On “Not Three Gods.” To Ablabius.

 Ye that are strong with all might in the inner man ought by rights to carry on the struggle against the enemies of the truth, and not to shrink from t

 In truth, the question you propound to us is no small one, nor such that but small harm will follow if it meets with insufficient treatment. For by th

 The argument which you state is something like this:—Peter, James, and John, being in one human nature, are called three men: and there is no absurdit

 What, then, is the reason that when we count one by one those who are exhibited to us in one nature, we ordinarily name them in the plural and speak o

 We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural, a

 Most men think that the word “Godhead” is used in a peculiar degree in respect of nature: and just as the heaven, or the sun, or any other of the cons

 But some one will say that the proof of our argument does not yet regard the question. For even if it were granted that the name of “Godhead” is a com

 As we have to a certain extent shown by our statement that the word “Godhead” is not significant of nature but of operation, perhaps one might reasona

 Since, then, the character of the superintending and beholding power is one, in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as has been said in our previous argumen

 If, then, every good thing and every good name, depending on that power and purpose which is without beginning, is brought to perfection in the power

 It does not seem to me absolutely necessary, with a view to the present proof of our argument, to contend against those who oppose us with the asserti

 But if it pleases our adversaries to say that the significance of the term is not operation, but nature, we shall fall back upon our original argument

 As, then, the golden staters are many, but the gold is one, so too those who are exhibited to us severally in the nature of man, as Peter, James, and

 Indeed, it would be a lengthy task to set out in detail from the Scriptures those constructions which are inexactly expressed, in order to prove the s

 If, however, any one cavils at our argument, on the ground that by not admitting the difference of nature it leads to a mixture and confusion of the P

 But in speaking of “cause,” and “of the cause,” we do not by these words denote nature (for no one would give the same definition of “cause” and of “n

 Thus, since on the one hand the idea of cause differentiates the Persons of the Holy Trinity, declaring that one exists without a Cause, and another i

But some one will say that the proof of our argument does not yet regard the question. For even if it were granted that the name of “Godhead” is a common name of the nature, it would not be established that we should not speak of “Gods”: but by these arguments, on the contrary, we are compelled to speak of “Gods”: for we find in the custom of mankind that not only those who are partakers14    Reading κοινωνοὺς for κοινωνίας, with Oehler. in the same nature, but even any who may be of the same business, are not, when they are many, spoken of in the singular; as we speak of “many orators,” or “surveyors,” or “farmers,” or “shoemakers,” and so in all other cases. If, indeed, Godhead were an appellation of nature, it would be more proper, according to the argument laid down, to include the Three Persons in the singular number, and to speak of “One God,” by reason of the inseparability and indivisibility of the nature: but since it has been established by what has been said, that the term “Godhead” is significant of operation, and not of nature, the argument from what has been advanced seems to turn to the contrary conclusion, that we ought therefore all the more to call those “three Gods” who are contemplated in the same operation, as they say that one would speak of “three philosophers” or “orators,” or any other name derived from a business when those who take part in the same business are more than one. I have taken some pains, in setting forth this view, to bring forward the reasoning on behalf of the adversaries, that our decision may be the more firmly fixed, being strengthened by the more elaborate contradictions. Let us now resume our argument.

Ἀλλ' οὔπω τις ἐρεῖ πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον βλέπειν τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ λόγου. οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ δοθείη κοινὴ τῆς φύσεως ἡ κλῆσις τῆς θεότητος εἶναι, ἤδη τὸ μὴ δεῖν λέγειν θεοὺς διὰ τούτου κατεσκευάσθη. τοὐναντίον μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ἀναγκαζόμεθα μᾶλλον λέγειν θεούς. εὑρίσκομεν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης συνηθείας οὐ μόνον τοὺς τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως κοινωνοὺς ἀλλά, κἄν τινες τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὦσιν ἐπιτηδεύματος, οὐχ ἑνικῶς τοὺς πολλοὺς μνημονευομένους καθό φαμεν ῥήτοράς τε πολλοὺς καὶ γεωμέτρας γεωργούς τε καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως. καὶ εἰ μὲν φύσεως ἦν ἡ τῆς θεότητος προσηγορία, μᾶλλον ἂν εἶχε καιρὸν κατὰ τὸν προαποδοθέντα λόγον ἑνικῶς τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις περιλαμβάνειν καὶ ἕνα θεὸν λέγειν διὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἄτμητόν τε καὶ ἀδιαίρετον: ἐπεὶ δὲ κατεσκευάσθη διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐνέργειαν σημαίνειν καὶ οὐχὶ φύσιν τὸ τῆς θεότητος ὄνομα, περιτρέπεταί πως πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἐκ τῶν κατασκευαζομένων ὁ λόγος, ὡς δεῖν ταύτῃ μᾶλλον λέγειν τρεῖς θεοὺς τοὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἐνεργείᾳ θεωρουμένους: ὥς φασι τρεῖς λέγεσθαι φιλοσόφους ἢ ῥήτορας ἢ εἴ τί ἐστιν ἕτερον ἐξ ἐπιτηδεύματος ὄνομα, ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ τοῦ αὐτοῦ συμμετέχοντες. ταῦτα φιλοπονώτερον ἐξειργασάμην, τὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἀνθυποφέρων λόγον, ὡς ἂν βεβαιότερον ἡμῖν παγείη τὸ δόγμα ταῖς εὐτονωτέραις τῶν ἀντιθέσεων κρατυνόμενον. οὐκοῦν ἐπαναληπτέος πάλιν ὁ λόγος.