Chapter 6

Division is the first section of the thing. Thus, for example, the animal is divided into rational and irrational. Redivision is the second section of the same thing. For example, the animal is redivided into apod, biped and quadruped—apod, as a fish; biped as a man or a bird; quadruped, as an ox, horse, or other such. Subdivision is the section of the already divided-off branch. For example, the animal is divided into rational and irrational, and then the rational into mortal and immortal. Now, the first thing is divided into two branches: the rational and the irrational. It is the division of one of these branches, namely, the division of the rational into mortal and immortal, that is subdivision. Division and redivision are not used in all cases. However, when everything is not covered by the first division—as, for example, when the animal is divided into rational and irrational, the biped is found both among the rational and the irrational animals—then of necessity we redivide, that is to say, we make a second division of the same thing, and we say: ‘The animal is divided into apod, biped, and quadruped.

For a similar reason, there are eight modes of division. Thus, everything that is divided is divided either according to itself, namely, according to substance, or according to accident. If it is divided according to itself, then it is either as a thing or as a term. If it is divided as a thing, then it is either as genus into species, as when you divide the animal into rational and irrational, or as species into individuals, as man into Peter and Paul and all other individual men, or as a whole into parts. This last division is twofold, being either into like or unlike parts. Now, a thing is of like parts whenever its sections admit of the name and the definition of the whole and of each other. For instance, when flesh is divided into several pieces, each portion is called flesh and admits of the definition of flesh. On the contrary, the thing is of unlike parts whenever the part cut off will not admit either of the name or of the definition, whether of the whole or of the parts. Thus, should you divide Socrates into hands and feet and head, the foot cut off from Socrates would neither be called Socrates nor his head, nor would it admit of the definition either of Socrates or of his head. Or division may be as that of an equivocal term into its various meanings. This, again, is of two kinds, because the term may signify either the whole of something or a part of it. It may signify the whole, as does the word ‘dog, since this last is used for land-dog, dog-star, and sea-dog, all of which are wholes and not part of an animal. On the other hand, it may signify a part, as when the name ‘tongue’ is given to the top part of a shoe, to a part of the flute, and to the organ of taste in animals, all of which are parts and not wholes.

The foregoing are the modes in which a thing is divided according to itself. When it is divided according to accident, however, it may be divided as substance into accidents, as when I say that some men are white and some black— for men are substance, while white and black are accidents. Or it may be divided as an accident into substances, as when I speak of animate white things and inanimate white things—for the white is an accident, while the animate and inanimate things are substances. Or it may be divided as an accident into accidents, as when I say that some cold things are white and dry, while others are black and wet— for the cold and the white, the black, and the wet, and the dry are all accidents.

There is still another mode of division, which is that of things which are derivative (deep* ivbq, from one) and those which are relative (upoq £v? to one). Things are derivative as in the case of a medical book or a medical instrument deriving from medicine; for from one thing, medicine, medical things are named. On the other hand, a healthful drug or healthful food are relative because they relate to one thing, namely, health. Of the things which are derivative, some derive from some cause—as the man’s image is said to be from the man as from a true cause; whereas others are as having being invented by someone, as the medical scalpel, and the like.

Now, this is the general division according to which everything that is divided is divided. It is either as genus into species, or as species into individuals, or as a whole into parts, or as an equivocal term into its various meanings, or as substance into accidents, or as accident into substances, or as accidents into accidents, or as the derivatives and relatives. There are some who deny the division of species into individuals, because they say that it rather is an enumeration, since all division is into two, or three, or, rarely, into four. But the species is divided into an unlimited number of individuals, because the number of individual men is unlimited.

One must furthermore know that that which is by nature prior and posterior, as well as that which is more and less, is not found to be divided into parts by any mode of division. However, that which is by nature prior and posterior, and that which is more and less, fall under derivatives and relatives—whence their classification.

{Περὶ διαιρέσεως.} Διαίρεσίς ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη τομὴ τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον τὸ ζῷον διαιρεῖται εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον. Ἐπιδιαίρεσις δέ ἐστιν ἡ δευτέρα τομὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος, οἷον τὸ ζῷον ἐπιδιαιρεῖται εἰς ἄπουν, δίπουν, τετράπουν, ἄπουν μὲν ἰχθύν, δίπουν δὲ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ὄρνεον, τετράπουν βοῦν, ἵππον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Ὑποδιαίρεσις δέ ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ τμηθέντος σκέλους τομὴ οἷον τὸ ζῷον διαιρεῖται εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, τὸ λογικὸν εἰς θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον. Ἰδοὺ τὸ πρῶτον διαιρεῖται εἰς δύο σκέλη, εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον. Ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς τῶν σκελῶν διαίρεσις ἡ λέγουσα ‘τὸ λογικὸν διαιρεῖται εἰς θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον’ ὑποδιαίρεσίς ἐστιν. (v. s. 4_10) Οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ γίνεται διαίρεσις καὶ ἐπιδιαίρεσις, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὴ πάντα περιέχονται ὑπὸ τὴν πρώτην διαίρεσιν, οἷον τοῦ ζῴου διαιρουμένου εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις θεωρεῖται τὸ δίπουν. Ἀναγκαίως οὖν ἐπιδιαιροῦμεν ἤγουν δευτέραν διαίρεσιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος ποιούμεθα ἤγουν τοῦ ζῴου καί φαμεν: Τὸ ζῷον διαιρεῖται εἰς ἄπουν, δίπουν, τετράπουν. Διαιρετικοὶ δὲ τρόποι εἰσὶν ὀκτὼ δι' αἰτίαν τοιαύτην: πᾶν γὰρ διαιρούμενον ἢ καθ' αὑτὸ διαιρεῖται ἤγουν κατ' οὐσίαν ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Καὶ εἰ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ ἢ ὡς πρᾶγμα ἢ ὡς φωνή: καὶ εἰ ὡς πρᾶγμα_ἢ ὡς γένος εἰς εἴδη, ὡς ὅταν διέλῃς τὸ ζῷον εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, _ἢ ὡς εἶδος εἰς ἄτομα, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς Πέτρον καὶ Παῦλον καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους, _ἢ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη: καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, ἢ εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ ἢ εἰς ἀνομοιομερῆ. Καὶ ὁμοιομερὲς μέν ἐστιν, ὅταν τὰ τμήματα καὶ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν ὅρον τοῦ τε ὅλου καὶ ἀλλήλων δέχωνται, οἷον ἡ σὰρξ διαιρεῖται εἰς πολλὰς σάρκας, καὶ ἕκαστον μέρος τῆς σαρκὸς σὰρξ λέγεται καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν τῆς σαρκὸς ἐπιδέχεται. Ἀνομοιομερὲς δέ ἐστι τὸ ἀνάπαλιν, ὅταν τὸ τμηθὲν μὴ ἐπιδέξηται μήτε τὸ ὄνομα μήτε τὸν ὁρισμὸν μήτε τοῦ ὅλου μήτε ἀλλήλων, ὡς ἵνα διέλῃς τὸν Σωκράτην εἰς χεῖρας καὶ πόδας καὶ κεφαλήν: οὔτε γὰρ ὁ τμηθεὶς ποῦς ἀπὸ Σωκράτους Σωκράτης λέγεται ἢ κεφαλὴ οὔτε τὸν ὁρισμὸν Σωκράτους ἢ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπιδέχεται. _ἢ ὡς ὁμώνυμος φωνὴ εἰς διάφορα σημαινόμενα, καὶ οὕτω πάλιν διχῶς: ἢ γὰρ ὅλον τι σημαίνεται ὑπὸ τῆς φωνῆς ἢ μέρος. Καὶ ὅλον μὲν ὡς ἡ κύων φωνή: φέρεται γὰρ κατά τε χερσαίου κυνὸς καὶ ἀστρῴου καὶ θαλασσίου, ἅπερ ὅλον τί εἰσι καὶ οὐ μέρος ζῴου: ὡς δὲ μέρος, ὅτε τὸ τῆς γλώσσης ὄνομα φέρεται κατὰ τοῦ ἄκρου τοῦ ὑποδήματος καὶ τοῦ αὐλοῦ καὶ τοῦ γευστικοῦ μορίου τῶν ζῴων, ἅτινα μέρη εἰσὶ καὶ οὐχὶ ὅλα. Καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ διαιρεῖται τὸ διαιρούμενον. Κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ_ἢ ὡς οὐσία εἰς συμβεβηκότα, ὡς ὅταν εἴπω: Τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μέν εἰσι λευκοὶ οἱ δὲ μέλανες: ἄνθρωποι μὲν γὰρ οὐσία, λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία συμβεβηκότα. _ἢ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς εἰς οὐσίας, ὡς ὅταν εἴπω: Τῶν λευκῶν τὰ μὲν ἔμψυχα τὰ δὲ ἄψυχα: λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ συμβεβηκός, ἔμψυχον δὲ καὶ ἄψυχον οὐσίαι. _ἢ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς εἰς συμβεβηκότα, ὡς ὅταν εἴπω: Τῶν ψυχρῶν τὰ μὲν λευκὰ καὶ ξηρὰ τὰ δὲ μελανὰ καὶ ὑγρά: τό τε γὰρ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μελανὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρόν, ἅπαντα συμβεβηκότα. _Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἕτερος τρόπος ὡς τὰ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν. Ἀφ' ἑνὸς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἰατρικὸν βιβλίον, ἰατρικὸν ἐργαλεῖον: ἀπὸ γὰρ ἑνός, τῆς ἰατρικῆς, ὠνομάσθησαν ἰατρικά. Πρὸς ἓν δὲ ὑγιεινὸν φάρμακον, ὑγιεινὸν βρῶμα: πρὸς ἓν γὰρ βλέπουσι, τὴν ὑγίειαν. Τῶν δὲ ἀφ' ἑνὸς τὰ μὲν ἔκ τινος αἰτίου λέγεται, ὡς ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐξ ἀληθινοῦ αἰτίου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἀπό τινος ἐξῃρημένου ὡς ἰατρικὸν σμιλίον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Καὶ αὕτη μέν ἐστιν ἡ καθόλου διαίρεσις, καθ' ἣν διαιρεῖται πᾶν διαιρούμενον, ἢ ὡς γένος εἰς εἴδη ἢ ὡς εἶδος εἰς ἄτομα ἢ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη ἢ ὡς ὁμώνυμος φωνὴ εἰς διάφορα σημαινόμενα ἢ ὡς οὐσία εἰς συμβεβηκότα ἢ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς εἰς οὐσίας ἢ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς εἰς συμβεβηκότα ἢ ὡς τὰ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν. Τινὲς δὲ ἀπαγορεύουσι τὴν ἀπὸ εἴδους εἰς ἄτομα διαίρεσιν μᾶλλον ἀπαρίθμησιν φάσκοντες: πᾶσα γὰρ διαίρεσις εἰς δύο ἢ τρία ἢ σπανίως πάνυ εἰς τέσσαρα γίνεται. Τὸ δὲ εἶδος εἰς ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει διαιρεῖται: ἄπειροι γὰρ τῷ πλήθει οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι. Δεῖ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὡς οὐδὲ ἑνὶ τρόπῳ τῆς διαιρέσεως θεωρεῖται ἐν τοῖς τμήμασι τὸ φύσει πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον οὐδὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὡς ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἓν διαιρουμένοις καὶ τὸ φύσει πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον θεωρεῖται καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ ἐξ οὗ ἡ ὀνομασία.