VIII. Why man’s form is upright; and that hands were given him because of reason; wherein also is a speculation on the difference of souls23    The Latin version divides the chapters somewhat differently at this point. The Bodleian ms. gives this section the title, “Of the dignity of the human form, and why man was created after the other creatures.”.

1. But man’s form is upright, and extends aloft towards heaven, and looks upwards: and these are marks of sovereignty which show his royal dignity. For the fact that man alone among existing things is such as this, while all others bow their bodies downwards, clearly points to the difference of dignity between those which stoop beneath his sway and that power which rises above them: for all the rest have the foremost limbs of their bodies in the form of feet, because that which stoops needs something to support it: but in the formation of man these limbs were made hands, for the upright body found one base, supporting its position securely on two feet, sufficient for its needs.

2. Especially do these ministering hands adapt themselves to the requirements of the reason: indeed if one were to say that the ministration of hands is a special property of the rational nature, he would not be entirely wrong; and that not only because his thought turns to the common and obvious fact that we signify our reasoning by means of the natural employment of our hands in written characters. It is true that this fact, that we speak by writing, and, in a certain way, converse by the aid of our hands, preserving sounds by the forms of the alphabet, is not unconnected with the endowment of reason; but I am referring to something else when I say that the hands co-operate with the bidding of reason.

3. Let us, however, before discussing this point, consider the matter we passed over (for the subject of the order of created things almost escaped our notice), why the growth of things that spring from the earth takes precedence, and the irrational animals come next, and then, after the making of these, comes man: for it may be that we learn from these facts not only the obvious thought, that grass appeared to the Creator useful for the sake of the animals, while the animals were made because of man, and that for this reason, before the animals there was made their food, and before man that which was to minister to human life.

4. But it seems to me that by these facts Moses reveals a hidden doctrine, and secretly delivers that wisdom concerning the soul, of which the learning that is without had indeed some imagination, but no clear comprehension. His discourse then hereby teaches us that the power of life and soul may be considered in three divisions. For one is only a power of growth and nutrition supplying what is suitable for the support of the bodies that are nourished, which is called the vegetative24    “Vegetative”:—reading (with several mss. of both classes of those cited by Forbes) φυτικὴ for φυσικὴ (the reading which Forbes follows in his text). A similar reading has been adopted in some later passages, where the mss. show similar variations. It seems not unlikely that the less common φυτικὸς should have been altered by copyists to φυσικός. But Gregory seems in this treatise to use the word φύσις for the corporeal nature: and he may have employed the adjectival form in a corresponding sense. soul, and is to be seen in plants; for we may perceive in growing plants a certain vital power destitute of sense; and there is another form of life besides this, which, while it includes the form above mentioned, is also possessed in addition of the power of management according to sense; and this is to be found in the nature of the irrational animals: for they are not only the subjects of nourishment and growth, but also have the activity of sense and perception. But perfect bodily life is seen in the rational (I mean the human) nature, which both is nourished and endowed with sense, and also partakes of reason and is ordered by mind.

5. We might make a division of our subject in some such way as this. Of things existing, part are intellectual, part corporeal. Let us leave alone for the present the division of the intellectual according to its properties, for our argument is not concerned with these. Of the corporeal, part is entirely devoid of life, and part shares in vital energy. Of a living body, again, part has sense conjoined with life, and part is without sense: lastly, that which has sense is again divided into rational and irrational. For this reason the lawgiver says that after inanimate matter (as a sort of foundation for the form of animate things), this vegetative life was made, and had earlier25    Earlier, i.e. earlier than the animal life, or “sensitive” soul. existence in the growth of plants: then he proceeds to introduce the genesis of those creatures which are regulated by sense: and since, following the same order, of those things which have obtained life in the flesh, those which have sense can exist by themselves even apart from the intellectual nature, while the rational principle could not be embodied save as blended with the sensitive,—for this reason man was made last after the animals, as nature advanced in an orderly course to perfection. For this rational animal, man, is blended of every form of soul; he is nourished by the vegetative kind of soul, and to the faculty of growth was added that of sense, which stands midway, if we regard its peculiar nature, between the intellectual and the more material essence being as much coarser than the one as it is more refined than the other: then takes place a certain alliance and commixture of the intellectual essence with the subtle and enlightened element of the sensitive nature: so that man consists of these three: as we are taught the like thing by the apostle in what he says to the Ephesians26    The reference is really to 1 Thess. v. 23. Apparently all Forbes’ mss. read πρὸς τοὺς ᾽Εφεσίους: but the Latin version of Dionysius Exiguus corrects the error, giving the quotation at greater length., praying for them that the complete grace of their “body and soul and spirit” may be preserved at the coming of the Lord; using, the word “body” for the nutritive part, and denoting the sensitive by the word “soul,” and the intellectual by “spirit.” Likewise too the Lord instructs the scribe in the Gospel that he should set before every commandment that love to God which is exercised with all the heart and soul and mind27    Cf. S. Mark xii. 30: for here also it seems to me that the phrase indicates the same difference, naming the more corporeal existence “heart,” the intermediate “soul,” and the higher nature, the intellectual and mental faculty, “mind.”

6. Hence also the apostle recognizes three divisions of dispositions, calling one “carnal,” which is busied with the belly and the pleasures connected with it, another “natural28    ψυχικὴν: “psychic” or “animal:”—the Authorised Version translates the word by “natural.”,” which holds a middle position with regard to virtue and vice, rising above the one, but without pure participation in the other; and another “spiritual,” which perceives the perfection of godly life: wherefore he says to the Corinthians, reproaching their indulgence in pleasure and passion, “Ye are carnal29    Cf. 1 Cor. iii. 3.,” and incapable of receiving the more perfect doctrine; while elsewhere, making a comparison of the middle kind with the perfect, he says, “but the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit: for they are foolishness unto him: but he that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged of no man30    Cf. 1 Cor. ii. 14, 15..” As, then, the natural man is higher than the carnal, by the same measure also the spiritual man rises above the natural.

7. If, therefore, Scripture tells us that man was made last, after every animate thing, the lawgiver is doing nothing else than declaring to us the doctrine of the soul, considering that what is perfect comes last, according to a certain necessary sequence in the order of things: for in the rational are included the others also, while in the sensitive there also surely exists the vegetative form, and that again is conceived only in connection with what is material: thus we may suppose that nature makes an ascent as it were by steps—I mean the various properties of life—from the lower to the perfect form.

831    The Latin versions make ch. ix. begin at this point. The Bodleian ms. gives as its title:—“That the form of the human body agrees with the rationality of the mind.”. Now since man is a rational animal, the instrument of his body must be made suitable for the use of reason32    It is not absolutely clear whether λόγος in the following passage means speech or reason—and whether λογικὸς means “capable of speech,” or “rational.” But as λογικὸς in §7 clearly has the force of “rational,” it would seem too abrupt a transition to make it mean “capable of speech” in the first line of §8, and this may determine the meaning of λόγος.; as you may see musicians producing their music according to the form of their instruments, and not piping with harps nor harping upon flutes, so it must needs be that the organization of these instruments of ours should be adapted for reason, that when struck by the vocal organs it might be able to sound properly for the use of words. For this reason the hands were attached to the body; for though we can count up very many uses in daily life for which these skilfully contrived and helpful instruments, our hands, that easily follow every art and every operation, alike in war and peace33    Reading τῶν for τὸν, with some of Forbes’ mss., are serviceable, yet nature added them to our body pre-eminently for the sake of reason. For if man were destitute of hands, the various parts of his face would certainly have been arranged like those of the quadrupeds, to suit the purpose of his feeding: so that its form would have been lengthened out and pointed towards the nostrils, and his lips would have projected from his mouth, lumpy, and stiff, and thick, fitted for taking up the grass, and his tongue would either have lain between his teeth, of a kind to match his lips, fleshy, and hard, and rough, assisting his teeth to deal with what came under his grinder, or it would have been moist and hanging out at the side like that of dogs and other carnivorous beasts, projecting through the gaps in his jagged row of teeth. If, then, our body had no hands, how could articulate sound have been implanted in it, seeing that the form of the parts of the mouth would not have had the configuration proper for the use of speech, so that man must of necessity have either bleated, or “baaed,” or barked, or neighed, or bellowed like oxen or asses, or uttered some bestial sound? but now, as the hand is made part of the body, the mouth is at leisure for the service of the reason. Thus the hands are shown to be the property of the rational nature, the Creator having thus devised by their means a special advantage for reason.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ηʹ. Διὰ τί ὄρθιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ σχῆμα, καὶ ὅτι διὰ τὸν λόγον αἱ χεῖρες: ἐν ᾧ τις καὶ περὶ διαφορᾶς ψυχῶν φιλοσοφία.

Ὄρθιον δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ σχῆμα, καὶ πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνατείνεται, καὶ ἄνω βλέπει. Ἀρχικὰ καὶ ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν βασιλικὴν ἀξίαν ἐπισημαίνονται. Τὸ γὰρ μόνον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἅπασι πρὸς τὸ κάτω νενευκέναι τὰ σώματα, σαφῶς δείκνυσι τὴν τῆς ἀξίας διαφορὰν, τῶν τε ὑποκυπτόντων τῇ δυναστείᾳ, καὶ τῆς ὑπερανεστώσης αὐτῶν ἐξουσίας. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοις ἅπασι τὰ ἔμπροσθεν κῶλα τοῦ σώματος πόδες εἰσὶ, διότι τὸ κεκυφὸς ἐδεῖτο πάντως τοῦ ὑπερείδοντος: ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς χεῖρες τὰ κῶλα ἐγένοντο. Τοῦ γὰρ ὀρθίου σχήματος αὐτάρκης ἦν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν μία βάσις, διπλοῖς ποσὶν ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ τὴν στάσιν ἐρείδουσα. Ἄλλως δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ λόγου χρείᾳ συνεργός ἐστιν ἡ τῶν χειρῶν ὑπουργία. Καί τις ἴδιον τῆς λογικῆς φύσεως τὴν τῶν χειρῶν ὑπηρεσίαν εἰπὼν, οὐ τοῦ παντὸς ἁμαρτήσεται, οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο καὶ πρόχειρον ἀποτρέχων τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὅτι γράμμασι τὸν λόγον διὰ τῆς τῶν χειρῶν εὐφυΐας ἐνσημαινόμεθα (ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτο λογικῆς χάριτος ἄμοιρον, τὸ φθέγγεσθαι διὰ γραμμάτων ἡμᾶς, καὶ τρόπον τινὰ διὰ χειρὸς διαλέγεσθαι, τοῖς τῶν στοιχείων χαρακτῆρσι τὰς φωνὰς διασώζοντας): ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πρὸς ἕτερον βλέπων, συνεργεῖν φημι τὰς χεῖρας τῇ ἐκφωνήσει τοῦ λόγου: μᾶλλον δὲ πρὶν περὶ τούτων διεξετάσαι, τὸν παρεθέντα λόγον κατανοήσωμεν. Μικροῦ γὰρ ἡμᾶς τὸ κατὰ τὴν τάξιν τῶν γεγονότων διέλαθεν: τίνος χάριν προηγεῖται μὲν ἡ βλάστη τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων, ἐπιγίνεται δὲ τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων, καὶ οὕτω μετὰ τὴν κατασκευὴν τούτων ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Τάχα γὰρ οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ προχείρου νοούμενον διὰ τούτου μανθάνομεν. ὅτι τῶν ζώων ἕνεκεν ἡ πόα χρήσιμος ἐφάνη τῷ κτίσαντι, διὰ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰ βοτά: οὗ χάριν πρὸ μὲν τῶν βοσκημάτων, ἐκείνων τροφὴ, πρὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ὑπηρετεῖν μέλλον τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ζωῇ. Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δόγμα τι τῶν κεκρυμμένων παραδηλοῦν διὰ τούτων ὁ Μωϋσῆς, καὶ τὴν περὶ ψυχῆς φιλοσοφίαν δι' ἀποῤῥήτων παραδιδόναι, ἣν ἐφαντάσθη μὲν καὶ ἡ ἔξωθεν παίδευσις, οὐ μὴν τηλαυγῶς κατενόησε. Διδάσκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς διὰ τούτων ὁ λόγος, ἐν τρισὶ διαφοραῖς τὴν ζωτικὴν καὶ ψυχικὴν δύναμιν θεωρεῖσθαι. Ἡ μὲν γάρ τίς ἐστιν αὐξητική τε μόνον καὶ θρεπτικὴ, τὸ κατάλληλον εἰς προσθήκην τῶν τρεφομένων προσάγουσα, ἢ φυσικὴ λέγεται, καὶ περὶ τὰ φυτὰ θεωρεῖται. Ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυομένοις ζωτικήν τινα δύναμιν αἰσθήσεως ἄμοιρον κατανοῆσαι. Ἕτερον δὲ παρὰ τοῦτο ζωῆς εἶδός ἐστιν, ὃ καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει, καὶ τὸ κατ' αἴσθησιν οἰκονομῆσαι προσείληφεν, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀλόγων ἐστίν. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον τρέφεται καὶ αὔξεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ἐνέργειάν τε καὶ ἀντίληψιν ἔχει. Ἡ δὲ τελεία ἐν σώματι ζωὴ ἐν τῇ λογικῇ, τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ λέγω, καθορᾶται φύσει, τρεφομένη τε καὶ αἰσθανομένη, καὶ λόγου μετέχουσα, καὶ νῷ διοικουμένη. Γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν τοιαύτη τις ἡ τοῦ λόγου διαίρεσις: Τῶν ὄντων τὸ μέν τι νοητὸν, τὸ δὲ σωματικὸν πάντως ἐστίν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν νοητοῦ παρείσθω νῦν ἡ πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα τομή: οὐ γὰρ τούτων ὁ λόγος.

Τοῦ δὲ σωματικοῦ τὸ μὲν ἄμοιρον καθόλου ζωῆς, τὸ δὲ μετέχει ζωτικῆς ἐνεργείας. Πάλιν τοῦ ζωτικοῦ σώματος τὸ μὲν αἰσθήσει συζῇ, τὸ δὲ ἀμοιρεῖ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. Εἶτα τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τέμνεται πάλιν εἰς λογικόν τε καὶ ἄλογον. Διὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν ἄψυχον ὕλην οἷον ὑποβάθραν τινὰ τῆς τῶν ἐμψύχων ἰδέας τὴν φυσικὴν ταύτην ζωὴν συστῆναι λέγει ὁ νομοθέτης, ἐν τῇ τῶν φυτῶν βλάστῃ προϋποστᾶσαν: εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπάγει τῶν κατ' αἴσθησιν διοικουμένων τὴν γένεσιν.

Καὶ ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῶν διὰ σαρκὸς τὴν ζωὴν εἰληχότων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητικὰ, καὶ δίχα τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν εἶναι δύναται, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν οὐκ ἂν ἑτέρως γένοιτο ἐν σώματι, εἰ μὴ τῷ αἰσθητῷ συγκραθείη: διὰ τοῦτο τελευταῖος μετὰ τὰ βλαστήματα καὶ τὰ βοτὰ κατεσκευάσθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὁδῷ τινι πρὸς τὸ τέλειον ἀκολούθως προϊούσης τῆς φύσεως. Διὰ πάσης γὰρ ἰδέας τῶν ψυχῶν κατακιρνᾶται τὸ λογικὸν τοῦτο ζῶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Τρέφεται μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ φυσικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος: τῇ δὲ αὐξητικῇ δυνάμει ἡ αἰσθητικὴ προσεφύη, μέσως ἔχουσα κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν τῆς τε νοερᾶς καὶ τῆς ὑλωδεστέρας οὐσίας: τοσούτῳ παχυμερεστέρα ταύτης, ὅσῳ καθαρωτέρα ἐκείνης. Εἶτά τις γίνεται πρὸς τὸ λεπτὸν καὶ φωτοειδὲς τῆς αἰσθητικῆς φύσεως ἡ τῆς νοερᾶς οὐσίας οἰκείωσίς τε καὶ ἀνάκρασις, ὡς ἐν τρισὶ τούτοις τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν: καθὼς καὶ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀποστόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐμάθομεν, ἐν οἷς πρὸς τοὺς Ἐφεσίους ἔφη, προσευχόμενος αὐτοῖς τὴν ὁλοτελῆ χάριν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ Κυρίου φυλαχθῆναι, ἀντὶ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ μέρους τὸ σῶμα λέγων, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικὸν τῇ ψυχῇ διασημαίνων, τὸ νοερὸν δὲ τῷ πνεύματι. Ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸν γραμματέα διὰ τοῦ Εὐαγγελίου παιδεύει ὁ Κύριος, πάσης ἐντολῆς προτιθέναι τὴν εἰς Θεὸν ἀγάπην, τὴν ἐξ ὅλης καρδίας καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ διανοίας ἐνεργουμένην. Καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖ μοι διαφορὰν ἑρμηνεύειν ὁ λόγος, τὴν μὲν σωματικωτέραν κατάστασιν καρδίαν εἰπὼν, ψυχὴν δὲ τὴν μέσην, διάνοιαν δὲ τὴν ὑψηλοτέραν φύσιν, τὴν νοεράν τε καὶ ποιητικὴν δύναμιν, Ὅθεν καὶ τρεῖς διαφορὰς προαιρέσεως ὁ Ἀπόστολος οἶδε, τὴν μὲν σαρκικὴν κατονομάζων, ἣ περὶ γαστέρα καὶ τὰς περὶ ταύτην ἡδυπαθείας ἠσχόληται: τὴν δὲ ψυχικὴν, ἢ μέσως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν ἔχει, τῆς μὲν ὑπερανεστῶσα, τῆς δὲ καθαρῶς οὐ μετέχουσα: τὴν δὲ πνευματικὴν, ἣ τὸ τέλειον ἐνθεωρεῖ τῆς κατὰ Θεὸν πολιτείας. Διό φησι πρὸς Κορινθίους, τὸ ἀπολαυστικὸν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐμπαθὲς ὀνειδίζων, ὅτι Σάρκινοί ἐστε, καὶ τῶν τελειοτέρων δογμάτων ἀχώρητοι: ἑτέρωθι δὲ σύγκρισίν τινα τοῦ μέσου πρὸς τὸ τέλειον ποιούμενος, λέγει: «Ψυχικὸς δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος: μωρία γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐστιν: ὁ δὲ πνευματικὸς ἀνακρίνει μὲν πάντα, αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ἀνακρίνεται.» Ὡς οὖν ἀναβέβηκεν ὁ ψυχικὸς τὸν σαρκικὸν, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁ πνευματικὸς τούτου ὑπερανέστηκεν. Εἰ οὖν τελευταῖον μετὰ πᾶν ἔμψυχον ἡ Γραφὴ γεγενῆσθαι λέγει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ φιλοσοφεῖ τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς ἡμῖν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἐπ' ἀναγκαίᾳ τινὶ τῇ τάξεως ἀκολουθίᾳ τὸ τέλειον ἐν τελευταίοις βλέπων. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ λογικῷ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ περιείληπται: ἐν δὲ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ καὶ τὸ φυσικὸν εἶδος πάντως ἐστίν. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ περὶ τὸ ὑλικὸν θεωρεῖται μόνον.

Οὐκοῦν εἰκότως, καθάπερ διὰ βαθμῶν ἡ φύσις, τῶν τῆς ζωῆς λέγω ἰδιωμάτων, ἀπὸ τῶν μικροτέρων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον ποιεῖται τὴν ἄνοδον. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν λογικόν τι ζῶόν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, κατάλληλον ἔδει τῇ χρείᾳ τοῦ λόγου κατασκευασθῆναι τὸ τοῦ σώματος ὄργανον. Καθάπερ τοὺς μουσικοὺς ἔστιν ἰδεῖν πρὸς τὸ τῶν ὀργάνων εἶδος τὴν μουσικὴν ἑκπονοῦντας, καὶ οὔτε διὰ βαρβίτων αὐλοῦντας, οὔτε ἐν αὐλοῖς κιθαρίζοντας: κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔδει τῷ λόγῳ κατάλληλον εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὀργάνων κατασκευὴν, ὡς ἂν προσφυῶς ἐνηχοίη πρὸς τὴν τῶν ῥημάτων χρείαν ὑπὸ τῶν φωνητικῶν μορίων τυπούμενος. Διὰ τοῦτο συνηρτήθησαν αἱ χεῖρες τῷ σώματι. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μυρίας ἔστιν ἀπαριθμήσασθαι τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον χρείας, πρὸς ἃς τὰ εὐμήχανα ταῦτα καὶ πολυαρκῆ τῶν χειρῶν ὄργανα χρησίμως ἔχει πρὸς πᾶσαν τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν ἐνέργειαν, τὸν κατὰ πόλεμόν τε καὶ εἰρήνην εὐαφῶς μετιόντα: ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως τοῦ λόγου χάριν προσέθηκεν αὐτὰς ἡ φύσις τῷ σώματι. Εἰ γὰρ ἄμοιρος τῶν χειρῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦν, πάντως ἂν αὐτῷ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῶν τετραπόδων καταλλήλως τῇ τῆς τροφῆς χρείᾳ διεσκεύαστο τοῦ προσώπου τὰ μόρια, ὥστε προμήκη τε τὴν μορφὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μυκτῆρας ἀπολεπτύνεσθαι, καὶ προβεβλῆσθαι τὰ χείλη τοῦ στόματος τυλώδη καὶ σταθερὰ, καὶ παχέα, πρὸς τὴν ἀναίρεσιν τῆς πόας ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντα, ἐγκεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς ὀδοῦσι τὴν γλῶσσαν ἄλλην: τινὰ τοιαύτην, πολύσαρκον, καὶ ἀντιτυπῆ καὶ τραχεῖαν, καὶ συγκατεργαζομένην τοῖς ὀδοῦσι τὸ ὑπὸ τὸν ὀδόντα γινόμενον: ἢ ὑγράν τε καὶ διακεχυμένην κατὰ τὰ πλάγια, οἵα ἡ τῶν κυνῶν τε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ὠμοβόρων ἐστὶ, τῷ καρχάρῳ τῶν ὀδόντων μεταξὺ τῶν διαστημάτων ἐνδιαῤῥέουσα. Εἰ οὖν μὴ παρῆσαν αἱ χεῖρες τῷ σώματι, πῶς ἂν ἔναρθρος τούτῳ ἐνετυπώθη φωνὴ, τῆς κατασκευῆς τῶν κατὰ τὸ στόμα μορίων οὐ συνδιασχηματιζομένης πρὸς τὴν χρείαν τοῦ φθόγγου; ὡς ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἢ βληχᾶσθαι πάντως, ἢ μηκάζειν, ἢ ὑλακτεῖν, ἢ χρεμετίζειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢ βουσὶν, ἢ ὄνοις βοᾷν παραπλήσιον, ἤ τινα θηριώδη μυκηθμὸν ἀφιέναι. Νυνὶ δὲ τῆς χειρὸς ἐντεθείσης τῷ σώματι, εὔσχολόν ἐστι τὸ στόμα τῇ ὑπηρεσίᾳ τοῦ λόγου. Οὐκοῦν ἴδιον τῆς λογικῆς φύσεως αἱ χεῖρες ἀναπεφήνασιν, οὕτω τοῦ πλάστου διὰ τούτων ἐπινοήσαντος τῷ λόγῳ τὴν εὐκολίαν.