OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal is with him. But when this, having been absurdly supposed, is refuted, the notion that "he has made" is not fitting for God is necessarily refuted along with it. For when this is refuted, its opposite is necessarily posited, that is, that "he has made" is fitting for God. For in every case, it is necessary for either the affirmation or the negation to be true. And when it is established that "he has made" is fitting for God, it is impossible to call a God one who has made nothing; for this follows from that. What then? Would you say that we err in calling God inactive? But we do not say this, but that God has indeed made nothing nor does he make nor will he make anything in time; for he has not made any more than he makes, nor again does he make any more than he will make; but the past with God is in the present and the future in what has already come to be, since God has nothing fluid, but is always doing the same things because of his perfect and immutable power and activity. But to flee the error of calling God inactive, and yet to say about him that he has neither made nor makes nor will he make anything in time, is to fall into the same error. For if you wished to err and call God inactive, what more would you have to say than what you have now said, not wishing to err and call God inactive, than that God has neither made nor makes nor will make? For when the verbs, which denote and have temporal significance, are removed from the activity of God, God will be found to be inactive, and therefore not a creator. If nothing temporal is with God, it is clear that neither the past of time is with him nor the present nor the future. How then does the respondent, while removing temporal things from God, posit temporal things for God and say: "But the past with God is in the present and the future in what has already come to be"? This implies one of two things: either this, not being with God, is in what is not, or this, not being with God, is in what is. But if the first, it is impossible; for to be or not to be in something belongs to what is. But if the second, there is with God what is not in what is, that is, the past of time in the present of time. But with this being established, it becomes a refutation of its not having been correctly said that nothing temporal is with God, seeing that the past is in the present and the future in what has already come to be, which things are temporal. And even if he has changed the manner of how the parts of time are with God, yet he has nevertheless granted that there are with him the past and the present and the future of time; and if "he has made" is not more than "he makes", nor again is "he makes" more than "he will make". Since what need was there of the refutation of "more" from the acts of making which, according to "he has made" and "he makes" and "he will make", differ from one another, when the acts of making are such as not to differ from one an

θεοῦ σημαντικά τε καὶ θετικὰ γίνονται τοῦ πάντα τὰ ποιήματα τοῦ θεοῦ ἔγχρονα εἶναι παρ' αὐτῷ, δῆλον ὅτι ἀτόπως ὑπέθηκε τὸ μηδὲν ἔγχρονον εἶναι παρ' αὐτῷ. Τούτου δὲ ὡς ἀτόπως ὑποτεθέντος ἀναιρουμένου, συναναιρεῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ μὴ ἁρμόττειν τῷ θεῷ τὸ πεποίηκε. Καὶ τούτου γὰρ ἀναιρε θέντος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τίθεται τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον, τουτέστι τὸ ἁρμόζειν τῷ θεῷ τὸ πεποίηκεν. Ἐπὶ παντὸς γὰρ χρὴ ἢ τὴν φάσιν εἶναι ἀληθῆ ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν. Κειμένου δὲ τοῦ ἁρμότ τειν τῷ θεῷ τὸ πεποίηκεν, ἀδύνατον λέγειν θεὸν τὸν μηδὲν πεποιηκότα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἐκείνῳ ἑπόμενον. Τί οὖν; Φαίης ἀνενέργητον ἡμᾶς τὸν θεὸν λέγοντας ἁμαρτάνειν; Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτό φαμεν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ πεποίηκε μὲν ὁ θεὸς οὐδὲν οὔτε ποιεῖ οὔτε ποιήσει ἐν χρόνῳ· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον πεποίηκεν ἢ ποιεῖ, οὐδ' αὖ ποιεῖ ἢ ποιήσει· ἀλλὰ τό τε παρελθὸν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐν τῷ ἤδη γεγονέναι, ὡς οὐδὲν μὲν ῥευστὸν ἔχοντος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀεὶ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ ποιοῦντος διὰ τὴν τελείαν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον δύναμίν τε καὶ ἐνέργειαν. Ἀλλὰ τὸ φεύγειν μὲν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν λέγουσαν τὸν θεὸν ἀνενέργητον, λέγειν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ οὔτε πεποίηκεν οὔτε ποιεῖ οὔτε ποιήσει ἐν χρόνῳ, εἰς τὴν αὐτήν ἐστιν ἁμαρτίαν ἐμπεσεῖν. Eἰ γὰρ ἠβουλήθης ἁμαρτανεῖν καὶ λέγειν τὸν θεὸν ἀνενέργητον, τί πλέον εἶχες λέγειν ὧν νῦν εἴ ρηκας, μὴ βουλόμενος ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ λέγειν ἀνενέργητον τὸν θεόν, τοῦ μήτε πεποιηκέναι τὸν θεὸν μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε ποιή σειν; Τῶν γὰρ ·ημάτων, τῶν χρονικὴν ἔμφασιν δηλούντων καὶ ἐχόντων, ἐκ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ θεοῦ ἀναιρουμένων εὑρεθήσεται ὁ θεὸς ἀνενέργητος, διὸ οὔτε ποιητής. Eἰ μηδὲν ἔγχρονόν ἐστι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε τὸ παρεληλυθὸς τοῦ χρόνου ἐστὶ παρ' αὐτῷ οὔτε τὸ ἐνεστὼς οὔτε τὸ μέλλον. Πῶς οὖν ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος, ἀναιρῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τὰ ἔγχρονα, τίθησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὰ ἔγχρονα καί φησιν· Ἀλλὰ τό τε παρελθὸν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐν τῷ ἤδη γεγονέναι; Τοῦτο δυεῖν τινων ἔχει τὴν ἔμ φασιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὴ ὂν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι, ἢ τοῦτο μὴ ὂν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ὄντι. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ἔστιν ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἔν τινι εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ἐστίν. Eἰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, ἔστι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐν τῷ ὄντι, τουτέστι τὸ παρεληλυθὸς τοῦ χρόνου ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι τοῦ χρόνου. Τούτου δὲ κειμένου, ἔλεγχος γίνεται τοῦ μὴ ὀρθῶς εἰρῆσθαι τὸ οὐδὲν ἔγχρονον παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὸ παρ εληλυθὸς ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐν τῷ ἤδη γεγονέναι, ἅτινά ἐστιν ἔγχρονα. Καὶ εἰ ἐνήλλαξε τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πῶς ἐστι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὰ τοῦ χρόνου μέρη, ἀλλ' ὅμως δέδωκεν εἶναι παρ' αὐτῷ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ παρεληλυθὸς καὶ τὸ ἐνεστὼς καὶ τὸ μέλλον· καὶ εἰ μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ πεποίηκε τοῦ ποιεῖ, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ ποιεῖ τοῦ ποιήσει. Ἐπεὶ τίς ἦν χρεία τῆς τοῦ μᾶλλον ἀναιρέσεως ἀπὸ τῶν ποιήσεων τῶν κατὰ τὸ πεποίηκε καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ ποιήσει ἀλλήλων διαφερουσῶν, τῶν ποιήσεων οὐσῶν τῶν κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον μὴ διαφερουσῶν ἀλ