a ruler drives a team of two; then of the 14 horses, one of them is noble and good and of such stock, but the other is from opposite stock and is opposite.” And again: “Every soul has care of all that is inanimate, and traverses the whole heaven, now in one form and now in another appearing.” These, then, are the Platonic things. But first it must be explained what the idea of the soul is. We say, then, that the substance of each thing is the one in it and what is, as it were, most unified, while the form is the multitude and the quasi-elements; for the soul is both one and many, and the idea of soul is the multitude and the elements. For this is what the horses and the charioteer mean. And the substance of our soul is without evil, but the horses, that is, its powers, are perverted, and sometimes are idle. The power of the substance, then, of one of the three kinds, is the charioteer; the power of the same is the better of the horses, and that of the other is the inferior. If, then, we conceive of two horses and a charioteer and unite them, the one power that generates both the charioteer and the horses, this is the idea of the soul. But “power” must be understood in the sense of the geometers, as when they are accustomed to say that the line is the power of the square. And the phrase “now in one form and now in another appearing” means this instead: establishing itself according to different logoi of its own, such as lunar or solar ones; for the partial soul so greatly changes its form as to become finally unrecognizable. Platonically the Platonic things; and this is the same as ridiculously the ridiculous things. On perception and perceptibles You have raised a wonderful problem in saying, “if each sense is made from each of the bodily elements, how, when those are four, have five senses come to be? For one of them is left to be made from something else. And what ever is this from which that one has its origin?” I think, then, that you accept the arrangement concerning the senses in Plato’s Timaeus. For there this wise man makes sight from fire, hearing from air, taste from water, and touch from earth, but smell and the genus of 15 odors to be half-formed and somewhat mixed. “When water is changing into air or air into water, in the interval between these,” he says, “they have come to be.” And smell would be the fifth. But Aristotle does not accept such an arrangement, nor does he make sight from fire. And he gives another reason for the fire flashing when the eye is pressed. “For smooth things,” he says, “are by nature apt to shine in the dark.” The middle black part of the eye, at any rate, which we call the pupil, is smooth and, because of its smoothness, shining when the eye is moved, it happens to produce an appearance of fire. But neither does this man say that seeing consists in sending out light. “For it would not be necessary,” he says, “to see things that are in water. For how is it possible for such fire and light to pass through water and not be extinguished?” And he adds that if seeing is in sending out light, animals should see better by night than by day. Thus, then, Aristotle seems to shake the Platonic opinions. And he also confounds Empedocles. For Empedocles at one time holds the light sent out from the sight responsible for seeing, and at another time the effluences spreading from the objects seen. But of Democritus’s opinion he accepts so much as that he generates sight from water, but he rejects the manner in which seeing occurs. For Democritus says that seeing is to receive the impression from the things seen. And an impression is the form appearing in the pupil. For he believes that certain images flow off, of like form with the things from which they flow, and fall upon the eyes of those who see, and thus seeing occurs. “And that,” says Aristotle, “the pupil through which we see is from water is clear from the eyes; for when these are destroyed, what flows out is seen to be water.” And with many arguments he refutes Plato’s opinion concerning the eye, not wishing sight to have its origin from fire. And he says it is most unreasonable also to say that there is sent out

ἄρχων συνωρίδος ἡνιοχεῖ· εἶτα τῶν 14 ἵππων ὁ μὲν αὐτοῦ καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων, ὁ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίων τε καὶ ἐναντίος.» καὶ αὖθις· «ψυχὴ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου, πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσι γιγνομένη.» τὰ μὲν οὖν Πλατωνικὰ ταῦτα. ἑρμηνευτέον δὲ πρότερον, τίς ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰδέα ἐστίν. λέγομεν οὖν, ὅτι οὐσία μὲν ἑκάστου πράγματός ἐστι τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ οἷον ἑνικώτατον, τὸ δὲ εἶδος τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰ οἱονεὶ στοιχεῖα· ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ καὶ ἕν ἐστι καὶ πολλά, καὶ ἰδέα ψυχῆς τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα. τοῦτο γὰρ βούλονται οἱ ἵπποι καὶ ὁ ἡνίοχος. ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν ἀκάκωτος, οἱ δὲ ἵπποι ἤτοι αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῆς διαστρέφονται, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ ἀργοῦσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῆς οὐσίας δύναμις, τοῦ ἑνὸς τῶν τριῶν γενῶν, ὁ ἡνίοχός ἐστιν· ἡ δὲ ταὐτοῦ δύναμις ὁ κρείττων τῶν ἵππων, ἡ δὲ τοῦ θατέρου ὁ καταδεέστερος. ἐὰν τοίνυν νοήσωμεν δύο ἵππους καὶ ἡνίοχον καὶ συμφύσωμεν αὐτούς, ἡ μία δύναμις ἡ γεννητικὴ τοῦ τε ἡνιόχου καὶ τῶν ἵππων, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἰδέα τῆς ψυχῆς. δύναμιν δὲ ἀκουστέον κατὰ τοὺς γεωμέτρας, ὡς εἰώθασι λέγειν τὴν εὐθεῖαν δύνασθαι τὸ τετράγωνον. τὸ δὲ «ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσι γιγνομένη» τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀντὶ τοῦ κατ' ἄλλους καὶ ἄλλους ἑαυτῆς λόγους ἱσταμένη, οἷον σεληνιακοὺς ἢ ἡλιακούς· ἡ γὰρ μερικὴ ψυχὴ τοσοῦτον ἀμείβει τὸ εἶδος, ὡς καὶ ἀνεπίγνωστος λοιπὸν γίνεσθαι. Πλατωνικῶς τὰ Πλατωνικά· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ τὰ γελοῖα γελοίως. Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν Θαυμάσιόν τι ἠπόρησας «εἰ ἑκάστη» εἰρηκὼς «αἴσθησις ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν σωματικῶν στοιχείων πεποίηται, πῶς ἐκείνων τεττάρων ὄντων πέντε αἰσθήσεις γεγένηνται; λείπεται γὰρ μία τούτων ἐξ ἄλλου του πεποιῆσθαι. καὶ τί ποτε τοῦτο ἐξ οὗ ἐκείνη τὴν γένεσιν ἔχει;» οἶμαι οὖν σε τὴν ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος περὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων διάταξ<ιν δέχ>εσθαι. ἐκεῖσε γὰρ οὗτος ὁ σοφὸς ἀνὴρ πυρὸς μὲν τὴν ὄψιν ποιεῖται, ἀέρος δὲ τὴν ἀκοήν, καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν ὕδατος, τὴν δὲ ἁφὴν γῆς, τὴν δὲ ὄσφρησιν καὶ τὸ τῶν 15 ὀσμῶν γένος ἡμιγενὲς εἶναι καὶ μικτόν πως. «μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα ἢ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τούτων» φησί «γεγόνασι.» καὶ εἴη ἂν ἡ ὄσφρησις πέμπτη. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ οὐ προσίεται [τὴν τοι]αύτην διάταξιν οὐδὲ πυρὸς ποιεῖται τὴν ὄψιν. περὶ δὲ τὸ πῦρ ἐκλάμπειν θλιβομένου τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἕτερον ποιεῖται αἴτιον. «τὰ γὰρ λεῖα» φησί «πεφύκασιν ἐν τῷ σκότει λάμπειν.» τὸ γοῦν τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ μέσον τὸ μέλαν, ὃ κόρην καλοῦμεν, λεῖόν τέ ἐστι καὶ διὰ τὴν λειότητα στίλβον κινουμένου τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ συμβαίνει πυρὸς ποιεῖν φαντασίαν. ἀλλ' οὐδέ φησιν ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος τὸ ὁρᾶν εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἐκπέμπειν φῶς. «οὐκ ἔδει γὰρ» φησί «τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ὄντα ὁρᾶν. πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε ἐν ὕδατι πῦρ καὶ φῶς τοιοῦτον διαβαίνειν καὶ μὴ σβέννυσθαι;» προστίθησι δὲ ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἐν τῷ ἐκπέμπειν φῶς τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐστιν, ἔδει νυκτὸς μᾶλλον ὁρᾶν τὰ ζῷα ἢ μεθ' ἡμέραν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν τὰς Πλατωνικὰς δόξας διασείειν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δοκεῖ. Παρασαλεύει δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα. ὁ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ποτὲ μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως ἐκπεμπόμενον φῶς αἰτιᾶται τοῦ ὁρᾶν, ποτὲ δὲ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρωμένων ἐφαπλουμένας ἀπορροίας. ∆ημοκρίτου δὲ τοσοῦτον ἀποδέχεται τὴν δόξαν ὅτι ἐξ ὕδατος τὴν ὄψιν γεννᾷ, τὸν δὲ τρόπον καθ' ὃν γίνεται τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀπαναίνεται. λέγει γὰρ ὁ ∆ημόκριτος τὸ ὁρᾶν εἶναι τὸ τὴν ἔμφασιν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρωμένων δέχεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἔμφασις τὸ ἐμφαινόμενον εἶδος ἐν τῇ κόρῃ. ἡγεῖται γὰρ εἴδωλά τινα ἀπορρέοντα, ὁμοιόμορφα τοῖς ἀφ' ὧν ἀπορρέουσιν, ἐμπίπτειν τοῖς τῶν ὁρώντων ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ οὕτως τὸ ὁρᾶν γίνεσθαι. «ὅτι δὲ» φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης «ἐξ ὕδατός ἐστιν ἡ κόρη δι' ἧς ὁρῶμεν δῆλον ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν· διαφθειρομένων γὰρ τούτων τὸ ἐκρέον ὕδωρ φαίνεται ὄν». Πολλοῖς δὲ ἐπιχειρήμασιν ἀναιρεῖ τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος περὶ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ δόξαν, μὴ βουλόμενος τὴν ὄψιν ἐκ πυρὸς ἔχειν τὴν γένεσιν. παραλογώτατον δέ φησι καὶ τὸ λέγειν ἐκπέμπεσθαι