Two books of soliloquies.

 As I had been long revolving with myself matters many and various, and had been for many days sedulously inquiring both concerning myself and my chief

 2. O God, Framer of the universe, grant me first rightly to invoke Thee then to show myself worthy to be heard by Thee lastly, deign to set me free.

 3. Thee I invoke, O God, the Truth, in whom and from whom and through whom all things are true which anywhere are true. God, the Wisdom, in whom and f

 4. Whatever has been said by me, Thou the only God, do Thou come to my help, the one true and eternal substance, where is no discord, no confusion, no

 5. Henceforth Thee alone do I love, Thee alone I follow, Thee alone I seek, Thee alone am I prepared to serve, for Thou alone art Lord by a just title

 Translation absent.

 7. A . Behold I have prayed to God. R A R A R A R A R A R A R A R A R A

 8. R . I allow so much: but yet if any one should say to thee, I will give thee to know God as well as thou dost know Alypius, wouldst thou not give t

 9. But let that go, and now answer to this: if those things which Plato and Plotinus have said concerning God are true, is it enough for thee to know

 10. R. It is then plain to you that a line cannot possibly be longitudinally divided into two? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 11. A. Pardon me, however vehemently thou urge and argue, yet I dare not say that I wish so to know God as I know these things. For not only the objec

 12. R. Thou art moved to good effect. For the Reason which is talking with thee promises so to demonstrate God to thy mind, as the sun demonstrates hi

 13. When therefore the mind has come to have sound eyes, what next? A. That she look. R.

 14. Therefore when the soul has obtained to see, that is, to apprehend God, let us see whether those three things are still necessary to her. Why shou

 15. Now listen, so far as the present time requires, while from that similitude of sensible things I now teach also something concerning God. Namely,

 16. But why do we delay? Let us set out: but first let us see (for this comes first) whether we are in a sound state. A. Do thou see to it, if either

 17. R. Do you not see that these eyes of the body, even when sound, are often so smitten by the light of this visible sun, as to be compelled to turn

 18. R. Thou hast made great progress: yet those things which remain in order to the seeing of that light, very greatly impede. But I am aiming at some

 19. R. You speak as if I were now inquiring what you hope. I am not inquiring what, denied, delights not, but what delights, obtained. For an extingui

 20. But I ask of thee, why thou dost desire, either that the persons whom thou affectest should live, or that they should live with thee. A. That toge

 21. R. We have pain of body left, which perhaps moves thee of its proper force. A. R.

 22. Now let us inquire concerning this, what sort of lover of wisdom thou art, whom thou desirest to behold with most chaste view and embrace, and to

 23. R. Such lovers assuredly it is, whom Wisdom ought to have. Such lovers does she seek, the love of whom has in it nothing but what is pure. But the

 24. And, another day having come, A. Give now, I pray, if thou canst, that order. Lead by what way thou wilt, through what things thou wilt, how thou

 25. R. In this way too the bodily eye might say: I shall not love the darkness, when I shall have seen the sun. For this too seems, as it were, to per

 26. A. Peace, I pray thee, peace. Why tormentest thou me? Why diggest thou so remorselessly and descendest so deep? Now I weep intolerably, henceforth

 27. R. Let us conclude, if you will, this first volume, that in a second we may attempt some such way as may commodiously offer itself. For this dispo

 28. R. What? When a chaste person dies, do you judge that Chastity dies also? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 29. R. Does this proposition seem to you to be true: Whatever is, is compelled to be somewhere? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 30. A. I thank thee much, and will diligently and cautiously review these things in my own mind, and moreover with thee, when we are in quiet, if no d

 Book II.

 1. A. Long enough has our work been intermitted, and impatient is Love, nor have tears a measure, unless to Love is given what is loved: wherefore, le

 2. A. I see a very plain and compendious order. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 3. R. Now I will have you answer me, does the soul seem to you to feel and perceive, or the body? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R

 4. R. Give answer now to this, whether it appears to you possible that at some time hereafter falsity should not be. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 5. A. O leaden dagger! For thou mightest conclude that man is immortal if I had granted thee that this universe can never be without man, and that thi

 6. R. Do any corporeal, that is, sensible things, appear to you to be capable of comprehension in the intellect? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 7. R. Give now still greater heed. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 8. R. Define therefore the True. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 9. R. God, to whom we have commended ourselves, without doubt will render help, and set us free from these straits, if only we believe, and entreat Hi

 10. R. First let us again and yet again ventilate this question, What is falsity? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 11. R. But all this forest of facts, unless I am mistaken, may be divided into two kinds. For it lies partly in equal, partly in inferior things. They

 12. R. We must, however, wait patiently, until the remaining senses also make report to us that falsity dwells in the similitude of the true. For in t

 13. R. Now give heed, while we run over the same things once more, that what we are endeavoring to show may come more plainly to view. A. R. A. R. A.

 14. R. It is ridiculous if you are ashamed, as if it were not for this very reason that we have chosen this mode of discourse: which, since we are tal

 15. A. Thou speakest rightly but what I have granted amiss I altogether fail to see: unless perchance that that is rightly called false which has som

 16. R. Attend rather for never can I be persuaded, that we have implored the Divine aid in vain. For I see that, having tried all things as far as we

 17. A. Proceed, I pray for now perchance thou hast begun to teach concerning falsities not falsely: but now I am considering of what sort that class

 18. A. Thou speakest rightly but I wonder why thou wouldst separate from this class those poems and jests, and other imitative trifles. R. A. R. A. R

 19. R. What then think you? Is the science of debate true, or false? A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 20. R. How as to Grammar itself? if it is true, is it not so far true as it is a discipline? For the name of Discipline signifies something to be lear

 21. R. Tell me now what science contains the principles of definitions, divisions and partitions. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 22. R. Attend therefore to the few things that remain. A. R. A. R. A.

 23. But as to thy question, who would grant, or to whom could it appear possible, that that which is in the subject should remain, while the subject p

 24. R. Groan not, the human mind is immortal. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 25. A. And now I am ready to plunge into the expected joys, but yet I am held hesitating by two thoughts. For, first, it makes me uneasy that we have

 26. R. Thou mayest note that it is not for naught that our reasoning has taken so wide a round. For we were inquiring what is Truth, which not even no

 27. What shall we say to this, that we have entreated God and do entreat, that He will show us a way, not to riches, not to bodily pleasures, not to p

 28. R. From this truth, as I remember, that Truth cannot perish, we have concluded, that not only if the whole world should perish, but even if Truth

 29. R. Is Truth then so called for any other reason than as being that by which everything is true which is true? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 30. R. You apprehend the matter well. But consider this, whether we can also with propriety call silver by the name of false lead. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 31. A. Go on to what remains for of this I am well convinced. R A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A R. A. R. A. R. A.

 32. R. What sayest thou concerning the rest? A. R. A R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 33. R. What need is there any longer than that we should inquire concerning the science of disputation? For whether the figures of Geometry are in the

 34. A. It is as thou sayest, and I willingly yield compliance with thine injunctions. But this at least I would entreat, before thou decreest a term t

 35. R. Such are those who are well instructed in the liberal arts since they by learning disinter them, buried in oblivion, doubtless, within themsel

 36. These points will be treated with more pains and greater subtilty, when we shall have begun to discuss the faculty of intelligence, which part of

8. R. I allow so much: but yet if any one should say to thee, I will give thee to know God as well as thou dost know Alypius, wouldst thou not give thanks, and say, It is enough? A. I should give thanks indeed: but I should not say, It is enough. R. Why, I pray? A. Because I do not even know God so well as I know Alypius, and yet I do not know Alypius well enough. R. Beware then lest shamelessly thou wouldest fain be satisfied in the knowledge of God, who hast not even such a knowledge of Alypius as satisfies. A. Non sequitur. For, comparing it with the stars, what is of lower account than my supper? and yet what I shall sup on to-morrow I know not: but in what sign the moon will be, I need take no shame to profess that I know. R. Is it then enough for thee to know God as well as thou dost know in what sign the moon will hold her course to-morrow? A. It is not enough, for this I test by the senses. But I do not know whether or not either God, or some hidden cause of nature may suddenly change the moon’s ordinary course, which if it came to pass, would render false all that I had presumed. R. And believest thou that this may happen? A. I do not believe. But I at least am seeking what I may know, not what I may believe. Now everything that we know, we may with reason perhaps be said to believe, but not to know everything which we believe. R. In this matter therefore you reject all testimony of the senses? A. I utterly reject it. R. That friend of yours then, whom you say you do not yet know, is it by sense that you wish to know him or by intellectual perception? A. Whatever in him I know by sense, if indeed anything is known by sense, is both mean and sufficiently known. But that part which bears affection to me, that is, the mind itself, I desire to know intellectually. R. Can it, indeed, be known otherwise? A. By no means. R. Do you venture then to call your friend, your inmost friend, unknown to you? A. Why not venture? For I account most equitable that law of friendship, by which it is prescribed, that as one is to bear no less, so he is to bear no more affection to his friend than to himself. Since then I know not myself, what injury does he suffer, whom I declare to be unknown to me, above all since (as I believe) he does not even know himself? R. If then these things which thou wouldst fain know, are of such a sort as are to be intellectually attained, when I said it was shameless in thee to crave to know God, when thou knowest not even Alypius, thou oughtest not to have urged to me the similitude of thy supper and the moon, if these things, as thou hast said, appertain to sense.

CAPUT III. Cognitio Dei.

8. R. Accipio istud: sed tamen si quis tibi diceret, Faciam te sic Deum nosse, quomodo nosti Alypium; nonne gratias ageres, et diceres, Satis est? A. Agerem quidem gratias, sed satis esse non dicerem. R. Cur, quaeso? A. Quia Deum ne sic quidem novi quomodo Alypium, et tamen Alypium non satis novi. R. Vide ergo ne impudenter velis satis Deum nosse, qui Alypium non satis nosti. A. Non sequitur. Nam in comparatione siderum, quid est mea coena vilius? et tamen cras quid sim coenaturus ignoro; quo autem signo luna futura sit, non impudenter me scire profiteor. R. Ergo vel ita Deum nosse tibi satis est, ut nosti quo cras signo luna cursura sit? A. Non est satis: nam hoc sensibus approbo. Ignoro autem utrum vel Deus vel aliqua naturae occulta causa subito lunae ordinem cursumque commutet: quod si acciderit, totum illud quod praesumpseram, falsum erit. R. Et credis hoc fieri posse? A. Non credo. Sed ego quid sciam quaero, non quid credam. Omne autem quod scimus, recte fortasse etiam credere dicimur; at non omne quod credimus, etiam scire. R. Respuis igitur in hac causa omne testimonium sensuum? A. Prorsus respuo. R. Quid? illum familiarem tuum quem te adhuc ignorare dixisti, sensu vis nosse, an intellectu? A. Sensu quidem quod in eo novi, si tamen sensu aliquid noscitur, et vile est, et satis est: illam vero partem qua mihi amicus est, id est ipsum animum, intellectu assequi cupio. R. Potestne aliter nosci? A. Nullo modo. R. Amicum igitur tuum et vehementer familiarem, audes tibi dicere esse ignotum? A. Quidni audeam? Illam enim legem amicitiae justissimam esse arbitror, qua praescribitur ut sicut non minus, ita nec plus quisque amicum quam seipsum diligat. Itaque cum memetipsum ignorem, qua potest a me affici contumelia, quem mihi esse dixero ignotum, cum praesertim, ut credo, ne ipse quidem se noverit? R. Si ergo ista quae scire vis, ex eo sunt genere quae intellectus assequitur, cum dicerem impudenter te velle Deum scire, cum Alypium nescias, non debuisti 0874 mihi coenam tuam et lunam proferre pro simili, si haec, ut dixisti, ad sensum pertinent.