and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being, being because it is matter, not-being because it is not the matter of something. But if matter is the matter of nothing, then matter is nothing of formlessness. But if matter is of formlessness, then matter as matter never was, but always the matter of something, sometimes of formlessness, sometimes of form. That formlessness is something is clear from its being posited as a principle of things that come to be. But if these things are so, then matter is never not-being, but always being, sometimes formless, sometimes formed; for which reason it is also always generated. If matter is able to cast off its co-eternal formlessness, then it is also able to cast off its co-eternal ungeneratedness. But if not the second, then not the first. How then does that which comes to be come to be from matter, when matter does not cast off its co-eternal formlessness? If, just as the mode of the triad according to Aristotle is different from the mode of the triad according to Plato, so also the triad is different, how is the hexad not the principle of things that come to be, but the triad is? And if the triad is not different, how is its mode different? z. From the same argument. For that which endures is a co-cause with the form of the things that come to be, like a mother; but the other part of the contrariety might often seem to one who fixes his mind on its evil-doing aspect not to exist at all. For since there is something divine and good and desirable, we say that one thing is contrary to it, and another is by its own nature disposed to desire and long for it. But it happens that the contrary longs for its own destruction. And yet it is not possible for the form to desire itself, because it is not in want, nor the contrary; for contraries are destructive of one another. But this is matter, as if the female for the male and the ugly for the beautiful; except it is not ugly in itself, but by accident, nor female, but by accident. And it is destroyed and comes to be in one sense, but in another sense not. For as that in which, it is destroyed in itself; for that which is destroyed in it is the privation; but as in potentiality, not in itself, but it is necessary for it to be indestructible and ungenerated. For if it came to be, something must first underlie it, from which it comes to be while immanent; and this is its very nature, so that it will exist before coming to be. For I call matter the first substrate for each thing, from which something comes to be immanently and not by accident. And if it is destroyed, it will arrive at this as its final state, so that it will have been destroyed before it is destroyed. If, just as matter and form are a principle of things that come to be, so also is privation, how is it that matter is a co-cause with form of things that come to be, but privation is not a co-cause? If form is a principle for this reason, that from it comes the being for that which comes to be, it is clear that privation is also a principle for this reason, that through it comes the not-being for that which comes to be. How then is the priv... called a principle of things that come to be

καὶ στερεῖται μὲν ἡ ὕλη τοῦ τινὸς εἶναι ὕλην, τοῦ δὲ εἶναι αὐτὴν ὕλην οὐ στερεῖται, ἔσται ἄρα ἡ ὕλη ὂν καὶ οὐκ ὄν, ὂν μὲν διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν ὕλην, οὐκ ὂν δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐ τὴν τινὸς ὕλην. Ἀλλ' εἰ μηδενός ἐστιν ὕλη ἡ ὕλη, οὐδὲν ἄρα τῆς ἀμορφίας ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη. Eἰ δὲ τῆς ἀμορφίας ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη, οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἦν ἡ ὕλη ᾗ ὕλη, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τινὸς ὕλη, ποτὲ μὲν τῆς ἀμορφίας, ποτὲ δὲ τῆς μορφῆς. Ὅτι δέ τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀμορφία δῆλον ἐξ οὗ ἐτέθη ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῶν γιγνομένων. Ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδέποτε ἄρα οὐκ ὂν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὂν εἶναι, ποτὲ μὲν ἄμορφον, ποτὲ δὲ μεμορ φωμένην· διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ γενητή. Eἰ δύναται ἡ ὕλη τὴν συν αΐδιον αὑτῆς ἀποβαλεῖν ἀμορφίαν, δύναται ἄρα καὶ τὴν συναΐδιον αὑτῆς ἀποβαλεῖν ἀγενεσίαν. Eἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ δεύτε ρον, οὐδ' ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον. Πῶς οὖν γίγνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης, τῆς ὕλης τὴν συναΐδιον αὑτῆς ἀμορφίαν μὴ ἀποβαλ λομένης; Eἰ, ὥσπερ ὁ τρόπος τῆς κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην τριάδος ἕτερός ἐστι παρὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα τριά δος, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τριὰς ἑτέρα, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τῶν γιγνο μένων ἡ ἑξὰς ἀλλ' ἡ τριάς; Καὶ εἰ ἡ τριὰς οὐχ ἑτέρα, πῶς ὁ τρόπος αὐτῆς ἕτερος; ζ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπομένουσα συναιτία τῇ μορφῇ τῶν γιγνο μένων ἐστίν, ὥσπερ μήτηρ· ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα μοῖρα τῆς ἐναντιώ σεως πολλάκις ἂν φαντασθείη τῷ πρὸς τὸ κακοποιὸν αὐτῆς ἀτενίζοντι τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδὲ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. Ὄντος γάρ τινος θείου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐφετοῦ, τὸ μὲν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ φαμεν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ πεφυκέναι ἐφίεσθαι καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν αὑτοῦ. Τοῖς δὲ συμβαίνει τὸ ἐναντίον ὀρέ γεσθαι τῆς αὑτοῦ φθορᾶς. Καίτοι οὔτε αὑτοῦ οἷόν τε ἐφίε σθαι τὸ εἶδος διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐνδεές, οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον· φθαρτικὰ γὰρ ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναντία. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ὕλη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θῆλυ ἄῤῥενος καὶ αἰσχρὸν καλοῦ· πλὴν οὐ καθ' αὑτὸ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐδὲ θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Φθείρεται δὲ καὶ γίνεται ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὔ. Ὡς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾧ, καθ' αὑτὸ φθείρεται· τὸ γὰρ φθειρόμενον ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἡ στέρησις· ὡς δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐ καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλ' ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγένητον ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν εἶναι. Eἴτε γὰρ ἐγίνετο, ὑποκεῖσθαί τι δεῖ πρῶ τον, τὸ ἐξ οὗ ἐνυπάρχοντος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις, ὥστ' ἔσται πρὶν γενέσθαι. Λέγω γὰρ ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον ὑπο κείμενον ἑκάστῳ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Eἴτε φθείρεται, εἰς τοῦτο ἔσχατον ἀφίξεται, ὥστε ἐφθαρμένη ἔσται πρὶν φθαρῆναι. Eἰ, ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τῶν γιγνομένων ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος, οὕτω καὶ ἡ στέρησις, πῶς ἡ μὲν ὕλη συναιτία τῇ μορφῇ τῶν γιγνο μένων, ἡ δὲ στέρησις οὐ συναιτία; Eἰ διὰ τοῦτο ἀρχὴ τὸ εἶ δος, ἐπειδὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶναι τῷ γιγνομένῳ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ στέρησις διὰ τοῦτο ἀρχή, ἐπειδὴ δι' αὐτὴν τὸ μὴ εἶναι τῷ γιγνομένῳ. Πῶς οὖν ἀρχὴ λέγεται τῶν γιγνομένων ἡ στέ