Saying; If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How then is it not absurd to say that what remains does not exist? For to remain belongs to that which is. If privation is one part of the opposition, and the form is that which does evil to it, how is the form not both good and evil, good for the matter, since through it matter has its being in substance, but evil for the privation, since it is destroyed through it? If there is something divine and good and desirable, and it has an opposite which is neither good nor desirable, then the divine will be both good and not good, desirable and not desirable, and for this reason both divine and not divine. But if this is absurd, then the divine which is both good and desirable has no opposite; for that which is simply good is good for all, not for some only. If the opposite of the good does not desire the good (for it desires the destruction of its own nature, if it desires the good) and the form does not desire itself (for the form is without need), and the divine is desirable and an object of appetite, to what then is it desirable and an object of appetite if not to matter? Matter, then, is ensouled; for it is characteristic of what is ensouled to desire and to have an appetite. But if matter is ensouled, how is it not false that matter is non-being accidentally? For the soul is a being, and that which has a soul is a being. If, as the female desires the male and as the ugly desires the beautiful, matter desires the good, and matter is not in itself female and ugly, but accidentally, it is clear that it does not desire the good in itself either, but accidentally. Then the divine too will not be in itself good and desirable and an object of appetite, but accidentally; which is absurd to say. If matter is generable through the form, and perishable through the privation, but ungenerated and imperishable through itself, then matter will always be either perishable or generable, but never imperishable and ungenerated; for it is always subject either to the privation that is perishing in it, or to the form that is coming to be in it. ‘Ungenerated’ in the case of generable things signifies the privation of a generation that can come to be, but in the case of eternal things it signifies the negation of all generation, both that which has come to be and that which will come to be; for example, the bronze that is to become a statue, before it becomes a statue, is called ungenerated by way of privation, because it is able to become a statue; but in the case of God, ‘ungenerated’ signifies the negation of all generation in respect to substance, both past and future. Since there are, then, two modes of ungeneratedness, in which way is matter ungenerated? If it is by way of privation, then matter is ungenerated just like the bronze; but if matter is ungenerated by way of negation, then matter becomes nothing; nor can matter have the same relation to substance that the bronze has to the statue, as Aristotle said. If matter is ungenerated in the same way as God, and God is able to make something out of the ungenerated, it is clear that God is also able to make something out of that which simply is not. For whatever unsuitability that which is not has for anything to come to be from it by nature and by art, the

ρησις; Eἰ, ὅτε πάρεστι τὸ εἶδος, τότε ἡ στέρησις οὐχ ὑπομέ νει, δῆλον ὅτι μὴ παρόντος τοῦ εἴδους ὑπομένει ἡ στέρησις. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτοπον τὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τὸ ὑπομένον; Ὄντος γάρ ἐστι τὸ ὑπομένειν. Eἰ ἑτέρα μοῖρα τῆς ἐναν τιώσεώς ἐστιν ἡ στέρησις, καὶ τὸ κακοποιὸν ταύτης ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ εἶδος ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθὸν μὲν τῇ ὕλῃ, ὡς δι' αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ οὐσίᾳ εἶναι, κακὸν δὲ τῇ στερήσει, ὡς δι' αὐτοῦ ἀναιρουμένῃ; Eἰ ἔστι τι θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐφετόν, καὶ ἔχει τὸ ἐναντίον ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε ἐφετόν, ἔσται ἄρα τὸ θεῖον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ἐφετόν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐφετόν, διὸ καὶ θεῖόν τε καὶ οὐ θεῖον. Eἰ δὲ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεῖον τὸ ἀγα θόν τε καὶ ἐφετὸν ἔχει τι ἐναντίον· τὸ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, οὔ τισι μόνον. Eἰ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἐφίεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (φθορᾶς γὰρ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως ἐφίεται, εἰ ἐφίεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἐφίεται (ἀνεν δεὲς γὰρ τὸ εἶδος), ἔστι δὲ τὸ θεῖον ἐφετόν τε καὶ ὀρεκτόν, τίνι δὲ ἐφετόν τε καὶ ὀρεκτὸν εἰ μὴ τῇ ὕλῃ; Ἔμψυχος ἄρα ἡ ὕλη· ἐμψύχου γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐφίεσθαι καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι. Eἰ δὲ ἔμψυχος ἡ ὕλη, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὲς τὸ οὐκ ὂν εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὴν ὕλην; Ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ ὄν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχον ὄν ἐστιν. Eἰ, ὡς θῆλυ ἐφίεται τοῦ ἄῤῥενος καὶ ὡς αἰσχρὸν τοῦ καλοῦ, ἡ ὕλη ἐφίεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ὕλη καθ' αὑτὸ θῆλυ καὶ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ καθ' αὑτὸ ἐφίεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβη κός. Ἔσται ἄρα καὶ τὸ θεῖον οὐ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ἐφετὸν καὶ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτο πον λέγειν. Eἰ ἔστιν ἡ ὕλη γενητὴ μὲν διὰ τὸ εἶδος, φθαρτὴ δὲ διὰ τὴν στέρησιν, ἀγένητος δὲ δι' ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἄφθαρτος, ἔσται ἄρα ἡ ὕλη ἀεὶ μὲν φθαρτὴ ἢ γενητή, ἄφθαρτος δὲ καὶ ἀγένητος οὐδέποτε· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἢ στερήσει ὑπόκειται τῇ ἐν αὐτῇ φθειρομένῃ, ἢ τῷ εἴδει τῷ ἐν αὐτῇ γιγνομένῳ. Τὸ ἀγένητον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γενητῶν τὴν στέρησιν σημαίνει γενέσεως δυναμέ νης ἔσεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀϊδίων τὴν ἀπόφασιν πάσης σημαίνει γενέσεως τῆς τε προγεγονυίας καὶ τῆς μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι· οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς ὁ μέλλων ἔσεσθαι ἀνδριάς, πρὶν γένηται ἀν δριάς, ἀγένητος λέγεται κατὰ στέρησιν, διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι αὐτὸν γενέσθαι ἀνδριάντα· ἐπὶ δὲ θεοῦ τὸ ἀγένητον πάσης ἀπό φασιν σημαίνει τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν γενέσεως προγεγονυίας τε καὶ μελλούσης. ∆ύο τοίνυν ὄντων τῶν τῆς ἀγενεσίας τρόπων, κατὰ ποῖόν ἐστιν ἀγένητος ἡ ὕλη; Eἰ μὲν κατὰ στέρησιν, ἀγέ νητος ἄρα ἡ ὕλη ὥσπερ ὁ χαλκός, εἰ δὲ κατὰ ἀπόφασίν ἐστιν ἡ ὕλη ἀγένητος, οὐδὲν ἄρα γίνεται ἡ ὕλη· οὔτε, ὃν λόγον ἔχει ὁ χαλκὸς πρὸς τὸν ἀνδριάντα, τοῦτον δύναται ἔχειν ἡ ὕλη πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν, καθὰ εἶπεν Ἀριστοτέλης. Eἰ οὕτως ἐστὶ ἡ ὕλη ἀγένητος ὡς ὁ θεός, καὶ δύναται ὁ θεὸς ἐκ τοῦ ἀγενήτου ποιῆσαί τι, δῆλον ὡς δύναται ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἁπλῶς μὴ ὄντος ποιῆσαί τι. Ἣν γὰρ ἔχει ἀνεπιτηδειότητα τὸ μὴ ὂν πρὸς τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τέχνην, τὴν