is resolved into the elements from which they were originally composed. Even if the manner of the dissolution of the parts occurs through being eaten by one another, yet the end of every dissolution, happening in whatever way, is for the dissolved things to return to the elements. Therefore one must not, because of the eating of a man by a fish and of each other, construct a sophistical difficulty that refutes the resurrection, but one should look to the power of God, who not only promises to effect the resurrection of the dead, but also, through the already accomplished resurrection of our savior Christ, has provided us with a sure faith in it. But if the elements are the substrate for the creation of things that come to be and for the re-creation of things that have perished, how, if one considers the re-creation of things that have perished to be unbelievable and impossible, will the creation of things that come to be in the beginning not also be unbelievable and impossible? Which is absurd. b. The Greeks believe in neither the creation of the world nor its re-creation. But if they are right about the first, it would become clear thus. For they say that time is eternal. But if time is eternal, it is necessary then that the parts of time also be eternal, that is, the hours and the days, the months and the year. But if these are not eternal, because in them some things are earlier and others are later, then neither can the world, being in time, be uncreated. c. One must disbelieve the resurrection of the dead for two reasons: either because God is not able to raise the dead, or because it is not advantageous for those who are resurrected to be incorruptible. But of these, the one is impious, the other ridiculous. But if this is so, how is the argument of those who disbelieve the resurrection of the dead not composed of impiety and ridicule? d. What God does by his own hand, these things he does by command; and the existence of the things made by him is simultaneous with the command of God. You thought, it says, and it is present. But if this is fittingly said about God, how does one who disbelieves the resurrection not also disbelieve that God has such power? For those who are raised from the dead need nothing else except the command of God. e. If it is true that "God finds a way for the unexpected," as indeed it is true, how does one who disbelieves the resurrection of the dead not make the saying false? . If, when the re-creation takes place, all the discord among men concerning the creator of the world in relation to his works is necessarily abolished, how will the re-creation of the world not be more beautiful than the creation of the world? For because of the re-creation, the creation is also beautiful. But if that is disbelieved as impossible, how will the creation of the world not be most wicked? g. A thing that is altogether impossible is one thing, and a thing that is impossible for someone is another. It is altogether impossible, for instance, for the diagonal to be commensurable with the side; but it is impossible for someone, for instance, for nature to make an animal without seed. To which of these impossibilities do you submit

γίνεται εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν τὴν ἀρχὴν συνετέθησαν. Eἰ καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς μέρων ἀναλύσεως γίνεται διὰ τῆς ὑπ' ἀλλή λων βρώσεως, ἀλλὰ πάσης ἀναλύσεως τῆς καθ' οἱονδήποτε τρόπον γινομένης τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα χωρεῖν τὰ ἀναλυόμενα. Oὐ χρὴ οὖν διὰ τὴν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων βρῶσιν ἀν θρώπου καὶ ἰχθύος σεσοφισμένην κατασκευάζειν ἀπορίαν ἀναι ρετικὴν ἀναστάσεως, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν ἀφορᾶν τοῦ θεοῦ, τοῦ μὴ μόνον ἐπαγγελλομένου ποιεῖν τῶν νεκρῶν τὴν ἀνάστα σιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἤδη ἠργμένης ἀναστάσεως τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Χριστοῦ βεβαίαν παρεσχηκότος ἡμῖν ταύτης τὴν πίστιν. Ἀλλ' εἰ τὰ στοιχεῖα ὑπόκειται εἰς τὴν κτίσιν τῶν γινομένων καὶ εἰς ἀνάκτισιν τῶν φθαρέντων, πῶς, εἰ ἄπιστον καὶ ἀδύ νατον ἡγεῖται ὂν τὴν ἀνάκτισιν τῶν φθαρέντων, οὐκ ἄπιστος καὶ ἀδύνατος ἔσται καὶ ἡ κτίσις τῶν γινομένων τὴν ἀρχήν; Ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. β. Oὔτε τὴν κτίσιν τοῦ κόσμου οὔτε τὴν ἀνάκτισιν αὐτοῦ πιστεύουσιν Ἕλληνες. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀληθεύουσι τὸ πρῶτον, οὕτως ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον. Λέγουσι γὰρ τὸν χρόνον εἶναι ἀΐ διον. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀΐδιος, ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ χρόνου εἶναι ἀΐδια, τουτέστι τάς τε ὥρας καὶ τὰς ἡμέρας, τούς τε μῆνας καὶ τὸν ἐνιαυτόν. Eἰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀΐδια, διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ μὲν πρότερα, τὰ δὲ ὕστερα, οὐδ' ἄρα ὁ κόσμος, ὢν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ, δύναται εἶναι ἀγένητος. γ. ∆ιὰ δύο πράγματα χρὴ ἀπιστεῖν τῶν νεκρῶν τὴν ἀνά στασιν, ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸν θεὸν ἐγείρειν τοὺς νεκρούς, ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς ἀνισταμένοις εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀφθάρ τους. Τούτων δὲ τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἀσεβές, τὸ δὲ γελοῖον. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, πῶς οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀσεβείας καὶ γέλωτος συνέστηκεν ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀπιστούντων τῶν νεκρῶν τὴν ἀνάστασιν; δ. Ἂ ποιεῖ ὁ θεὸς αὐτουργικῶς, ταῦτα προστάγματι ποιεῖ· σύγχρονος δὲ τῷ προστάγματι τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ὕπαρξις τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ποιουμένων. ∆ιενοήθης, φησί, καὶ πάρεστιν. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο ἁρμοδίως εἴρηται περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, πῶς ὁ ἀπι στῶν τὴν ἀνάστασιν οὐκ ἀπιστεῖ καὶ τῷ θεῷ τὸ ἔχειν τὴν τοι αύτην δύναμιν; Oὐδὲ γὰρ ἑτέρου τινὸς δέονται οἱ ἀνιστάμενοι ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν πλὴν τοῦ προστάγματος τοῦ θεοῦ. ε. Eἰ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ Τῶν ἀδοκήτων πόρον εὗρε θεός, καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἀληθές, πῶς οὐ ψευδῆ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖ ὁ τῶν νεκρῶν ἀπιστῶν τὴν ἀνάστασιν; . Eἰ, γινομένης τῆς ἀνακτίσεως, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀναιρεῖται πᾶσα ἡ περὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ ἐν ἀνθρώποις διχόνοια, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται τοῦ κόσμου ἡ ἀνάκτισις καλλίων τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κτίσεως; ∆ιὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀνά κτισιν καλὴ καὶ ἡ κτίσις. Ἐκείνης δὲ ἀπιστουμένης ὡς ἀδυ νάτου, πῶς οὐ κακίστη ἔσται ἡ τοῦ κόσμου κτίσις; ζ. Ἄλλο τὸ πάντη ἀδύνατον, καὶ ἄλλο τὸ τινὶ ἀδύνατον. Πάντη μὲν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν, ὡς τῇ διαμέτρῳ τὸ σύμμετρον εἶναι τῇ πλευρᾷ· τινὶ δὲ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν, ὡς τῇ φύσει τὸ χωρὶς σπέρματος ποιεῖν ζῶον. Τίνι τούτων τῶν ἀδυνάτων ὑποβάλ