LESSON III

[iii. 4. 1276b7-1277b33]

             365 After having shown what a citizen is and solved certain difficulties, the Philosopher here inquires into the virtue that characterizes the citizen. This section is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows that the virtue of the citizen is not the same absolutely as that of the good man. In the second, he raises certain difficulties in this connection. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he shows that the virtue of the dedicated citizen is not the same absolutely as that of the good man. Secondly, he shows that the virtue of a certain citizen is the same as that of the good man. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he states his intention; for, after what has been said, we must now consider whether or not we should assert that the virtue [of the good citizen] is the same as that of the good man. This is to ask whether the same thing prompts us to call someone a good man and a good citizen; for virtue is that which makes the person who possesses it good. Now, in order to investigate this question properly, we must first show what the virtue of the citizen is in some sort of outline and likeness.

             366 Secondly, he shows that the virtue of the good citizen is not the same as that of the good man for three reasons.

             In the first of these, he begins by proposing a comparison to illustrate what the virtue of the good citizen is. He says that, just as the word "sailor" signifies something common to many persons, so, too, does the word "citizen." And he explains how the word "sailor" is common to many men. Many men who differ in power, that is to say, by their art and by their function, are called sailors: one of them is a rower, who propels the ship by means of oars; another is a pilot, who steers the ship by means of the rudder; another a look-out or guardian of the prow, which is the forepart of the ship; and others have other names and functions. Now it is obvious that each one of these men has something that belongs to him [129] by reason of his proper competence and something that belongs to him by reason of a common competence. It pertains to the competence of each one individually to understand and look after his own function diligently, steering, for example, in the case of the pilot, and the same for the others. The common competence, on the other hand, is one that belongs to all, for the work of all of them is directed toward one end, namely, safe navigation; for it is to this end that the aim and desire of any sailor is directed and that the common competence of sailors, which is the competence of the sailor as sailor, is ordered. In the same way also, since there are different citizens having dissimilar functions and dissimilar positions by means of which they exercise their proper operations in the city, the common work of all is the safety of the community; and this community consists in the order of the regime. Hence it is clear that the virtue of the citizen as citizen is considered in relation to the regime, so that the good citizen is the man who works well to preserve the regime.

             Now there are several species of regimes, as we shall see later and as is evident to some extent from what we have already said; and men are well ordered to different regimes by means of different virtues. For a popular state is preserved in one way and a rule of the few or a tyranny in another. Hence it is evident that there does not exist a perfect virtue according to which a citizen [that is, as citizen] could be called good absolutely; but a man is called virtuous by reason of a single perfect virtue, namely, prudence, upon which all the moral virtues depend. It happens, therefore, that someone is a good citizen although he does not possess the virtue by which one is a good man; and this is the case in regimes other than the best regime.

             367 Then he states the second reason. He says that by inquiring and raising objections, we can in another way reach the same conclusion even concerning the best regime, namely, that the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man are not the same. For it is impossible, however good the regime may be, that all the citizens be virtuous; nevertheless, each one must perform his work pertaining to the city well, and this is accomplished by means of the virtue of the citizen as citizen. I say, therefore, that all the citizens cannot be alike in the sense that they would all perform the same work. From this it follows that the virtue of the good man and that of the good citizen are not identical. This consequence he manifests as follows. In the best regime, every citizen must possess the virtue of the good citizen, for in this manner the city will be most perfect. But it is impossible that all possess the virtue of the good man, because all the men in a city arc not virtuous, as we have said.

             368 Then he states the third reason. He says that every city is made up of heterogeneous elements, like an animal. An animal is indeed composed forthwith of heterogeneous elements, namely, soul and body; and likewise, the human soul is made up of heterogeneous parts, namely, a rational power and an appetitive power. The domestic society, in turn, is composed of heterogeneous parts, namely, man and woman, and [the art of] acquisition also requires a master and a slave. Now the city is made up of all these different parts and of many others. But we said in Book I that the virtue of the ruler is not the same as that of the subject, either in the soul or in other things. Hence it remains that the virtue of all the citizens is not one and the same, just as we see that in a chorus the virtue of the leader, that is, the one who directs the chorus, is not the same as that of the man who is next to him or his assistant. But it is obvious that the virtue of the good man is one and the same. It remains, therefore, that the virtue of the good citizen is not the same as that of the good man.

             369 Then he shows that the virtue of one particular citizen is the same as that of the good man; and in this connection he does three things. First, he shows what he proposes. Secondly, he draws the conclusion arrived at in what has already been said. Thirdly, he raises a certain difficulty concerning what has already been said and resolves it.

             He says then, first of all, that one will perhaps be able to say that the same virtue as that of the good man is required of a certain citizen in order that he may be good. For a man is not said to be a good ruler unless he is good as a result of his possessing the moral virtues and unless he is prudent. For it is said in Book VI of the Ethics that government is a certain part of prudence. Hence the statesman, that is to say, the head of the regime, must be prudent and, consequently, he must be a good man.

             370 Then from this he infers that the virtue of the good citizen is not the same absolutely as that of the good man. In order to prove this, he first adduces the statement made by some people to the effect that the training by which the ruler is to be educated to virtue is other than that of the citizen, as is clear from the fact that the sons of rulers are instructed in the science of horsemanship and warfare. Hence Euripides also, speaking in the person of a ruler, said, "It is not for me to know beautiful and profound things," namely, those things that are the concern of the philosopher, "but what is necessary to rule a city." This he said to indicate that there is a certain training proper to the ruler.

             From this he infers that, if the training and virtue of the good ruler are the same as that of the good man, and if not every citizen is a ruler--for there are also citizens who are subjects--it follows that the virtue of the citizen is not the same absolutely as that of the good man, unless perhaps it be that of a certain citizen, namely, the one who can be a ruler. This is so because the virtue of the ruler is not the same as that of the citizen. That is why Jason said that he used to grieve when he was not a tyrant, as if he did not know how to live as a private person. [130]

             371 Then he raises a difficulty concerning what has been said. In this connection he does two things. First, he raises an objection against what has been said. Secondly, he resolves it.

             He says then, first of all, that sometimes a citizen is praised because of the fact that he is able to rule and obey well. If, therefore, the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good ruler, and if the virtue of the good citizen is ordered to both of these things, namely, to rule and to obey, it follows that both things, namely, to be a good citizen and a good man, are not praiseworthy in the same way, but that it is much better to be a good citizen.

             372 Then he resolves the aforesaid difficulty. First, he shows how the training of the ruler is the same as that of the subject and how it is not. Secondly, he shows how both ruler and subject possess the same virtue.

             Concerning the first point, he does three things. First, he states his intention. He says that, because, as we have already said, both of these statements seem at times to hold, namely, that the ruler must not receive the same training as the subject and, again, that the good citizen should know both how to rule and how to obey, we must consider how each one is true from what follows.

             373 Secondly, he sets down one type of rule in which one of the statements made, namely, that the training of the ruler is other than that of the subject, is verified. He says that there is a certain rule that is despotic, in which case the ruler is the master of the subjects. Such a ruler does not have to know how to do the things that pertain to the services necessary for life; rather, he should know how to make use of them. The other element, namely, to be able to serve in the things that pertain to the ministerial actions, appears to be of a servile rather than princely or despotic nature.

             Now there are different kinds of slaves according to the different operations of servants. Among them, one role is played by those who work with their hands, as do craftsmen, cooks, and the like. These men live from the works of their hands, as their name indicates; and among such men must be reckoned the menial craftsmen, that is to say, those who by the work of their art dirty their bodies, as was said in Book I. Because the operations of these craftsmen are not those of a ruler but are rather of a servile nature, formerly, among certain peoples, craftsmen did not have any share in the government of the city. This, I say, was the case before the advent of an extreme form of popular rule, that is to say, before the lowliest among the people were invested with power in the cities.

             So it is clear, then, that neither the good statesman, or ruler of the city, nor even the good citizen should learn to perform works of subjects such as these, except occasionally because of some advantage to himself, and not because in these matters he should serve others; for then, if the masters were to exercise these servile functions, the distinction between master and slave would be obliterated.

             374 Thirdly, he sets down another type of rule, in which the second statement, namely, that ruler and subject should learn the same things, is verified. He says that there is a certain rule according to which one rules, not as a master over slaves, but over free men and equals. This is political rule, according to which now some people and now others are called upon to rule in the cities. A ruler such as this one must learn how to rule while he is still a subject, just as one learns how to command cavalrymen by having been a subject among cavalrymen, and how to be a general by having served under a general, and having been in charge of a particular unit, for example, a company or a cohort, and having laid ambushes at the general's orders. For a man learns to exercise a high office both by obedience and by training in lower offices. In this respect the proverb is right in stating that he who has not served under a ruler cannot rule well.

             375 Then he shows how the virtue of the ruler is the same as that of other men and how it differs from it. He says that even in this type of rule the virtue of the ruler is other than that of the subject; the fact remains, however, that the man who is a good citizen absolutely should know both how to rule and how to be subject to a rule, not indeed to a despotic rule, which is that of slaves, but to a political rule, which is that of free men. This is the virtue of the citizen, namely, that he be well disposed toward one and the other. Good men, absolutely speaking, know both how to rule well and how to obey well. Thus the virtue of the good citizen, in so far as he is able to rule, is the same as that of the good man; but in so far as he is a subject, the virtue of the ruler and of the good man is other than that of the good citizen. For example, the temperance and justice of the ruler and the temperance and justice of the subjects are of a different species. For the subject who is free and good does not possess only one virtue, for example, justice; rather, his justice belongs to two species, according to one of which he can rule well and according to the other of which he can obey well. Such is also the case with the other virtues.

             376 And he illustrates this by means of an example. The temperance and fortitude of a man and of a woman are different. A man is reputed timid if he is not more courageous than a courageous woman; and a woman, for whom silence is becoming, is reputed loquacious if she is as voluble as a good man. This is so because even in the management of the household, some things pertain to the man and other things to the woman; for it is the proper concern of the man to acquire riches and the proper concern of the woman to preserve them.

             The same obtains in the city with regard to ruler and subject. For the virtue of the ruler is properly prudence, which directs and governs. The other moral virtues, whose nature it is to be governed and to obey, are [131] common to both subjects and rulers. Nevertheless, subjects share in prudence to the extent to which they have true opinion concerning things to be done, by which they can govern themselves in their own acts in accordance with the government of the ruler. And he cites the example of the flute-maker, who is related to the flute-player, who uses the flutes, in the same way as the subject to the ruler; for he works well in making flutes if his opinion is regulated in accordance with the orders of the flute-player. The case is the same in the city with reference to subject and ruler. Now he is speaking here of the virtue of the subject, not in so far as he is a good man, who as such must have prudence; rather, he is speaking of him in so far as he is a good subject, for this requires only that he have true opinion regarding the things that are demanded of him.

             377 Finally, in an epilogue, he concludes from what has been said that it is obvious whether or not the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, and, further, how it is the same and how it differs: it is the same in so far as he is able to rule well, and different in so far as he is able to obey well.