Chapter VIII.—If It Be Granted that Second Marriage is Lawful, Yet All Things Lawful are Not Expedient.

Let it now be granted that repetition of marriage is lawful, if everything which is lawful is good.  The same apostle exclaims:  “All things are lawful, but all are not profitable.”40    1 Cor. x. 23.  Pray, can what is “not profitable” be called good?  If even things which do not make for salvation are “lawful,” it follows that even things which are not good are “lawful.”  But what will it be your duty rather to choose; that which is good because it is “lawful,” or that which is so because it is “profitable?”  A wide difference I take to exist between “licence” and salvation.  Concerning the “good” it is not said “it is lawful;” inasmuch as “good” does not expect to be permitted, but to be assumed.  But that is “permitted” about which a doubt exists whether it be “good;” which may likewise not be permitted, if it have not some first (extrinsic) cause of its being:—inasmuch as it is on account of the danger of incontinence that second marriage, (for instance), is permitted:—because, unless the “licence” of some not (absolutely) good thing were subject (so our choice), there were no means of proving who rendered a willing obedience to the Divine will, and who to his own power; which of us follows presentiality, and which embraces the opportunity of licence.  “Licence,” for the most part, is a trial of discipline; since it is through trial that discipline is proved, and through “licence” that trial operates.  Thus it comes to pass that “all things are lawful, but not all are expedient,” so long as (it remains true that) whoever has a “permission” granted is (thereby) tried, and is (consequently) judged during the process of trial in (the case of the particular) “permission.”  Apostles, withal, had a “licence” to marry, and lead wives about (with them41    See 1 Cor. ix. 5.).  They had a “licence,” too, to “live by the Gospel.”42    See vers. 4, 9–18.  But he who, when occasion required,43    In occasionem. “did not use this right,” provokes us to imitate his own example; teaching us that our probation consists in that wherein “licence” has laid the groundwork for the experimental proof of abstinence.

CAPUT VIII.

0923B Liceat nunc denuo nubere, si omne quod licet bonum est. Idem Apostolus exclamat: omnia licent, sed non omnia prosunt (I Cor. VI, 12). Quod non prodest, oro te, bonum potest dici? Si licita sunt et quae non pro salute, ergo et quae non bona sunt, licita sunt. Quid autem magis velle debebis, quod ideo bonum est, quia licet, an quod ideo quia prodest? Multum existimo esse inter licentiam et salutem . De bono non dicitur , licet, quia bonum permitti non exspectat, sed adsumi. Permittitur autem quod, an bonum sit, in dubio est, quod potest etiam non permitti, si non habeat aliquam sui caussam primam. Propter incontinentiae periculum permittitur nubere secundo; quia nisi licentia alicujus non bonae rei subjaceret, non esset in quo probaretur 0923C qui divinae voluntati, et qui suae potestati obsequeretur; quis nostrum utilitatis praesentiam sectetur, et quis occasionem licentiae amplexetur. Licentia plerumque tentatio est disciplinae, quoniam 0924A disciplina per tentationem probatur, tentatio per licentiam operatur. Ita fit, ut omnia liceant, sed non omnia expediant; dum tentatur cui permittitur, et judicatur dum in permissione tentatur . Licebat et Apostolis nubere, et uxores circumducere (I Cor. VI, 12); licebat et de Evangelio ali. Sed qui jure hoc usus non est in occasionem, ad exemplum nos suum provocat, docens in eo esse probationem, in quo licentia experimentum abstinentiae praestruxit .