ARTICLE 8

In this article the question is: Whether virtues are in us by nature.

It would seem that they are.

             OBJECTIONS:

1. Damascene says, in De Orthodox. Fide: "There are natural virtues which are in all of us naturally and equally."

             2. Further, on Matt. 4:23: "And Jesus went about all Galilee teaching," the Gloss (ordinaria) comments: "He taught natural virtues, namely, chastity, justice, and humility, such as a man has by nature."

             3. Further, in Rom. 2:14 it says that men who have not the law do naturally those things that are of the law. But the law commands virtuous acts. Therefore, men naturally perform acts of virtue; and so it would seem that virtue is from nature.

             4. Further, in a sermon to his monks Anthony declares: "If the will should mutilate nature, this would be perverse. Let the condition of nature be safeguarded, and virtue is the result." In the same sermon he tells them that natural adornment suffices for man. But this would not be so, if virtues were not natural. Therefore, virtues are natural.

             5. Further, Cicero says that uprightness of soul is ours by nature. But this seems to refer to magnanimity. Therefore, magnanimity is ours by nature, and, for the same reason, other virtues.

             6. Further, to perform a virtuous deed all that is required is the capability, the will, and the knowledge of good. But knowledge of the good is in us by nature, as Augustine remarks in De Libero Arbitrio. The will to good is also in man by nature, as the same author states, in De Genesi ad litteram. Likewise, the power to do good is in man naturally, since the will is master of its own act. Therefore, nature suffices for an act of virtue, and virtue is man's naturally, at least in its inchoative stage.

             7. But it might be objected that virtue is natural to man as to its beginning, but that the perfection of virtue is not from nature.--On the contrary, Damascene says in De Orthodox. Fide: "As long as we adhere to what is according to nature, we are virtuous. As soon as we fall away from what is natural, from virtue, we fall into what is unnatural and malicious." From this it is clear that it is according to our nature to turn away from malice. But this is the work of perfect virtue. Therefore, the perfection of virtue is from nature.

             8. Further, since virtue is a form, it is simple and lacks parts. If, therefore, it is from nature according to one of its aspects, it would seem that it must be completely from nature.

             9. Further, man is nobler and more perfect than irrational creatures. But other creatures have from nature a sufficiency of those things which pertain to their perfection. Since the virtues are among man's perfections, it would seem that they are in man by nature.

             10. But it might be objected that this cannot be, because men's perfection consists in many and diverse things, whereas nature is ordered to one thing. -On the contrary, the inclination of virtue is also to one thing, as is that of nature. For Cicero describes virtue as a habit, in the likeness of a nature, which is in conformity with reason. Therefore, nothing prohibits virtue from being in man from nature.

             11. Further, virtue consists in a mean. But a mean is determined to one point. Therefore, nothing prohibits the inclination of nature from being determined to what is virtuous.

             12. Further, sin is the privation of measure, species, and order. But sin is also the privation of virtue. Therefore, virtue consists in measure, species, and order. Now measure, species, and order are natural to man. Therefore, virtue is natural to man.

             13. Further, the appetitive part of the soul follows the cognitive part. But in the cognitive part there is a natural habit, namely, the understanding of principles. So also in the appetitive or affective part, which is the subject of virtue, there is a natural habit. Thus it would seem that some virtue is natural.

             14. Further, the natural is that of which the principle is within (naturale est cuius principium est intra.); as to be borne upwards is natural to fire, because the principle of this movement is in that which is moved. But the principle of virtue is in man. Therefore, virtue is natural to man.

             15. Further, that is itself natural, the seed of which is natural. But the seed of virtue is natural; for a Gloss observes, on Heb. 1, that God willed to plant in every soul the seeds of wisdom and understanding. Therefore, it would seem that virtue is natural.

             16. Further, contraries are of the same genus. But the contrary of virtue is malice. Now malice is natural to us, for we read, in Wisd. 12:10, that: "their malice (was) natural;" and in Eph. 2:3: "we . . . were by nature children of wrath." Therefore, it would seem that virtue is natural.

             17. Further, it is natural that the lower powers be subject to reason. The Philosopher says, in De Anima, that the higher appetite, which is that of reason, moves the lower, which belongs to the sensitive part, as a higher sphere moves a lower sphere. Now moral virtue consists in the subordination of the lower powers to reason. Therefore, these virtues are natural.

             18. Further, that a movement be natural, a natural aptitude in the interior passive principle suffices. Thus the generation of simple bodies is said to be natural, as well as the movement of the heavenly bodies. For the active principle of the celestial bodies is not nature, but an intellect, while the principle of the generation of simple bodies is extrinsic. But there is in man a natural aptitude for virtue; as the Philosopher says, in the Ethics: "we are adapted by nature to receive them (the virtues) and are made perfect (in them) by habit." Therefore, it would seem that virtues are natural.

             19. Further, that which is in man from birth is natural. But according to the Philosopher, in the Ethics, some men truly seem to be brave and temperate from birth, and well-disposed as regards the other virtues. In Job 31:18 it is written: "From my infancy mercy grew up in me: and it came out with me from my mother's womb." Therefore, virtues are natural to man.

             20. Further, nature is not deficient in necessaries. But virtues are necessary for man to attain the end to which he is naturally ordered, i.e. happiness, which consists in an act of perfect virtue. Therefore, man has virtues from nature.

             ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Natural properties are not lost through sin; hence Dionysius says, in De Divin. Nomin., that the natural gifts of the demons remain in them. But virtues are lost through sin. Therefore, they are not natural.

             2. Further, neither habitual activity nor lack of it affect those things which are from nature and which inhere naturally. But virtuous habits we can both acquire and lose. Therefore, virtuous habits are not natural.

             3. Further, those things which are in us naturally are in every one of us. But virtues are not universally in all of us, since in some there are vices contrary to virtue.

             4. Further, we neither acquire nor lose merit by natural things, because they are always in us. But we merit by virtue, just as we lose merit by vice. Therefore, virtues and vices are not natural.

             I reply: There are diverse opinions regarding the acquiring of the sciences and the virtues, according as opinions differ concerning the production of natural forms.

             For there have been some who held that forms pre-exist in matter actually, although in a latent state, and that they are brought from a hidden to a manifest state by a natural agent. This was the opinion of Anaxagoras, whose position was that all things are in everything, so that from all things all things can be produced.

             Others said that forms exist completely extrinsic to things, which have them either by participation in ideas, as Plato held, or from some agent intellect, as Avicenna taught; and that natural agents do no more than dispose matter for form.

             The third view is the mean (via media) proposed by Aristotle, in De Generatione Animalium, which states that forms preexist in matter potentially, but are reduced to act by an external natural agent.

             Likewise with regard to the sciences and virtues, some have said that they are in us by nature, and that study serves merely to remove the impediments to science and virtue. This seems to have been Plato's doctrine, when he teaches that the sciences and virtues are caused in us by participation in separated forms; but that the soul has been prevented from making use of them by its union with the body. Thus the impediment should be removed by application in the sciences and exercise in the virtues.

             Others have said that science and virtue are in us from the action of an agent intellect, for which influence man is disposed by study and exercise.

             There is a third, mediate opinion, which holds that there is in us from nature an aptitude for the sciences and virtues, but that their perfection is not in us naturally. This is the best opinion. Just as the strength (virtus) of natural agents in no way diminishes natural forms; so as regards the acquirement of science and virtue, study and exercise conserve their efficacy.

             It should be noted that an aptitude for a perfection or form can be in a subject in two ways. First, according to some passive potency only; as in the matter of air there is an aptitude for the form of fire. Secondly, according to both an active and a passive potency at the same time; as in a body capable of health there is a natural aptitude for health, because the body is (naturally) susceptive of health. In this second way there is in man a natural aptitude for virtue; partly from the nature of the species, whereby this aptitude is common to all men, and partly from the nature of the individual, according as some are more aptly disposed for virtue than others.

             In confirmation it may be observed that in man three powers can be the subjects of virtue, as is clear from what has been said above. These are: the intellect, the will, and the lower appetite, which comprises the concupiscible and irascible parts. In each of these we must consider in some way both the susceptibility for and the active principle of virtue.

             In the intellective part, it is evident, there are the possible intellect, which is potential to all intelligible beings in the knowledge of which being intellectual virtue consists; and the active intellect, by the light of which objects are made actually intelligible. Of these intelligible objects, some are naturally known to man from the outset, without any study or inquiry: among these are first principles--not only of the speculative order, e.g. "Every whole is greater than its part," and such like, but also of the practical order, as "Evil is to be avoided," and so forth. These naturally known truths are the principles of all the subsequent knowledge which is acquired by study, whether it be practical or speculative.

             Similarly, with respect to the will there is quite manifestly some natural active principle. For the will is naturally inclined to the ultimate end. Now in actions the end has the ratio of a natural principle. Therefore, the inclination of the will is a kind of active principle with respect to every disposition acquired by exercise in the affective part. The will itself, insofar as it is a power free to choose between any two alternative means, is certainly susceptible of an habitual inclination to this or that means to the end.

             Furthermore, the concupiscible and irascible appetites are apt by nature to obey reason: hence they are naturally susceptive of virtue, which perfects them and disposes them to follow the good which reason proposes.

             These inchoative states of virtue are present in man from the nature of the human species; wherefore, they are common to all men.

             There is an initial stage of virtue which corresponds to the nature of an individual, wherein one man, by his natural complexion or from some impression of the heavenly bodies, is inclined to acts of some virtue. This inclination is the beginning of virtue; however, it is not perfect virtue, because for perfect virtue the mean or measure of reason is required. For this reason, in the definition of virtue, we say that it chooses the mean which accords with right reason. If one should follow a natural inclination without the discretion of reason, he would frequently sin. Just as this beginning of virtue, without the work of reason, has not the nature of perfect virtue, so neither does any of the others mentioned above.

             For we arrive by the inquiry of reason from universal principles to particular applications. Moreover, by the use of reason a man is led from a desire for the ultimate end to those means which are appropriate to this end. Reason itself, by commanding the irascible and concupiscible powers, subjects them to itself. Hence the work of reason is clearly required for the completion of virtue, whether it be virtue in the intellect, the will, or the irascible and concupiscible powers.

             The perfection of virtue lies in this: that the beginning of virtue in the higher part orders virtue in the lower. Thus a man is made apt for the virtue which is in the will both by the beginning of virtue which resides therein, and by that which is in the intellect. He is made apt for virtue in the irascible and concupiscible parts by the beginnings of virtue in them, and by that which is in the higher powers; but not vice-versa. From this it is also clear that reason, which is the superior faculty, works for the perfection of all the virtues.

             Reason as an operative principle is distinguished from nature as an operative principle, as we read in the Physics, by the fact that the rational power is capable of considering contraries, whereas nature is ordered to one thing alone. Therefore, the perfection of virtue is manifestly not from nature, but from reason.

             REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Virtues are said to be natural with respect to the natural beginnings of virtue which are in man, not with respect to their perfection.

             The same may be said in reply to the second, third, fourth, and fifth objections.

             6. The capability of good is in us simply from nature in that our powers are natural; whereas willing and knowing are in us in some degree by nature, that is, in a broad and inchoative state. But this does not suffice for virtue. A good act that is the effect of virtue requires that a man attain a good result promptly and infallibly, and for the most part. But a man cannot do this without a virtuous habit. Thus it is evident that a man can know in a general way how to produce a work of art, for example, how to conduct an argument, how to cut, or something of this sort; but that he do so promptly and without any mistake, he must have the habit of art. And the same is true of virtue.

             7. By nature a man does have, to a certain extent, the power to turn away from malice. But that he do so promptly and infallibly, a virtuous habit is required.

             8. Virtue is not said to be partially from nature as though some 'part' of it were so and another part not; but because it is from nature in an imperfect manner of being, namely, potentially and according to an aptitude.

             9. God is per se perfectly good; hence He needs nothing to attain goodness. The higher substances, those closer to Him, need place only a few acts to attain from Him their perfect goodness. But man, who is more remote, needs more things to acquire perfect goodness, because he is capable of beatitude. Finally, creatures which have no capacity for beatitude need fewer things to attain their perfection than does man to attain his. Wherefore, man is nobler than these other creatures, even though he stands in relatively greater need. Thus one who can obtain perfect health by much exercise is better disposed than another, who can reach only imperfect health, although with little effort.

             10. There can also be a natural inclination to those things which are the object of one virtue. But there can be no inclination from nature to the objects of all the virtues, because a natural disposition which inclines to one virtue inclines to the contrary of another virtue: for example, one who is naturally disposed to fortitude, which consists in pursuing arduous goods, is less disposed to meekness, which consists in restraining the passions of the irascible appetite. Consequently, we observe that animals which are naturally inclined to the act of one "virtue," are inclined to a vice contrary to another virtue: as the lion, which is naturally daring, is also naturally cruel.

             Now a natural inclination to this or that virtue suffices for other animals, which are incapable of obtaining the perfect good of virtue, and attain only some sort of limited good. However, men are constituted to attain the perfection of virtuous good; and so they require an inclination to all virtuous acts: which, since it cannot be from nature, must flow from reason, wherein the seeds of all the virtues reside.

             11. The mean in virtue is not determined by nature, as is the center of the earth, towards which heavy objects tend; rather the virtuous mean must be determined according to right reason, as it says in the Ethics. For what is the mean for one man is less than or more than the mean for another.

             12. Measure, species, and order constitute every sort of good, as Augustine says, in his book De Natura Boni. Hence, the measure, species, and order in which natural good consists are naturally in man, nor are they lost by sin. Sin is rather said to be the privation of measure, species, and order insofar as these constitute virtuous good.

             13. The will does not operate through the information of any species, as does the possible intellect; and so no natural habit is required in the will for natural desire. This is especially true since the will is moved by a natural habit in the intellect, inasmuch as the good understood is the object of the will.

             14. Although the beginnings of virtue, namely, man's rational powers, may be in man, nevertheless, this principle or beginning of virtue does not act as nature does, so that what proceeds from it is not said to be from nature.

             The same may be said in reply to the fifteenth objection.

             16. Their malice was natural in that it became so eventually, by constant repetition of wicked deeds, since custom is a "second nature." But we were by nature sons of wrath because of original sin, which is the sin of our nature.

             17. It is natural that the lower powers be subject to reason, but not that they be subject by some habit.

             18. Movement is said to be natural where there is a natural aptitude for it in the mobile being, i.e. when the mover moves it to one thing determined naturally, as the cause of formation of the elements (sicut generans in elementis) and the mover of the heavenly bodies. But such is not the case in the matter at hand; hence the reasoning does not follow.

             19. That natural inclination to virtue whereby some are, almost immediately from birth, brave and temperate, does not suffice for perfect virtue, as has been said.

             20. Nature does not fail man in necessaries, for although it does not provide everything that is necessary, still it does give him the power of using his reason to acquire everything he needs and whatever may serve his needs.