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1.71 Empedocles of Acragas, saying thus: but it is the way of the wicked strongly to distrust; for so the pledges of our Muse command. The unbelievers, therefore, according to the man of Acragas, are of the party of the wicked; and the same are foolish and like the deaf according to Hera 1.72 clitus. But indeed also Parmenides the Eleatic, the companion of Xenophanes of Colophon, exhorts to approach the intelligible things by faith; for he says: Yet look upon things absent as being securely present to the mind. For it is possible to approach the intelligible things by mind alone; but without fai 1.73 th the mind is not even able to see the things that are understood. And Solon also hints at this: But of understanding the unseen measure is hardest to discern, which alone holds the limits of all things. 1.74 And if it is hardest to discern, then it is altogether impossible to express. And Empedocles also says concerning the unseen things: It is not possible for us to approach it so as to bring it within reach of our eyes, or to grasp it with our hands; which is the main highway of persuasion that falls into the mind of men. 1.75 And Antisthenes, a pupil of Socrates, and founder of the Cynic school, proclaims concerning the God of the universe: "He is not known from an image, he is not seen by the eye, he is like nothing; 1.76 wherefore no one can learn of Him from an image." Faith, therefore, is necessary for those who wish to perceive the intelligible things, since it is not even possible to find a fitting image for them. And Xenophon the Athenian, the Socratic, the son of Gryllus, has written in harmony with these things. 1.77 For he says: "He who shakes and keeps all things still is manifest as someone great and powerful; but what He is in form is unseen." There is need, then, of faith for those who are striving to understand the unse 1.78 en. And one might also hear Bacchylides saying in his Paeans: For it is not easy to find the gates of unspoken words. We have need, therefore, of intellectual eyes for the comprehension of intelligible things, and just as we need the eyes of the body for the contemplation of visible things, so indeed we need faith for the 1.79 vision of divine things. For what the eye is in the body, that indeed faith is in the mind; or rather, just as the eye needs light to show the visible things, so also again the mind needs faith to show the divine things and to keep the opinion concerning them steadfast. 1.80 But of those who are not willing to contemplate intelligible things, hear how Plato accuses them: "Look around," he says, "and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. And these are they who think that nothing else exists than what they can grasp tightly with their hands, but do not accept actions and generations and everything invisible as being 1.81 in the category of substance." And you are of this company; but do not be annoyed at the refutation; for you are devoted only to visible things, revering handmade idols, and you do not accept the teaching about the nature of the unse 1.82 en. And perhaps to men so disposed Epicharmus the comic poet applied that iambic line: Natures of men, inflated wineskins. But it is the mark of prudent men not to be enslaved to preconception nor to be bound by ancestral customs, but to seek the truth and to collect what is 1.83 useful from every quarter. Or did not Socrates say such things to Crito: "I am not only now, but always, of such a nature as to obey nothing of mine other than the argument which, upon consideration, appears to me to be the best." And he shows by these things that by using reason he longed to find what was profitable and did not hold it as a law 1.84 to be enslaved to preconception. Thus he persuades Alcibiades to learn, having first banished the conceit of knowledge. For first he refuted him as not knowing; then when he said: "But do you not think that I would find out?" he added: "Indeed you would, if you should seek." And when he in turn said: "Then do you not think I would seek?" 1.85 he replied and said: "I do, if you would but think you do not know." The beginning of knowledge, therefore, is the knowledge of ignorance. And in addition to this, one must drive out the evil teachings from the soul, and then thus receive the divine things. And this again Plato taught, saying: "For it is not lawful for the impure to touch the pure." 1.86 And this also Orpheus says: I will speak to those to whom it is lawful; but you, profane, shut the doors.

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1.71 Ἀκραγαντῖνος Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγων ὡδί· ἀλλὰ κακοῖς μὲν κάρτα πέλει κρατέουσιν ἀπιστεῖν· ὧδε γὰρ ἡμετέρης κέλεται πιστώματα Μούσης. Τῆς τῶν κακῶν ἄρα μερίδος κατὰ τὸν Ἀκραγαντῖνον οἱ ἄπιστοι· ἀξύνετοι δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐοικότες κωφοῖς κατὰ τὸν Ἡρά 1.72 κλειτον. Ἀτὰρ δὴ καὶ Παρμενίδης ὁ Ἐλεάτης, ὁ τοῦ Κολοφωνίου Ξενοφάνους ἑταῖρος, πίστει τοῖς νοητοῖς προσβάλλειν παρεγ γυᾷ· φησὶ γάρ· λεῦσσε δ' ὅμως ἀπεόντα, νόῳ παρεόντα βεβαίως. Νῷ γὰρ μόνῳ πελάζειν τοῖς νοητοῖς δυνατόν· δίχα δὲ πί 1.73 στεως οὐδὲ ὁ νοῦς ὁρᾶν δύναται τὰ νοούμενα. Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ὁ Σόλων αἰνίττεται· γνωμοσύνης δ' ἀφανὲς χαλεπώτατόν ἐστι νοῆσαι μέτρον, ὃ δὴ πάντων πείρατα μοῦνον ἔχει. 1.74 Εἰ δὲ νοῆσαι χαλεπώτατον, εἰπεῖν ἄρα πάμπαν ἀδύνατον. Καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀοράτων φησίν· οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθαι ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτὸν ἡμετέροις ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν· ἥπερ τε μεγίστη πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἁμαξιτὸς εἰς φρένα πίπτει. 1.75 Καὶ Ἀντισθένης δέ, ὁ Σωκράτους μὲν φοιτητής, τῆς δὲ Κυ νικῆς αἱρέσεως ἡγησάμενος, περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων βοᾷ· "Ἀπὸ εἰκόνος οὐ γνωρίζεται, ὀφθαλμῷ οὐχ ὁρᾶται, οὐδενὶ ἔοικε· 1.76 διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται." Ἀναγκαία ἄρα ἡ πίστις τοῖς τὰ νοητὰ κατιδεῖν βουλομένοις, ἐπειδήπερ οὐδὲ εἰκόνα ἐξευρεῖν αὐτοῖς ξυμβαίνουσαν οἷόν τε. Καὶ Ξενοφῶν δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ὁ Σωκρατικός, ὁ Γρύλλου παῖς, ξυνῳδὰ τούτοις 1.77 γέγραφεν· φησὶ γάρ· "Ὁ γοῦν πάντα σείων καὶ ἀτρεμίζων, ὡς μὲν μέγας τις καὶ δυνατός, φανερός· ὁποῖος δέ ἐστι μορφήν, ἀφανής." ∆εῖ δήπου πίστεως τοῖς τἀφανὲς ὀριγνωμένοις καταμα 1.78 θεῖν. Ἀκούσαι δ' ἄν τις καὶ Βακχυλίδου λέγοντος ἐν τοῖς Παιᾶσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ῥᾷστον ἀρρήτων ἐπέων πύλας ἐξευρεῖν. Χρεία τοίνυν ἡμῖν νοερῶν ὀμμάτων εἰς τὴν τῶν νοητῶν κατα νόησιν, καὶ καθάπερ δεόμεθα τῶν τοῦ σώματος ὀφθαλμῶν εἰς τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν ὁρατῶν, οὕτω δήπου χρῄζομεν πίστεως εἰς τὴν 1.79 ἐποπτείαν τῶν θείων. Ὅπερ γὰρ δή ἐστιν ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν σώματι, τοῦτο ἄρα πίστις ἐν διανοίᾳ· μᾶλλον δέ, ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς δεῖται φωτὸς ἐπιδεικνύντος τὰ ὁρατά, οὕτω δὴ αὖ καὶ ὁ νοῦς δεῖται πίστεως ἐπιδεικνύσης τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὴν περὶ τούτων δόξαν φυλατ τούσης βεβαίαν. 1.80 Τῶν δέ γε τὰ νοητὰ θεωρεῖν οὐ βουλομένων ἀκούσατε ὅπως ὁ Πλάτων κατηγορεῖ· "Ἄθρει γὰρ δή" φησι "περισκοπῶν, μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούσῃ· εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡγούμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὗ ἂν ἀπρὶξ ταῖς χερσὶ λαβέσθαι δύναιντο, πρά ξεις δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς 1.81 ἐν οὐσίας μέρει." Ταύτης δὲ τῆς ξυμμορίας καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐστε· ἀλλὰ μὴ δυσχεράνητε τὸν ἔλεγχον· μόνοις γὰρ τοῖς ὁρατοῖς προστε τήκατε καὶ τὰ χειρόκμητα ξόανα σέβοντες, τὴν περὶ τῆς τοῦ 1.82 ἀοράτου φύσεως διδασκαλίαν οὐ δέχεσθε. Καὶ ἴσως τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις ἀνθρώποις Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ κωμικὸς τὸν ἴαμβον ἐκεῖ νον προσήρμοσε· φύσεις ἀνθρώπων, ἀσκοὶ πεφυσημένοι. Ἀνδρῶν δέ γε σωφρονούντων ἴδιον μὴ προλήψει δουλεύειν μηδὲ ἔθεσι προσδεδέσθαι πατρῴοις, ἀλλὰ ζητεῖν τἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ 1.83 χρήσιμον πανταχόθεν ξυλλέγειν. Ἢ οὐ τοιαῦτα καὶ Σωκράτης τῷ Κρίτωνι ἔλεγεν· "Ὡς ἐγώ, οὐ μόνον νῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἄν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνοιτο." ∆ηλοῖ δὲ διὰ τούτων, ὡς λόγῳ χρώμενος ἐξευρεῖν ἐπόθει τὸ ξυμφέρον καὶ οὔ τι νόμον 1.84 εἶχε τὸ τῇ προλήψει δουλεύειν. Οὕτω τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην πείθει μαθεῖν τὴν τῆς γνώσεως οἴησιν πρότερον ἐξορίσας. Πρότερον μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐξήλεγξεν οὐκ εἰδότα· εἶτ' ἐκείνου εἰρηκότος· "Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν εὑρεῖν με ἡγῇ;" ἐπήγαγεν· "Καὶ μάλα γε, εἰ ζητή σαις." Ἐκείνου δ' αὖ φάντος· "Εἶτα ζητῆσαί με οὐκ ἂν οἴει;" 1.85 ὑπολαβὼν ἔφη· "Ἔγωγε, εἰ οἰηθείης γε μὴ εἰδέναι." Ἀρχὴ ἄρα γνώσεως τῆς ἀγνοίας ἡ γνῶσις. ∆εῖ δὲ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τὰ πονηρὰ μαθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελάσαι, εἶθ' οὕτως τὰ θεῖα προσδέξασθαι. Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν ὁ Πλάτων ἐδίδαξεν εἰπών· "Οὐ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν εἶναι." 1.86 Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Ὀρφεύς φησιν· φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστί, θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι.