and in actuality; which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and the world comes to be by being always preserved, but by always being the same it is uncreated. A refutation of the response not correctly made. To say that God who has made nothing is powerless is absurd. For here again the same argument applies, that there is nothing temporal with God. If on account of "There is nothing temporal with God" it is absurd to say of him "he has made," then "to make" is also of the same absurdity, being temporal just as "he has made." How then does the respondent say that "he has made" is unfitting for God, but "he makes" is fitting? And if "having made" has the same meaning as "he makes," and likewise "he makes" as "he will make," and the interchange of equivalent terms is unhindered, how in the first response did the respondent apply to God "having made" and "he makes," but now he removes both from him? And he applied "having made" to God thus: "He is the same God," he says, "who made the things here;" and he applied "to make" thus: "It is necessary, therefore," he says, "that the same one, remaining over the same things, make the same things." But removing in the second response what was stated in the first response, he says thus: "It is absurd to say that God who has made nothing is powerless." And again: "God has neither made nor makes nor will make in time." But perhaps he endured this contradicting himself through his own forgetfulness, through which, as he said, it happens that humans are ignorant. But let us examine the things that follow from these. "Nothing," he says, "is temporal with God;" it is clear that neither is it fitting to apply the past of time to God. But if this is not fitting, it is also not fitting to say that God has made anything whatsoever. In these things the respondent, having supposed the absurdity that nothing is temporal with God, introduces as reasonable the things that necessarily follow from the absurdity, namely, "If nothing is temporal with God, it is clear that neither is it fitting to apply the past of time to God." But if this is not fitting, it is also not fitting to say that God has made anything whatsoever. But that he absurdly supposed that nothing is temporal with God, which he used for the proof with the following additions, the respondent refutes himself in what he asserted in the first response: "But if it is he himself," he says, "God who made the things here, it is clear that since the same God remains both later and always, the same things will be." For what he was able to do long ago, he is also able to do now. If, therefore, nothing is temporal with God, it is clear that neither "having made" nor "he makes" nor "before" and "after" nor "long ago" and "now" nor "he was able" and "he is able." For "having made" and "before" and "long ago" and "he was able" are indicative of past time, and "he makes" and "after" and "now" and "he is able" are significant of present and future time. But if these things being applied to the

καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. Ὁ αὐτὸς τοίνυν μένων οὐδὲν ἔχει ἔγχρονον. Ποιεῖ τοίνυν τὸν κόσμον, τάττων αὐτὸν ἀεί, καὶ ὁ κόσμος τῷ μὲν ἀεὶ φρουρεῖσθαι γίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ εἶναι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀγένητος ὑπάρχει. Ἔλεγχος τῆς ἀποκρίσεως οὐκ ὀρθῶς γεγενημένης. Τὸ λέγειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι θεὸν τὸν μηδὲν πεποιηκότα ἄτοπόν ἐστι. Πάλιν γὰρ κἀνταῦθα ὁ αὐτὸς ἐφαρμόζει λόγος, ὡς οὐδὲν ἔγχρονόν ἐστι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ. Eἰ διὰ τὸ Μηδὲν ἔγ χρονόν ἐστι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ πεποίηκε, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἀτοπίας καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν, ἔγχρονον ὡς τὸ πεποίηκε. Πῶς οὖν ἀνάρμοστον μὲν λέγει ὁ ἀποκρι νάμενος τῷ θεῷ τὸ πεποίηκεν, εὐάρμοστον δὲ τὸ ποιεῖ; Καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ ποιήσας ἴσον δύναται τῷ ποιεῖ, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖ τῷ ποιήσει, τῶν δὲ ἰσοδυναμούντων ἀκώλυτος ἡ μετά ληψις, πῶς ἐν μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ ἀποκρίσει ἔθηκεν ὁ ἀποκρινά μενος ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ ποιήσας καὶ τὸ ποιεῖ, νῦν δὲ ἀναιρεῖ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀμφότερα; Καὶ τὸ μὲν ποιήσας οὕτως ἔθηκεν ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ· Ὁ αὐτός ἐστι, φησίν, ὁ θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὰ τῇδε· τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν οὕτως ἔθηκε· ∆εῖ οὖν, φησί, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μένοντα τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν. Ἀναιρῶν δὲ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ ἀποκρίσει τὰ κείμενα ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἀποκρίσει οὕτως φησίν· Ἄτοπον τὸ λέγειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι θεὸν τὸν μηδὲν πεποιη κότα. Καὶ πάλιν· Oὔτε πεποίηκεν ὁ θεὸς οὔτε ποιεῖ οὔτε ποιήσει ἐν χρόνῳ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἀντιλέγειν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν λήθην ὑπέμεινε, καθ' ἥν, ὡς εἶπε, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸ ἀγνοεῖν. Ἐξετάσωμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς τὰ τού των ἑξῆς. Oὐδέν, φησίν, ἔγχρονόν ἐστι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ· δῆλον ὡς οὔτε τὸ παρεληλυθὸς τοῦ χρόνου ἁρμόζει ἐπιφέρειν τῷ θεῷ. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἁρμόζει, καὶ τὸ πεποιηκέναι τὸν θεὸν τὸ ὁτι οῦν οὐχ ἁρμόττει λέγειν. Ἐν τούτοις τὸ ἄτοπον ὑποθέμενος ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος. ὡς οὐδὲν ἔγχρονον παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, τὰ τῷ ἀτόπῳ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑπόμενα ὡς εὔλογα ἐπιφέρει, τὸ Eἰ μηδὲν ἔγχρονον παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, δῆλον ὡς οὔτε τὸ παρεληλυθὸς τοῦ χρόνου ἁρμόζει ἐπιφέρειν τῷ θεῷ. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἁρμόζει, καὶ τὸ πεποιηκέναι τὸν θεὸν τὸ ὁτιοῦν οὐχ ἁρμόζει λέγειν. Ὅτι δὲ ἀτόπως ὑπέθηκε τὸ μηδὲν ἔγχρονον εἶναι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, οὗ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐπαγομένοις ἐχρήσατο, ἐλέγχει αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος ἐν οἷς ἔφασκεν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἀποκρίσει· Eἰ δὲ αὐτός, φησίν, ὁ θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὰ τῇδε, δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ μένοντος καὶ ἐς ὕστερον καὶ ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔσται. Ἂ γὰρ πάλαι ἠδύνατο καὶ νῦν δύναται. Eἰ τοίνυν μηδὲν ἔγχρονόν ἐστι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ποιήσας οὔτε τὸ ποιεῖ οὔτε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον οὔτε τὸ πάλαι καὶ τὸ νῦν οὔτε τὸ ἠδύνατο καὶ δύναται. Τὸ γὰρ ποιήσας καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ πάλαι καὶ τὸ ἠδύνατο τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου ἐστὶ δηλωτικά, καὶ τὸ ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ νῦν καὶ τὸ δύναται τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος καὶ τοῦ μέλ λοντος χρόνου ἐστὶ σημαντικά. Eἰ δὲ ταῦτα κείμενα ἐπὶ τοῦ