Chapter VI.—The Arguments of the Platonists for the Soul’s Incorporeality, Opposed, Perhaps Frivolously.

These conclusions the Platonists disturb more by subtilty than by truth. Every body, they say, has necessarily either an animate nature40    Animale, “having the nature of soul.” or an inanimate one.41    Inanimale. If it has the inanimate nature, it receives motion externally to itself; if the animate one, internally. Now the soul receives motion neither externally nor internally: not externally, since it has not the inanimate nature; nor internally, because it is itself rather the giver of motion to the body. It evidently, then, is not a bodily substance, inasmuch as it receives motion neither way, according to the nature and law of corporeal substances. Now, what first surprises us here, is the unsuitableness of a definition which appeals to objects which have no affinity with the soul. For it is impossible for the soul to be called either an animate body or an inanimate one, inasmuch as it is the soul itself which makes the body either animate, if it be present to it, or else inanimate, if it be absent from it.  That, therefore, which produces a result, cannot itself be the result, so as to be entitled to the designation of an animate thing or an inanimate one. The soul is so called in respect of its own substance. If, then, that which is the soul admits not of being called an animate body or an inanimate one, how can it challenge comparison with the nature and law of animate and inanimate bodies? Furthermore, since it is characteristic of a body to be moved externally by something else, and as we have already shown that the soul receives motion from some other thing when it is swayed (from the outside, of course, by something else) by prophetic influence or by madness, therefore I must be right in regarding that as bodily substance which, according to the examples we have quoted, is moved by some other object from without. Now, if to receive motion from some other thing is characteristic of a body, how much more is it so to impart motion to something else!  But the soul moves the body, all whose efforts are apparent externally, and from without. It is the soul which gives motion to the feet for walking, and to the hands for touching, and to the eyes for sight, and to the tongue for speech—a sort of internal image which moves and animates the surface. Whence could accrue such power to the soul, if it were incorporeal? How could an unsubstantial thing propel solid objects? But in what way do the senses in man seem to be divisible into the corporeal and the intellectual classes? They tell us that the qualities of things corporeal, such as earth and fire, are indicated by the bodily senses—of touch and sight; whilst (the qualities) of incorporeal things—for instance, benevolence and malignity—are discovered by the intellectual faculties. And from this (they deduce what is to them) the manifest conclusion, that the soul is incorporeal, its properties being comprehended by the perception not of bodily organs, but of intellectual faculties.  Well, (I shall be much surprised) if I do not at once cut away the very ground on which their argument stands.  For I show them how incorporeal things are commonly submitted to the bodily senses—sound, for instance, to the organ of hearing; colour, to the organ of sight; smell, to the olfactory organ.  And, just as in these instances, the soul likewise has its contact with42    Accedit. the body; not to say that the incorporeal objects are reported to us through the bodily organs, for the express reason that they come into contact with the said organs. Inasmuch, then, as it is evident that even incorporeal objects are embraced and comprehended by corporeal ones, why should not the soul, which is corporeal, be equally comprehended and understood by incorporeal faculties? It is thus certain that their argument fails. Among their more conspicuous arguments will be found this, that in their judgment every bodily substance is nourished by bodily substances; whereas the soul, as being an incorporeal essence, is nourished by incorporeal aliments—for instance, by the studies of wisdom. But even this ground has no stability in it, since Soranus, who is a most accomplished authority in medical science, affords us as answer, when he asserts that the soul is even nourished by corporeal aliments; that in fact it is, when failing and weak, actually refreshed oftentimes by food. Indeed, when deprived of all food, does not the soul entirely remove from the body? Soranus, then, after discoursing about the soul in the amplest manner, filling four volumes with his dissertations, and after weighing well all the opinions of the philosophers, defends the corporeality of the soul, although in the process he has robbed it of its immortality. For to all men it is not given to believe the truth which Christians are privileged to hold. As, therefore, Soranus has shown us from facts that the soul is nourished by corporeal aliments, let the philosopher (adopt a similar mode of proof, and) show that it is sustained by an incorporeal food. But the fact is, that no one has even been able to quench this man’s43    We follow Oehler’s view of this obscure passage, in preference to Rigaltius’. doubts and difficulties about the condition of the soul with the honey-water of Plato’s subtle eloquence, nor to surfeit them with the crumbs from the minute nostrums of Aristotle. But what is to become of the souls of all those robust barbarians, which have had no nurture of philosopher’s lore indeed, and yet are strong in untaught practical wisdom, and which although very starvelings in philosophy, without your Athenian academies and porches, and even the prison of Socrates, do yet contrive to live? For it is not the soul’s actual substance which is benefited by the aliment of learned study, but only its conduct and discipline; such ailment contributing nothing to increase its bulk, but only to enhance its grace. It is, moreover, a happy circumstance that the Stoics affirm that even the arts have corporeality; since at the rate the soul too must be corporeal, since it is commonly supposed to be nourished by the arts.  Such, however, is the enormous preoccupation of the philosophic mind, that it is generally unable to see straight before it. Hence (the story of) Thales falling into the well.44    See Tertullian’s Ad Nationes (our translation), p. 33, Supra.. It very commonly, too, through not understanding even its own opinions, suspects a failure of its own health. Hence (the story of) Chrysippus and the hellebore. Some such hallucination, I take it, must have occurred to him, when he asserted that two bodies could not possibly be contained in one: he must have kept out of mind and sight the case of those pregnant women who, day after day, bear not one body, but even two and three at a time, within the embrace of a single womb. One finds likewise, in the records of the civil law, the instance of a certain Greek woman who gave birth to a quint45    Quinionem. of children, the mother of all these at one parturition, the manifold parent of a single brood, the prolific produce from a single womb, who, guarded by so many bodies—I had almost said, a people—was herself no less then the sixth person! The whole creation testifies how that those bodies which are naturally destined to issue from bodies, are already (included) in that from which they proceed. Now that which proceeds from some other thing must needs be second to it. Nothing, however, proceeds out of another thing except by the process of generation; but then they are two (things).

CAPUT VI.

Haec Platonici, subtilitate potius quam veritate, conturbant. Omne, inquiunt, corpus, aut animale sit 0654A necesse est, aut inanimale. Et siquidem inanimale est, extrinsecus movebitur; si vero animale, intrinsecus. Anima autem nec intrinsecus movebitur, ut quae non sit inanimalis; nec extrinsecus, ut quae ipsa potius moveat corpus. Itaque non videri eam corpus, quae non corporalium fornia ex aliqua regione moveatur. Ad hoc nos mirabimur incongruentiam primo definitionis provocantis ad ea quae in animam non conveniunt . Non enim potest anima animale corpus dici, aut inanimale; cum ipsa sit quae aut faciat corpus animale, si adsit; aut inanimale, si absit ab illo. Itaque quod facit, non potest esse ipsa, ut dicatur animale vel inanimale. Anima enim dicitur substantiae suae nomine. Quod si non capit animale corpus dici aut inanimale quod est anima, quomodo 0654B provocabitur ad animalium et inanimalium corporum formam? Dehinc, si corporis est moveri extrinsecus ab aliquo; ostendimus autem supra moveri animam et ab alio cum vaticinatur, cum furit, utique extrinsecus, cum ab alio: merito quod movebitur extrinsecus ab alio, secundum exempli propositionem, corpus agnoscam. Enim vero, si ab alio moveri corporis est, quanto magis movere aliud? Anima autem movet corpus, et conatus ejus extrinsecus, foris parent. Ab illa est enim impingi et pedes in incessum, et manus in contactum, et oculos in conspectum, et linguam in effatum, velut sigillario motu superficiem intus agitante. Unde haec vis incorporal animae? unde vacuae rei solida propellere? Sed quomodo divisi videntur in homine sensus corporales et 0654C intellectuales? Corporalium aiunt rerum ualitates, ut terrae , ut ignis, corporalibus sensibus renuntiari, ut tactu, ut visu : incorporalium vero intellectualibus conveniri, ut benignitatis, vel malignitatis. Itaque incorporalem esse animam constat, cujus qualitates non corporalibus, sed intellectualibus sensibus comprehendantur. Plane, si non hujus definitionis gradum exclusero. Ecce enim, incorporalia ostendo corporalibus sensibus subjici, sonum auditui, colorem conspectui, odorem odoratui: quorum exemplo etiam anima corpori accedit, ne dicas idcirco ea per corporales 0655A renuntiari sensus , quia corporalibus accedant. Igitur si constat incorporalia quoque a corporalibus comprehendi, cur non et anima, quae corporalis, ab incorporalibus renuntietur? Certe definitio exclusa sit. De insignioribus argumentationibus erit etiam illa, quod omne corpus corporalibus ali judicant; animam vero ut incorporalem, incorporalibus, sapientiae scilicet studiis. Sed nec hic gradus stabit, etiam Sorano methodicae medicinae instructissimo auctore respondente animam corporalibus quoque ali; denique, deficientem eam cibo plerumque fulciri. Quidni, quo adempto, in totum dilabitur ex corpore? Ita etiam ipse Soranus plenissime super anima commentatus quatuor voluminibus, et cum omnibus philosophorum sententiis expertus, corporalem animae substantiam 0655B vindicat, etsi illam immortalitate fraudavit. Non enim omnium est credere, quod Christianorum est. Sicut ergo Soranus ipse rebus ostendit animam corporalibus ali, proinde et philosophus exhibeat illam incorporalibus pasci. Sed nemo unquam cunctanti de exitu animae mulsam aquam de eloquio Platonis infudit; aut micas de minutiloquio Aristotelis infersit. Quid autem facient tot ac tantae animae rupicum et barbarorum , quibus alimenta sapientiae desunt, tamen indoctae prudentia pollent, et sine academiis et porticibus atticis, et carceribus Socratis, denique jejunantes philosophia , nihilominus vivunt. Non enim substantiae ipsi alimenta proficiunt studiorum, 0656A sed disciplinae; quia nec opimiorem animam efficiunt, sed ornatiorem. Bene autem, quod et artes Stoici corporales adfirmant. Adeo sic quoque anima corporalis, si et artibus ali creditur. Sed enormis intentio philosophiae solet plerumque nec prospicere pro pedibus: sic Thales in puteum. Solet et, sententias non intelligendo, valetudinis corruptelam suspicari: sic Chrysippus ad elleborum. Tale aliquid, opinor, ei accidit, cum duo in unum corpora negavit, alienatus a prospectu et recogitatu praegnantum, quae non singula quotidie corpora, sed et bina et terna in unius uteri ambitu perferunt . Invenitur etiam in jure civili graeca quaedam quinionem enixa filiorum, semel omnium mater, unici foetus parens multiplex, unici uteri puerpera numerosa, 0656B quae tot stipata corporibus, pene dixerim populo, sextum ipsa corpus fuit. Universa conditio testabitur, corpora de corporibus processura jam illic esse, unde procedunt: secundum sit necesse est, quod ex alio est: nihil porro ex alio est, nisi dum gignitur: sed tunc duo sunt.