ARTICLE 6

In this article the question is: Whether there is virtue in the practical intellect as in a subject.

It would seem that there is not.

             OBJECTIONS:

1. According to the Philosopher, knowledge is of little or no value for virtue. Now he is speaking here of practical knowledge, as is clear when he goes on to say that many do not do things of which they have knowledge. But knowledge ordered to action is in the practical intellect. Therefore, the practical intellect cannot be the subject of virtue.

             2. Further, a man cannot act rightly without virtue. But one can act rightly with even an imperfect practical intellect, since he can be instructed by another man as to what he must do. Therefore, the perfection of the practical intellect is not a virtue.

             3. Further, the more one turns away from virtue, so much the greater is his sin. But a lack of perfection in the practical intellect lessens one's guilt; for ignorance excuses, either partially or wholly, from sin. Therefore, the perfection of the practical intellect cannot be a virtue.

             4. Further, according to Cicero virtue operates after the manner of nature (like a second nature). But this is contrary to the way in which reason or the practical intellect operates. This is clear from the Physics, where a natural agent is distinguished from one which acts from reason. Therefore, it would seem that there is virtue in the practical intellect.

             5. Further, goodness and truth are formally different, in their proper notions (rationes). But a formal difference of objects diversifies habits. Since, therefore, the object of virtue is the good, while the perfection of the practical intellect is truth--as ordained to action; it would seem that virtue is not the perfection of the practical intellect.

             6. Further, according to the Philosopher, virtue is a voluntary habit. But the habits of the practical intellect differ from those of the will or of the appetitive part. Therefore, the habits which are in the practical intellect are not virtues; and so the practical intellect cannot be the subject of virtue.

             ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Prudence is one of the four cardinal virtues; and yet its subject is the practical intellect. Therefore, the practical intellect can be the subject of virtue.

             2. Further, human virtue is that which resides in a human power as in its subject. But the practical intellect is more a human power than are the irascible and concupiscible appetites; as what is such by its essence is more such than what is such only by participation. Therefore, the practical intellect can be the subject of human virtue.

             3. Further, the cause whereby a thing is such is still more so (propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis). But virtue resides in the affective part on account of reason, since virtue is assigned to the affective part when the latter obeys reason. Therefore, a fortiori, there should be virtue in the practical intellect.

             I reply: Between natural and rational virtues, there is difference, that a natural virtue is determined to one thing, whereas a rational virtue may have many objects (from which to choose).

             The sensitive or rational appetite must be inclined to its own appetible object by some preceding apprehension, for inclination towards an end, without previous knowledge, pertains to a natural appetite, as when a heavy object tends towards the center of gravity. Since the object of both the sensitive and the rational appetite must be some apprehended good, where this good is uniform, there can be a natural inclination in the appetite, following a natural judgement in the cognitive power, as happens in brutes.

             Since brutes are capable of few operations, on account of the weakness of the active principle in them, which extends to few objects, in all animals of the same species there is one uniform good. Hence they are inclined by a natural appetite to this good, and by their cognitive power they form a natural judgment of it as their proper, uniform good. Thus by a natural judgement and inclination of this sort, every sparrow builds its nest in the same way, and every spider spins its web in a uniform fashion. The same is to be observed of all other brutes.

             Now man is capable of many and diverse operations because of the superiority of his active principle, namely, his soul, the power of which extends, in a certain sense, to an infinite variety of objects. Consequently, a natural appetite for good would not suffice for man, nor a natural judgement, to enable him to act correctly, unless it were more fully determined and perfected.

             Man is inclined, indeed, by a natural appetite to desire his own good; but since this good of his consists in many and varied things, there could be in man no natural appetite for this determined good, fulfilling all the conditions required that it be good for him. The reason for this is that man's good is of manyfold diversity, according to the diverse conditions of persons, times, places, and so forth.

             For the same reason, natural judgement is not enough, because it is uniform and so does not suffice for determining human good. Hence man should seek and judge his own proper good, according to all the conditions under which it is here and now to be sought, through reason, which is able to consider diverse aspects of things. For this function, practical reason without a perfecting habit, is like the speculative reason, without the habit of science, trying to form a judgement on some scientific conclusion: which, certainly, it could do only imperfectly and with difficulty.

             Just as the speculative reason must be perfected by the habit of science, that it may judge correctly concerning the objects of knowledge which pertain to science; so the practical reason must be perfected by some habit, that it may judge rightly concerning human good in each single act to be performed. This virtue is called prudence, the subject of which is the practical reason. It perfects all the moral virtues, which reside in the appetitive part, each of which has an inclination to some type of human good: as justice inclines one to the good which is equality in those things which men share in their community life with one another; temperance, inclining one to the good which consists in restraining oneself in concupiscible pleasures; and similarly for each of the other virtues.

             Now each of these virtues may act in a variety of ways; nor do they operate in the same way in everyone. Hence prudence is required, to establish the right mode in all of them. Thus rectitude and the complete perfection of goodness is derived in all the other virtues from prudence, so that, in the Ethics, the Philosopher says that the mean in moral virtue is determined by right reason. All the habits of the appetitive part derive their status as virtue from this rectitude and perfection of goodness; from which it follows that prudence is the cause of all the virtues of the appetitive part, which are called moral virtues. Moreover, Gregory says, in his Moralia, that the other virtues, unless they act prudently with respect to appetible objects, cannot in truth be called virtues.

             REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. In this passage the Philosopher is speaking of practical science; but prudence implies more than practical science. For it belongs to practical science to form a universal judgment on what things are to be done, as: fornication is evil, theft must not be committed, and so on. However, once we have this science, the judgment of reason may direct us falsely in a particular act; hence science is said to be of little value for virtue, because even when a man possesses science, he may sin against virtue.

             It is the office of prudence to judge correctly concerning individual acts, exactly as they are to be done here and now: and this judgment is corrupted by sin. Therefore, while prudence remains, a man will not sin. Clearly then prudence is, not of meagre, but of tremendous importance for virtue--indeed, it is the cause of virtue itself, as was said above (in the body of the Art.).

             2. A man can take counsel from another concerning what must be done in general; but that he judge correctly in each act, and overcome all his passions, can be effected only by the virtue of prudence. Without this there can be no virtue.

             3. The ignorance which is opposed to prudence is ignorance in choice, according to which every evil man is ignorant. This arises from the fact that the judgment of reason is hindered by the inclination of the appetite: which does not excuse from sin, but rather constitutes it. But the ignorance which is opposed to practical knowledge does excuse or at least lessen the guilt of sin.

             4. Cicero's words are to be understood with regard to the inclination of the appetite tending to some common good, e.g. acting bravely, or something similar. But unless such an inclination were directed by the judgement of reason, it would frequently be led away over-hastily, and the more so, the more vehement it was. The Philosopher, in the Ethics, cites the example of the blind man who, the more swiftly he is running, is knocked down so much the more forcefully, when he strikes a wall.

             5. Goodness and truth are objects of two parts of the soul, namely, the intellective and the appetitive parts. Now these two parts are so inter-related, that both operate in the other's act: thus, the will wills the intellect to know, and the intellect knows that the will wills. Therefore these two, goodness and truth, include each other: for goodness is true, insofar as it is apprehended by the intellect, i.e. as the intellect knows that the will wills the good, or, in another way, insofar as the intellect itself understands that something is good. Similarly, truth itself is a certain good of the intellect, which also falls under the will as an object, insofar as a man wills to understand the truth.

             Nevertheless, the truth of the practical intellect is goodness, which is also the end of action: for goodness does not move the appetite, save when it is apprehended. Hence there is nothing to prohibit virtue from being in the practical intellect.

             6. In this part of the Ethics, the Philosopher is defining moral virtue: he treats of intellectual virtue in VI Ethics, Chapters 1 to 7. Now the virtue which is in the practical intellect is not moral but intellectual: indeed, the Philosopher himself places prudence among the intellectual virtues, in II Ethics, 5 and 8.