a body from one of the seeing things, such that it is able to be extended as far as the stars. But it was better, he says, than to say that the external light coalesces with the light sent forth from the sight once it is outside, to say that the external light coalesces with the internal light at the pupil before 16 it is sent forth, because there would be no need of the emanation of light from the sight, if it were not going to grasp the visible object itself. Aristotle therefore posits that sight is of water, hearing of air, and smell of fire. For he posits that smell in actuality is the same as the thing smelled. The thing smelled and the odor, which the sense of smell perceives, is a dry and smoky exhalation, and such an exhalation is fiery and from fire, so that of the four bodies, two belong to earth, touch and taste (for taste is a kind of touch), sight belongs to water, hearing to air, and smell to fire. He says that the sensitive soul is one also in number, and he locates this in the heart, from which the transmission of sensation to the brain occurs. For three passages extend from there to the brain, then from the brain one of them descends to the sight, another to the hearing, and another to the smell. But those of touch and taste extend directly from the heart, and not by way of the path to the brain. Light is the actuality of the transparent insofar as it is transparent, and like a color {of}, not simply, but accidentally, because the transparent does not receive light passively, but in relation to it. And color, he says, is not the limit of the body, but in the limit of the body, being a limit not of a body, but of the transparent insofar as it is transparent. The opinion of Aristotle concerning sensation, contrary to those of others, is this: for sight, he says, perceives by being affected by visible things, just as each of the other senses, but not by acting and sending forth, and being affected not by receiving certain emanations from the objects of sense, but by the transparent medium between the sight and the thing seen, when it is such in actuality (and such is what is illuminated), being moved by the visible things, that is, by the colors (for color is what moves the transparent in actuality). For the transparent in actuality, being moved and affected by the visible things, transmits their form to the pupil, which is itself also transparent. And thus through this, which receives through the transparent medium the form of the thing seen and transmits it as far as the primary sense-organ, 17 seeing occurs because the intervening passage is full of such a body; for not by emanations, [as those] before him thought (for in that case sight would be a kind of touch), but by the motion of the transparent medium between the sight and {the} thing seen, caused by the visible things. The philosopher defines flavor as the affection produced by the dry in the earth in the moist, which alters potential taste into actuality. You also asked what is the part of politics. It is, then, the care concerning each one of the citizens, and it is called ethics. Each of the citizens is a part of the city, and ethics is a part of politics. And where there are certain ends beyond the actions, as in the productive arts, in these the products are better than the activities, that is, the things made, but where there are the activities themselves, nothing is more honorable than the activities. In all faculties, the ends of the master arts are more desirable than those under them. Master arts are said to be those that rule and control those under them, just as the art of the master-builder rules that of piloting. Various Greek opinions concerning the soul. Some of the Greeks dare to discourse clearly even concerning our own secrets. At least the philosopher Proclus, presenting the departure of the soul from here as it is by nature, says "borne" "about the soul is a company of angels and shining around it from all sides and making it full of the undefiled fire, which gives to it an unswerving order and power,

σῶμα ἔκ τινος τῶν ὁρώντων, ὡς ἀποτείνεσθαι αὐτὸ μέχρι τῶν ἄστρων δύνασθαι. βέλτιον δέ, φησίν, ἦν τοῦ λέγειν τῷ ἐκπεμφθέντι ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως φωτὶ ἐκτὸς γενομένῳ τὸ ἐκτὸς φῶς συμφύεσθαι τὸ λέγειν τὸ ἐκτὸς φῶς τῷ ἐντὸς πρὸ τοῦ 16 ἐκπεμφθῆναι συμφύεσθαι πρὸς τῇ κόρῃ, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐδεῖτο τῆς ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦ φωτὸς ἀπορροίας, εἰ μὴ ἔμελλεν αὐτὴ περιλήψεσθαι τὸ ὁρατόν. Τίθεται οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν μὲν ὄψιν ὕδατος εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀκοὴν ἀέρος, τὴν δὲ ὄσφρησιν πυρός. τὴν γὰρ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὄσφρησιν ταὐτὸν τίθεται τῷ ὀσφραντῷ. τὸ ὀσφραντὸν καὶ ἡ ὀσμή, ἧς ἡ ὄσφρησις ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ξηρὰ καὶ καπνώδης ἐστὶν ἀναθυμίασις, ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ἀναθυμίασις πυρώδης καὶ ἐκ πυρός, ὥστε εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων σωμάτων γῆς μὲν τὰς δύο, ἁφήν τε καὶ γεῦσιν (ἡ γὰρ γεῦσις ἁφῆς τι εἶδος), ὕδατος δὲ τὴν ὄψιν, ἀέρος δὲ τὴν ἀκοήν, πυρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν. Μίαν δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ψυχὴν λέγει, καὶ ταύτην ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ οἰκίζει, ἀφ' ἧς ἐπὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως γίνεται διάδοσις. πόροι γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον διατείνουσι τρεῖς, εἶτα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου ὁ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ὄψιν, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκοήν, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ὄσφρησιν καθήκουσιν. οἱ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ τῆς γεύσεως ἐπ' εὐθείας ἀπὸ τῆς καρδίας τέτανται, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ὁδοῦ. Τὸ δὲ φῶς ἐντελέχειά ἐστι τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές, καὶ ὥσπερ χρῶμα {τῶν}, οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι μὴ παθητικῶς ἀναδέχεται τὸ διαφανὲς τὸ φῶς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ σχέσιν τὴν πρὸς αὐτό. τὸ δὲ χρῶμα οὐ τὸ τοῦ σώματος, φησί, πέρας ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος πέρατι, πέρας ὂν οὐχ ὡς σώματος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ διαφανοῦς καθ' ὃ διαφανές. ∆όξα δὲ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων αὕτη ἐστί· πάσχουσα γάρ, φησίν, ἡ ὄψις ὑπὸ τῶν ὁρατῶν αἰσθάνεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ποιοῦσα καὶ ἐκπέμπουσα, πάσχουσα δὲ οὐ τῷ δέχεσθαι ἀπορρέοντά τινα ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς τε ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρωμένου διαφανές, ὅταν κατ' ἐνέργειαν ᾖ τοιοῦτον (τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστι τὸ πεφωτισμένον), κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ὁρατῶν, τουτέστι τῶν χρωμάτων (κινητικὸν γὰρ τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς). κινούμενον γὰρ καὶ διατιθέμενον τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανὲς ὑπὸ τῶν ὁρατῶν τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ διαδίδωσι τῇ κόρῃ, οὔσῃ καὶ αὐτῇ διαφανεῖ. καὶ οὕτως διὰ ταύτης δεχομένης διὰ τοῦ διαφανοῦς τὸ μεταξὺ εἶδος τοῦ ὁρωμένου καὶ μέχρι τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ διαδιδούσης αὐτὸ 17 τῷ τὸν μεταξὺ πόρον τοιούτου σώματος εἶναι πλήρη τὸ ὁρᾶν γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ταῖς ἀπορροίαις, [ὡς ᾤοντο οἱ] πρὸ αὐτοῦ (ἁφὴ γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ἡ ὄψις ἔσται), ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ μεταξὺ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ {τῆς} τοῦ ὁρωμένου διαφανοῦς κινήσει ὑπὸ τῶν ὁρατῶν. χυμὸν δὲ ὁρίζεται ὁ φιλόσοφος τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τῇ γῇ ξηροῦ γινόμενον πάθος ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τῆς γεύσεως τῆς κατὰ δύναμιν ἀλλοιωτικὸν εἰς ἐνέργειαν. Ἠρώτησας δὲ καὶ τί ἐστι τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτικῆς. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπιμέλεια, καλεῖται δὲ ἠθική. μόριον δὲ ἕκαστος μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν τῆς πόλεως, ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς. καὶ ἔνθα μὲν ἔστι τινὰ τέλη παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, οἷον ἐν ταῖς ποιητικαῖς, ἐν ταύταις βελτίω τὰ ἔργα τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, τουτέστι τὰ ποιήματα, ἔνθα δὲ αὐταὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι, οὐδὲν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τιμιώτερον. ἐν ἁπάσαις δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσι τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τεχνῶν τέλη αἱρετώτερα τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτά. ἀρχιτεκτονικαὶ δὲ λέγονται αἱ ἄρχουσαι καὶ κρατοῦσαι τῶν ὑφ' αὑτάς, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ τῆς πηδαλιουργικῆς. ∆ιάφοροι δόξαι Ἑλληνικαὶ περὶ ψυχῆσ Τολμῶσιν ἔνιοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀπορρήτων σαφῶς διαλέγεσθαι. ὁ γοῦν φιλόσοφος Πρόκλος τὴν ἐντεῦθεν ἀπαλλαγὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς ἔχει φύσεως παριστῶν «φερομένη» φησί «περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγγέλων μερὶς καὶ περιλάμπουσα αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν καὶ πλήρη ποιοῦσα τοῦ ἀχράντου πυρός, ὃ ἐνδίδωσιν αὐτῇ τάξιν ἄκλιτον καὶ δύναμιν,