Chapter VI.—Further disagreements between Plato and Aristotle.

And that these very wonderful sages of yours do not even agree in other respects, can be easily learned from this. For while Plato says that there are three first principles of all things, God, and matter, and form,—God, the maker of all; and matter, which is the subject of the first production of all that is produced, and affords to God opportunity for His workmanship; and form, which is the type of each of the things produced,— Aristotle makes no mention at all of form as a first principle, but says that there are two, God and matter. And again, while Plato says that the highest God and the ideas exist in the first place of the highest heavens, and in fixed sphere, Aristotle says that, next to the most high God, there are, not ideas, but certain gods, who can be perceived by the mind. Thus, then, do they differ concerning things heavenly. So that one can see that they not only are unable to understand our earthly matters, but also, being at variance among themselves regarding these things, they will appear unworthy of credit when they treat of things heavenly. And that even their doctrine regarding the human soul as it now is does not harmonize, is manifest from what has been said by each of them concerning it. For Plato says that it is of three parts, having the faculty of reason, of affection, and of appetite.21    τὸ λογικόν τὸ θυμικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, —corresponding to what we roughly speak of as reason, the heart, and the appetites. But Aristotle says that the soul is not so comprehensive as to include also corruptible parts, but only reason. And Plato loudly maintains that “the whole soul is immortal.” But Aristotle, naming it “the actuality,”22    ἐντελέχεια, —the completion or actuality to which each thing, by virtue of its peculiar nature (or potentiality, δύναμις), can arrive. would have it to be mortal, not immortal. And the former says it is always in motion; but Aristotle says that it is immoveable, since it must itself precede all motion.

Ὅτι τοίνυν οἱ σφόδρα θαυμαστοὶ καθ' ὑμᾶς σοφοὶ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις συμφωνοῦντες φαίνονται, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων γνῶναι ῥᾴδιον. Τοῦ γὰρ Πλάτωνος τρεῖς ἀρχὰς τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι λέγοντος, θεὸν καὶ ὕλην καὶ εἶδος (θεὸν μὲν τὸν πάντων ποιητήν, ὕλην δὲ τὴν ὑποκειμένην τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν γενομένων γενέσει καὶ τὴν πρόφασιν αὐτῷ τῆς δημιουργίας παρέχουσαν, εἶδος δὲ τὸ ἑκάστου τῶν γινομένων παράδειγμα), Ἀριστοτέλης τοῦ μὲν εἴδους ὡς ἀρχῆς οὐδαμῶς μέμνηται, δύο δὲ ἀρχάς, θεὸν καὶ ὕλην, εἶναί φησι. Καὶ αὖθις τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τοῦ ἀνωτάτω οὐρανοῦ ἀπλανεῖ σφαίρᾳ τόν τε πρῶτον θεὸν καὶ τὰς εἰδέας εἶναι λέγοντος, Ἀριστοτέλης μετὰ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν οὐ τὰς εἰδέας ἀλλά τινας νοητοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι λέγει. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἐν οὐρανοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφέρονται πραγμάτων. Ὥστε εἰδέναι προσήκει ὅτι οἱ μηδὲ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐνταῦθα γνῶναι δυνηθέντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους διενεχθέντες, οὐκ ἀξιόπιστοι φανήσονται περὶ τῶν ἐν οὐρανοῖς διηγούμενοι. Ὅτι τοίνυν οὐδὲ ὁ περὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς αὐτοῖς συμφωνήσει λόγος, δῆλον ἀπὸ τῶν ὑφ' ἑκατέρου αὐτῶν περὶ αὐτῆς λεχθέντων. Πλάτων μὲν γὰρ τριμερῆ αὐτὴν εἶναί φησι, καὶ τὸ μὲν λογικὸν αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ θυμικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν εἶναι λέγει: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ οὐ κοινοτέραν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναί φησιν, ἐν ᾧ περιείληπται καὶ τὰ φθαρτὰ μόρια, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογικὸν μόνον. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πλάτων Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος κέκραγε λέγων: Ἀριστοτέλης δέ, ἐντελέχειαν αὐτὴν ὀνομάζων, οὐκ ἀθάνατον ἀλλὰ θνητὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι βούλεται. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀεικίνητον αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγει: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἀκίνητον αὐτὴν εἶναί φησιν, ἁπάσης κινήσεως προηγουμένην.