LESSON IV

[iii. 5. 1276b34-1278b6]

             378 After having shown what the virtue of the dedicated citizen is and whether it is the same as that of the good man, the Philosopher raises a certain difficulty concerning the things that have already been treated. In this connection, he does three things. First, he raises the difficulty. Secondly, he resolves it. Thirdly, he clarifies the solution.

             He says then, first of all, that there still remains a certain difficulty concerning the citizen, namely, whether only he who can share in the government of the city is a citizen or whether menial craftsmen, who have no share in the government, should also be ranked among the citizens. And he objects to both parts. For if laborers, who have nothing to do with the city, are called citizens, it will follow that the virtue that we said is that of the good citizen, namely, that he be able to rule and to obey well, does not apply to every citizen, because this man is ranked among the citizens despite the fact that he is not able to rule. If we say that no one of this sort is a citizen, there still remains a question, namely, in what category should laborers be placed. We cannot call them aliens, as if they came from elsewhere to reside in the city; nor can we call them strangers, like travelers who come to the city on business and not to stay; for these craftsmen make their home in the city, and were born there, and do not come from elsewhere.

             379 He resolves this difficulty and says that for this last reason there is a question as to the category in which craftsmen should be placed, but the fact that they are not citizens does not pose a problem. They are men who are not citizens and yet are neither aliens nor strangers, as is clearly the case with slaves and freedmen, who have been restored from servitude to freedom. For it is true that not all who are necessary for the perfection of the city and without whom the city cannot exist are citizens, since we see that not only slaves but even sons are not perfect citizens, as are men. Men are citizens absolutely, capable as they are of discharging the functions of citizens; but sons are citizens by supposition, that is to say, with some diminishing qualification, for they are imperfect citizens. And just as slaves and children are really citizens in some way but not perfectly, so also are craftsmen. Hence in ancient times menial craftsmen and even strangers were slaves in certain cities, just as many are such even now.

             380 Then he clarifies this solution, for even in the best disposed city workers could not be citizens. And if we say that a worker is a citizen in some way, then we have to say that the virtue of the citizen, which we have defined as consisting in the ability to rule and to obey well, is not that of the citizen, notwithstanding the fact that the word "citizen" is used in any way whatever. Rather, in order that this virtue may apply to them, it is necessary not only that they be free but also that they be discharged, that is to say, released from the tasks necessary for life. For if those who are assigned to such necessary tasks serve one man only, they are doing what is properly the work of slaves; for slaves used to perform such services for their masters. If, on the other hand, they perform these services for anyone indiscriminately, they are doing the work of laborers and mean persons who serve anyone for money.

             381 Then he clarifies the proposed solution. And concerning this, he does three things. First, he shows how one is a citizen differently under different regimes. Secondly, he shows that he who can share in the government is most of all a citizen under any regime. Thirdly, he gathers together in an epilogue all that has been said about the virtue of the citizen.

             He says then, first of all, that the truth concerning the things that have been said will become evident from a brief consideration of what follows. For if one understands perfectly what will be said, what has already been said will become obvious to him. Since there are many regimes differing in species, and since one speaks of a citizen in relation to a regime, as we have said, there must also necessarily be several species of citizens. This difference is best seen with reference to the subjects among the citizens, who are diversely related to the rulers under different regimes. Now those who are set over the others are the rulers under any regime. Hence, because of the diversity of regimes and consequently of citizens, it is necessary that under a certain regime, namely, the popular state, in which only freedom is sought, laborers be citizens; for, since they are free, they will have the possibility of being promoted to the government. Under other regimes, however, this is impossible, as is especially the case in the rule of the best, where honors are granted to those who are worthy of them by reason of their virtue. Those who live the life of laborers cannot, as rulers, provide the city with the things that pertain to virtue since they are not practiced in such things. But not even in the rule of the few are laborers capable of being citizens because in regimes of this sort some men are called upon to rule by reason of previous long-standing honors and riches. Hence it cannot easily happen that laborers are elevated to positions of honor, since throughout their whole lives they can scarcely gather enough [134] to become rich. But craftsmen under such regimes can be citizens and rulers because many craftsmen become rich quickly and so, by reason of their riches, can be called upon to govern in a rule of the few, when, abstaining from the practice of their art for a certain period of time after they have become rich, they have led honorable lives. Hence among the Thebans there was a statute enabling a man who had abstained from the affairs of the market place for ten years to participate in virtue, namely, ruling virtue.

             381a But even though strangers, aliens, and lowly persons cannot be citizens in the sense that they are able to rule in cities that are well established, nevertheless, in many regimes, namely, in many popular regimes, the law stipulating that strangers and aliens are not citizens is relaxed; for in certain cities he who is born of a citizen mother is considered a citizen, even if his father is an alien or a stranger. There is likewise also in many places a law to the effect that illegitimate children are citizens; but they do this on account of the scarcity of good citizens and the smallness of the population. Suffering from a deficiency of numbers, in which the power of the popular state consists, they make use of such laws so as first to choose as citizens those who were born of a male or female slave, provided one of the parents is a freeman. Then, as the population increases, they exclude all the sons of slaves but regard as citizens those whose mothers are citizens but whose fathers are aliens. Finally, they come to a point where they consider as citizens those who were born of parents both of whom are freemen and citizens. So it is evident then that there are different species of citizens according to the difference of regimes.

             382 Then he shows who is most of all a citizen. He says that in any regime he who shares in the honors of the city is most of all said to be a citizen. Hence Homer says poetically of someone that he arose, that is, to speak, after the others as one unhonored, that is, as an alien who was not a citizen. But this notion of citizen is hidden; men are indeed misled due to the fact that they live together and therefore think that all those who reside together in the city are citizens. This is not proper, however, because he who does not share in the honors of the city is like an alien in the city.

             383 Then in an epilogue he gathers together what has been said. He says that, concerning the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the dedicated citizen, we have shown that in a certain city, namely, that of the best, in which the ruling offices are granted according to the virtue which is that of the good man, the good man and the good citizen are identical, while in other cities, namely, in corrupt regimes, in which ruling offices are not distributed according to virtue, the good citizen is not the same as the good man. Furthermore, the one who is identical to the good man is not any citizen whatever but the ruler of the city and the master of those things that pertain to the care of the community, or the man who is capable of becoming such, either alone or with others. For we have said above that the virtue of the ruler is the same as that of the good man. Hence, if by citizen we mean he who is or is capable of being a ruler, his virtue is the same as that of the good man. But if by citizen we mean an imperfect citizen, who cannot become a ruler, then the virtue of the good citizen will not be the same as that of the good man, as is clear from what we have said.