LESSON II

[iii. 2. 1275b34-3. 1276b16]

             357 After having determined what a citizen is absolutely speaking, the Philosopher here points out certain difficulties concerning what has been said and treats of them. He lists four difficulties that follow upon one another.

             The first difficulty has to do with those who, after a change of regime, are received as members of the political community. This, for example, is what a certain wise man by the name of Cleisthenes did in Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants. He added to the associations of the city many foreigners and even a certain number of alien slaves, so that, as a result of the increase in population, the rich would not be able to oppress the people tyrannically. By way of solving this difficulty, he says that there is no question whether these men are citizens or not, since, from the very fact that they were made citizens, they are citizens. But there is a question whether this was done justly or unjustly; and what the Philosopher seems to be driving at is that those who are instated by the person who overthrows the regime are citizens.

             358 Then he raises a second difficulty: one could question whether he who is not in justice a citizen is a citizen, as if in this matter "unjust" meant the same thing as "false." For it is obvious that a false citizen is not a citizen. To this he answers that, since some people are held to be rulers notwithstanding the fact that they rule unjustly, for the same reason those who are citizens unjustly are to be called citizens, because one is called a citizen as a result of his having some share in the government, as was said earlier.

             359 Then he states the third difficulty. He says that the question whether one is or is not in justice a citizen is bound up with a previous difficulty raised at the beginning of this third book. When complete changes of regimes occur in a city, one usually asks: When is that which is done an act of the city and when is it not? For example, it sometimes happens that the regime of a city changes from a tyranny or from a rule of the rich to a popular rule, and then the people, assuming control of the government, do not wish to honor the agreements that were made either by the tyrant or by the rich who once ruled. They claim that if some things were given to the tyrant or to the rich men of the city, the city did not receive them; and so it is in many such cases, for in certain regimes, the men in power obtain certain things from others, not for the common benefit of the city, but for their private advantage. And he solves this difficulty [by saying] that, if the city remains the same once a complete change in regime has occurred, just as that which is done by the popular state is an act of the city, so, too, is that which is done when a few or a tyrant are in power. For just as the power in the city was then held by the tyrant or by the rich, so also in a popular state it is held by the people.

             360 Then he states the fourth difficulty. First, he states this difficulty in general, and he says that, in order to solve the third difficulty, the proper way to speak is to ask how one should say that a city is or is not the same. Secondly, he divides the aforesaid difficulty into two parts. He says that this question on the surface appears to refer to two things, namely, the territory of the city and the men who reside in the city. For it sometimes happens that men are separated from the territory in different ways, as, for example, when all the citizens are expelled from the city and some are led away to one place and others to another. Hence, if other residents are brought in to replace them, a question may arise whether the city is or is not the same. But this difficulty is really less serious, that is to say, easier to answer. For the term "city" has many meanings. In one sense, it refers to the territory of the city, and in this sense the city is the same. In another sense, it refers to the people of the city, and in this sense it is not the same.

             361 But then there remains another difficulty, [126] for if the same men always reside in the same place, there can be a doubt as to when the city is, or is not, one.

             First, he eliminates one notion of unity. He asserts that it cannot be said that the men residing in a city preserve the identity of the city because they live within the same walls. For one whole region, for example, the Peloponnesus, could happen to be encircled by one wall and yet not constitute the same city. Such was the case with Babylon or with any other very large city that comprises one nation rather than one city. Indeed, it is said of Babylon that when one part of the city was captured, the other part did not hear about it until three days later because of the length of the walls.

             362 And he remarks parenthetically that this question, namely, whether it is advantageous to have a city of that size, will have to be considered elsewhere, that is, in Book VII. For it pertains to the statesman to know how large a city should be and whether it should include men of one nation or of several. The size of the city should indeed be such that the region may be sufficiently productive and that it may be possible to repel external enemies. It should also preferably be made up of a single nation in view of the fact that the men of the same nation possess the same way of life and the same customs, which foster friendship among the citizens because of their resemblance. Accordingly, the cities that were constituted out of different nations were ruined on account of the dissensions that arose in them due to the diversity of manners, for one part used to ally itself with [external] enemies out of hatred for the other part.

             363 Then he investigates another notion of unity, namely, whether, when men remain in the same place, the city must be said to be the same because its inhabitants belong to the same race; for even though they are not the same numerically, one generation is succeeded by another. Just as we say that springs or rivers are the same because of the steady flow of waters, even though one part runs off and another part runs in, so we say that a city is the same, even though some men die and others are born, so long as the same race of men endures.

             364 Then, by solving this difficulty, he reveals the true nature of the unity of the city. He says that, because of the aforesaid succession of men belonging to the same race, a multitude of men can be called the same in a sense; a city, however, cannot be called the same if the political order [or regime] is changed. For, since the association of citizens, which we call a regime, pertains to the nature of the city, it is evident that, if the regime is changed, the city does not remain the same. We see, for example, among those who sing in choruses, that the chorus is not the same if at one time it is a comic chorus, that is to say, if it sings comic songs about the deeds of lowly persons, and if at another time it is a tragic chorus, that is to say, if it sings tragic songs about the exploits of princes. So, too, we see in all other things that consist in a certain composition or association that, whenever there is a different species of composition, the identity is destroyed, just as, for example, a harmony is not the same if at one time it is Dorian, that is to say, if it is a harmony of the seventh or eighth tone, and at another time Phrygian, that is to say, if it is a harmony of the third or fourth tone.

             Since, then, this is the case with all such things, it is evident that a city must be said to be the same with respect to the order of the regime, in such a way that, if the order of the regime is changed, though the territory and the men remain unchanged, the city is not the same, even if materially it is the same. A city changed in this manner may be called by the same name or by another name, whether the men be the same or different; but if it retains the same name, the name will be used equivocally. Now whether, due to the fact that the city does not remain the same once a complete change of regime has taken place, it is just or not that the agreements contracted by the previous regime be honored, is another matter, which will be discussed later.