Chapter 5

Since it is our purpose to discuss every simple philosophical term, we must first of all know with what sort of terms it is that philosophy is concerned. So, we begin our discussion with sound itself. A sound is either meaningless or it has meaning. If it is meaningless, then it signifies nothing; but if it has a meaning, then it signifies something. Then, again, a meaningless sound is either articulate or inarticulate. Now, that sound which cannot be written is inarticulate, whereas that which can be written is articulate. Thus, for example, the sound made by a stone or a piece of wood is an inarticulate and meaningless one, because it is not written and has no meaning. But such a sound, for example, as scindapsus is meaningless, yet articulate; for it can be written, although it does not mean anything, because there never has been a scindapsus, nor is there any now. Now, philosophy is not concerned with the meaningless sound, whether it be inarticulate or articulate. Again, the sound which has meaning is either articulate or inarticulate. Thus, an inarticulate sound which does have meaning is one such as the barking of dogs, because this sound, since it is the sound made by a dog, signifies the dog. It also signifies the approach of some person. It is, however, inarticulate, because it is not written. And so, philosophy is not concerned with this kind of sound either. Now, the articulate sound which has meaning is either universal or particular. Man, for example, is universal, whereas Peter and Paul are particular. It is not with the particular term that philosophy is concerned; rather, philosophy is concerned with that sound which has meaning, is articulate, and is universal, or, in other words, common and predicated of several things.

Again, such a term is either essential or non-essential. Thus, that term is essential which signifies the essence, or, to -be more precise, the nature, of things. On the other hand, that is non-essential which signifies the accidents. For example: Man is a rational mortal animal. All of these terms are essential, for, should you remove one of them from the man, he would no longer be a man. If you say that he is not an animal, then, he is not a man. In the same way, if you say that he is not mortal, then he is not a man, because every man is at once animal, rational, and mortal. So, it is for this reason that these are called ‘essential, namely, that they complete man’s nature, so that without them it is impossible for the man to be a man. And similarly with every individual thing, those elements which go to make up the nature are called essential. Non-essential, however, are the accidents which can be or not be in the subject—in a man, say, or a horse, or some such other thing. Take the color white, for instance. Whether one be white or black, one is by no means any less a man.

Consequently, these and the like are non-essential, which is to say, they are accidents, and they or their opposites may inhere in us.

The essential term either shows what a thing is or of what sort it is. Thus, for example, when we are asked what a man is, we say that he is an animal. Then, when we are asked what sort of animal he is, we say a living and a mortal one. So, the essential term, which shows of what sort something is, is called difference. That term which shows what something is either signifies several species, in which case it constitutes the genus, or it signifies several individuals differing from one another numerically but by no means specifically, in which case it constitutes the species. An example of the former, that is to say, of genus, is substance. Substance signifies both man and horse and ox, because each one of them is termed a substance and is such, although each one is a different species. An example of the latter, that is to say, of species, is man, because this term signifies several men, or, more exactly, all numerically different men. Thus, Peter is one and Paul is another, and they are not one but two. In species, however, that is to say, in nature, they do not differ, for all are called men and are such.

Consequently, there is that which is more particular and is numerically different, as, for example, Peter, an individual, a person, and a hypostasis. This signifies a definite person. For, when we are asked who this man is, we say that he is Peter. The term 'other signifies the same thing, for Peter is one and Paul is another. Likewise the terms she/ 'this/ and 'that—these and such others as stand of themselves are applied to the individual. But that which includes the individuals is called species and is more general than the individual, because it does include several individuals. An example would be man, because this term includes both Peter and Paul and all individual men besides. This is what is called nature and substance and form by the holy Fathers. Now, that which includes several species is called genus, an example of which is animal, for this includes man, ox, and horse, and is more universal than the species. Moreover, both species and genus were called nature and form and substance by the holy Fathers. Furthermore, the species— that is, the nature and the substance and the form—does not produce something which is 'other or something which is ‘of another sort, but rather 'another of the same sort. Thus, we may say that by nature man is one thing and the horse another, but we may not say that they are one and another of the same sort. Speaking specifically, one says 'this, and ‘it, and ‘that, and the like, all of which declare in what something is. The specific difference, however, constitutes something ‘of a different sort. Thus, the rational animal is a thing of one sort, while the irrational animal is something of another sort. The specific difference furthermore constitutes ‘such a thing, and ‘what kind of a thing, and ‘what sort of a thing. The non-essential term may be applied either to one species or to several. If it applies to one, then it is called a property. For example, the property of laughter belongs to man alone and that of neighing to the horse alone. If, however, it is to be found in several species, then it is an accident. Take whiteness, for example. This exists both in man and in the horse, and in the dog and many other species.

Now, these are the five terms to which every philosophical term may be reduced. Accordingly, we must know what each one means and what they have in common with one another and in what they differ. They are genus, species, difference, property, and accident.

Genus is that which is predicated—that is, affirmed and expressed (for to be predicated is to be affirmed in respect to something)—of several things that are specifically different in respect to what pertains to their essence. Species, on the other hand, is that in which something is, but which is predicated of several things that are numerically different. And difference is that which is predicated of several things specifically different in respect to their particular sort, and it is included in the definition as essential. This is that which cannot be and not be in the same species and cannot not be in the species to which it belongs. When present, it assures the existence of the species; when absent, the species is destroyed. Also, it is impossible for it and its opposite to be in the same species. Thus, for example, the rational cannot not be in man, because that which is irrational is not man. When it is present, it constitutes the nature of man; when it is absent, it destroys it, because that which is irrational is not man. Now, one must know that this is called essential, natural, constituent, and distinguishing, and specific difference, essential quality, and natural property of a nature. It is very properly said by the philosophers to be a difference which is presentative of the nature possessing it and most proper to this nature itself. A property is that which exists in one species and in the entire species, and which is always in it and is conversely predicable with it. Take, for example, the property of laughter. Thus, every man can laugh and everything that can laugh is a man. An accident is that in which something is of a certain sort and which is predicated of several things differing in species but which does not enter into the definition. It can either be or not be, for, when present, it does not assure the existence of the species, and when it is absent, the species is not destroyed. It is called a non-essential difference and quality. It is either separable or inseparable. That accident is separable which is sometimes present and sometimes absent in the same hypostasis, as would be sitting, lying, standing, sickness, or health. That, on the other hand, is inseparable which is not constituent of a substance because it is not found in the entire species, but which, nevertheless, when it does become present in some hypostasis, cannot be separated from it. Such, for example, are the having of a snub nose, being hooknosed, being gray-haired, and the like. This inseparable accident is called a characteristic peculiarity. This is because such distinctiveness produces the hypostasis, which is to say, the individual—and an individual is that which subsists in itself of substance and accidents, is numerically distinct from the others of the same species, and does not signify what but whom. In the following we shall, with God’s help, learn more accurately about these things.

See alternate