρ κακία ἐστί. Πρέπει οὖν τῷ θεῷ ἁπάντων τῶν λεγομένων καὶ νοουμένων μείζονι εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν. Ποῖον οὖν μεῖζον, τὸ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων θεοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν οὐσίας ἢ ἀνθρωπίνως τῇ δημιουργικῇ, μᾶλλον δὲ τεκτονικῇ τέχνῃ περὶ τὴν ὕλην καταγίνεσθαι; Μανιχαῖος· Πάντως, ὅτι τὸ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων. Ὀρθόδοξος· Οὐκοῦν πρέπει θεῷ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ποιεῖν οὐσίας, καὶ οὐκ ἦν ὕλη, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἐγένετο. 21 Μανιχαῖος· Ὁ θεὸς κατὰ πάντα ἐστὶν ἄναρχος ἢ κατὰ τὶ μέν, κατὰ τὶ δὲ οὔ; Ὀρθόδοξος· Εἰ οὐ κατὰ πάντα ἄναρχος, καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ οὐκ ἄναρχος. Εἰ δὲ κατὰ πάντα ἄναρχος, ὄντως ἄναρχος καὶ φύσει ἄναρχος. Τὸ δὲ ἄναρχον καὶ ἀπέραντον· ἓν γὰρ ἀρχῆς εἶδος καὶ τὸ τέλος. Πᾶν οὖν ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος ἔχει κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, καὶ πᾶν τέλος ἔχον καὶ ἀρχὴν ἔχει. Καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι γοῦν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες καὶ τέλος ἔχουσι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν, εἰ καὶ τῇ θείᾳ χάριτι πάλιν ἄρχονται τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἀνακαινίζονται. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἀκίνητον σῶμα ἀρξάμενον τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἐκ τόπου ἤρξατο, τουτέστι τὸ κυκλικόν, φθάνον δὲ τὸν τόπον, ὅθεν ἤρξατο, ἐπλήρωσε τὴν περιφέρειαν καὶ τὸν κύκλον, πάλιν δὲ ἄρχεται τῆς κινήσεως καὶ νέαν ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ποιεῖται καὶ οὕτω διαμένει κινούμενον, ἕως ἂν ὁ κελεύων αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι θέλῃ, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι κινούμενοι ζωτικῶς καὶ φθάνοντες τὸ φυσικὸν τέλος τῆς ἑαυτῶν ὑπάρξεως ἄρχονται τῆς ζωτικῆς κινήσεως, ἕως πάλιν προστάξει τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτοὺς παύσονται τῆς κινήσεως. Ἀεὶ γὰρ παρὰ θεοῦ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ζωτικῶς καὶ νοερῶς κινεῖσθαι λαμβάνουσιν οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντες τοῦτο. Ὥσπερ δὲ τροχὸς κινηθεὶς κινεῖται καὶ παύεται-ἐὰν δὲ ἔχῃ τὸ ἀεικίνητον, ἀεὶ κινεῖται οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἔχων τὴν κίνησιν-, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντες τὸ εἶναι, ὅσον κινεῖ αὐτοὺς ὁ ποιήσας, κινοῦνται· ἂν μέντοι ἐκεῖνος μὴ κινήσῃ, παύονται τῆς κινήσεως. Ὥστε τὸ ἀρχὴν ἔχον πάντως καὶ τέλος, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἔχον πάντως καὶ ἀρχήν. Καὶ τὸ φύσει ἄναρχον κατὰ πάντα ἄναρχόν ἐστι, κατά τε αἰτίαν καὶ χρόνον καὶ τόπον καὶ ἐξουσίαν. 22 Τὰ οὖν δύο ἢ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἔσονται ἢ τόπῳ περιγραφήσονται καὶ οὐκ ἄναρχοί εἰσι. Πῶς οὖν ἐν ἀλλήλοις τὸ φῶς καὶ τὸ σκότος; Τὸ γὰρ φῶς τοῦ σκότους ἀναιρετικόν. Εἰ οὐ μεθόριά εἰσι τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ μεθόρια τοῦ σκότους, οὐδὲ τὸ φῶς ἀπερίγραπτον ὡς μὴ πανταχοῦ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ σκότος. Καὶ οὐ παντελῶς ἄναρχα ἔχοντα τοπικὴν ἀρχήν. Ἀμήχανον γὰρ μὴ ὄντος τινὸς διατειχίσματος καὶ μεσοτοίχου ἀνεπίμικτον παντελῶς εἶναι τὸ φῶς καὶ τὸ σκότος. Εἰ γὰρ ἐν νυκτὶ λύχνον ἀνάψωμεν, ὁ μὲν περὶ τὸν λύχνον τόπος φωτεινότερος ἔσται, κατὰ μικρὸν δὲ διάστημα ἔσται σκοτεινότερον, μέχρις ἂν τελείως ἐκλίπῃ τὸ φῶς καὶ καθαρὸν σκότος γένηται φωτὸς ἀνεπίμικτον. Ἢ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμίγνυτο τῷ φωτὶ τὸ σκότος, καὶ οὐκ ἐναντία ταῦτα παντελῶς καὶ ἀκοινώνητα, ἢ ἕτερόν τι μεσότοιχον ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸ ταῦτα χωρίζον, καὶ οὐκέτι δύο ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς. Τὸ φύσει πεφυκὸς οὐ μεθίσταται, τὸ δὲ μεταβαλλόμενον οὐ φύσει. Εἰ οὖν φύσει