Chapter VII.

Yet let no one ask, “How was it that, if God foresaw the misfortune that would happen to man from want of thought, He came to create him, since it was, perhaps, more to his advantage not to have been born than to be in the midst of such evils?” This is what they who have been carried away by the false teaching of the Manichees put forward for the establishment of their error, as thus able to show that the Creator of human nature is evil. For if God is not ignorant of anything that is, and yet man is in the midst of evil, the argument for the goodness of God could not be upheld; that is, if He brought forth into life the man who was to be in this evil. For if the operating force which is in accordance with the good is entirely that of a nature which is good, then this painful and perishing life, they say, can never be referred to the workmanship of the good, but it is necessary to suppose for such a life as this another author, from whom our nature derives its tendency to misery. Now all these and the like assertions seem to those who are thoroughly imbued with the heretical fraud, as with some deeply ingrained stain, to have a certain force from their superficial plausibility. But they who have a more thorough insight into the truth clearly perceive that what they say is unsound, and admits of speedy demonstration of its fallacy. In my opinion, too, it is well to put forward the Apostle as pleading with us on these points for their condemnation. In his address to the Corinthians he makes a distinction between the carnal and spiritual dispositions of souls; showing, I think, by what he says that it is wrong to judge of what is morally excellent, or, on the other hand, of what is evil, by the standard of the senses; but that, by withdrawing the mind from bodily phenomena, we must decide by itself and from itself the true nature of moral excellence and of its opposite. “The spiritual man,” he says, “judgeth all things27    1 Cor. ii. 15..” This, I think, must have been the reason of the invention of these deceptive doctrines on the part of those who propound them, viz. that when they define the good they have an eye only to the sweetness of the body’s enjoyment, and so, because from its composite nature and constant tendency to dissolution that body is unavoidably subject to suffering and sicknesses, and because upon such conditions of suffering there follows a sort of sense of pain, they decree that the formation of man is the work of an evil deity. Since, if their thoughts had taken a loftier view, and, withdrawing their minds from this disposition to regard the gratifications of the senses, they had looked at the nature of existing things dispassionately, they would have understood that there is no evil other than wickedness. Now all wickedness has its form and character in the deprivation of the good; it exists not by itself, and cannot be contemplated as a subsistence. For no evil of any kind lies outside and independent of the will; but it is the non-existence of the good that is so denominated. Now that which is not has no substantial existence, and the Maker of that which has no substantial existence is not the Maker of things that have substantial existence. Therefore the God of things that are is external to the causation of things that are evil, since He is not the Maker of things that are non-existent. He Who formed the sight did not make blindness. He Who manifested virtue manifested not the deprivation thereof. He Who has proposed as the prize in the contest of a free will the guerdon of all good to those who are living virtuously, never, to please Himself, subjected mankind to the yoke of a strong compulsion, as if he would drag it unwilling, as it were his lifeless tool, towards the right. But if, when the light shines very brightly in a clear sky, a man of his own accord shuts his eyelids to shade his sight, the sun is clear of blame on the part of him who sees not.

[7] Καὶ μηδεὶς ἐρωτάτω, εἰ προειδὼς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην συμφορὰν ὁ θεὸς τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀβουλίας αὐτῷ συμβησομένην ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ κτίσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ᾧ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἴσως ἢ τὸ ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι λυσιτελέστερον ἦν. ταῦτα γὰρ οἱ τοῖς Μανιχαικοῖς δόγμασι δι' ἀπάτης παρασυρέντες εἰς σύστασιν τῆς ἑαυτῶν πλάνης προβάλλουσιν, ὡς διὰ τούτου πονηρὸν εἶναι τὸν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως κτίστην ἀποδεικνύοντες. εἰ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖ μὲν τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν ὁ θεός, ἐν κακοῖς δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκέτ' ἂν ὁ τῆς ἀγαθότητος τοῦ θεοῦ διασώζοιτο λόγος, εἴπερ ἐν κακοῖς μέλλοντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ζήσεσθαι πρὸς τὸν βίον παρήγαγεν. εἰ γὰρ ἀγαθῆς φύσεως ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐνέργεια πάντως ἐστίν, ὁ λυπηρὸς οὗτος καὶ ἐπίκηρος βίος οὐκέτ' ἄν, φησίν, εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δημιουργίαν ἀνάγοιτο, ἀλλ' ἕτερον χρὴ τῆς τοιαύτης ζωῆς αἴτιον οἴεσθαι, ᾧ πρὸς πονηρίαν ἡ φύσις ἐπιρρεπῶς ἔχει. ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μὲν ἐν βάθει καθάπερ τινὰ δευσοποιὸν βαφὴν τὴν αἱρετικὴν παραδεδεγμένοις ἀπάτην ἰσχύν τινα διὰ τῆς ἐπιπολαίου πιθανότητος ἔχειν δοκεῖ: τοῖς δὲ διορατικωτέροις τῆς ἀληθείας σαθρὰ ὄντα καὶ πρόχειρον τὴν τῆς ἀπάτης ἀπόδειξιν ἔχοντα σαφῶς καθορᾶται. καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν τὸν ἀπόστολον ἐν τούτοις συνήγορον τῆς κατ' αὐτῶν κατηγορίας προστήσασθαι. διαιρεῖ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς Κορινθίους λόγῳ τάς τε σαρκώδεις καὶ τὰς πνευματικὰς τῶν ψυχῶν καταστάσεις, δεικνύς, οἶμαι, διὰ τῶν λεγομένων, ὅτι οὐ δι' αἰσθήσεως τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ κακὸν κρίνειν προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἔξω τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα φαινομένων τὸν νοῦν ἀποστήσαντας, αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου διακρίνειν τὴν φύσιν. ὁ γὰρ πνευματικός, φησίν, ἀνακρίνει τὰ πάντα. ταύτην οἶμαι τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν δογμάτων τούτων μυθοποιίας τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα προφέρουσιν ἐγγεγενῆσθαι, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἡδὺ τῆς σωματικῆς ἀπολαύσεως τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὁριζόμενοι διὰ τὸ πάθεσι καὶ ἀρρωστήμασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι κατ' ἀνάγκην τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν σύνθετον οὖσαν καὶ εἰς διάλυσιν ῥεοῦσαν, ἐπακολουθεῖν δέ πως τοῖς τοιούτοις παθήμασιν ἀλγεινήν τινα αἴσθησιν, πονηροῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἀνθρωποποιίαν ἔργον εἶναι νομίζουσιν. ὡς εἴγε πρὸς τὸ ὑψηλότερον ἔβλεπεν αὐτοῖς ἡ διάνοια, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς διαθέσεως τὸν νοῦν ἀποικίσαντες ἀπαθῶς ἐπεσκόπουν τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι κακὸν εἶναι παρὰ τὴν πονηρίαν ᾠήθησαν. πονηρία δὲ πᾶσα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ στερήσει χαρακτηρίζεται, οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὖσα, οὐδὲ καθ' ὑπόστασιν θεωρουμένη: κακὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔξω προαιρέσεως ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ κεῖται, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὕτω κατονομάζεται. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν οὐχ ὑφέστηκε, τοῦ δὲ μὴ ὑφεστῶτος δημιουργὸς ὁ τῶν ὑφεστώτων δημιουργὸς οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐκοῦν ἔξω τῆς τῶν κακῶν αἰτίας ὁ θεὸς ὁ τῶν ὄντων, οὐχ ὁ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ποιητὴς ὤν: ὁ τὴν ὅρασιν, οὐ τὴν πήρωσιν δημιουργήσας: ὁ τὴν ἀρετήν, οὐ τὴν στέρησιν αὐτῆς ἀναδείξας: ὁ ἆθλον τῆς προαιρέσεως τὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γέρας τοῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτευομένοις προθείς, οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ τινὶ βιαίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἑαυτῷ δοκοῦν ὑποζεύξας τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, καθάπερ τι σκεῦος ἄψυχον ἀκουσίως πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἐφελκόμενος. εἰ δὲ τοῦ φωτὸς ἐξ αἰθρίας καθαρῶς περιλάμποντος ἑκουσίως τις ὑποβάλοι τοῖς βλεφάροις τὴν ὅρασιν, ἔξω τῆς τοῦ μὴ βλέποντος αἰτίας ὁ ἥλιος.