Chapter VIII.—The Sophistical Arts Useless.

But the art of sophistry, which the Greeks cultivated, is a fantastic power, which makes false opinions like true by means of words. For it produces rhetoric in order to persuasion, and disputation for wrangling. These arts, therefore, if not conjoined with philosophy, will be injurious to every one. For Plato openly called sophistry “an evil art.” And Aristotle, following him, demonstrates it to be a dishonest art, which abstracts in a specious manner the whole business of wisdom, and professes a wisdom which it has not studied. To speak briefly, as the beginning of rhetoric is the probable, and an attempted proof88    ἐπιχειρημα.    Ps. viii. 5. the process, and the end persuasion, so the beginning of disputation is what is matter of opinion, and the process a contest, and the end victory. For in the same manner, also, the beginning of sophistry is the apparent, and the process twofold; one of rhetoric, continuous and exhaustive; and the other of logic, and is interrogatory. And its end is admiration. The dialectic in vogue in the schools, on the other hand, is the exercise of a philosopher in matters of opinion, for the sake of the faculty of disputation. But truth is not in these at all. With reason, therefore, the noble apostle, depreciating these superfluous arts occupied about words, says, “If any man do not give heed to wholesome words, but is puffed up by a kind of teaching, knowing nothing, but doting (νοσῶν) about questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh contention, envy, railings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, destitute of the truth.”89    1 Tim. vi. 3–5. [He treats the sophists with Platonic scorn, but adopts St. Paul’s enlarged idea of sophistry.]    Rom. xvi. 26, 27.

You see how he is moved against them, calling their art of logic—on which, those to whom this garrulous mischievous art is dear, whether Greeks or barbarians, plume themselves—a disease (νοσος). Very beautifully, therefore, the tragic poet Euripides says in the Phœnissæ,—

For the saving Word91    [He has no idea of salvation by any other name, though he regards Gentile illumination as coming through philosophy.]    Prov. vi. 6, 8. is called “wholesome,” He being the truth; and what is wholesome (healthful) remains ever deathless. But separation from what is healthful and divine is impiety, and a deadly malady. These are rapacious wolves hid in sheep-skins, men-stealers, and glozing soul-seducers, secretly, but proved to be robbers; striving by fraud and force to catch us who are unsophisticated and have less power of speech.

says the tragedy. Such are these wranglers, whether they follow the sects, or practice miserable dialectic arts. These are they that “stretch the warp and weave nothing,” says the Scripture;92    Where, nobody knows.    Rom. iii. 20. prosecuting a bootless task, which the apostle has called “cunning craftiness of men whereby they lie in wait to deceive.”93    Eph. iv. 14.    Rom. v. 13. “For there are,” he says, “many unruly and vain talkers and deceivers.”94    Tit. i. 10.    Rom. vii. 6. Wherefore it was not said to all, “Ye are the salt of the earth.”95    Matt. v. 13.    1 Tim. i. 9. For there are some even of the hearers of the word who are like the fishes of the sea, which, reared from their birth in brine, yet need salt to dress them for food. Accordingly I wholly approve of the tragedy, when it says:—

We must not, then, aspire to please the multitude. For we do not practice what will please them, but what we know is remote from their disposition. “Let us not be desirous of vainglory,” says the apostle, “provoking one another, envying one another.”96    Gal. v. 26.    Rom. xiii. 8–10.

Thus the truth-loving Plato says, as if divinely inspired, “Since I am such as to obey nothing but the word, which, after reflection, appears to me the best.”97    Plato, Crito, vi. p. 46.    Luke x. 27.

Accordingly he charges those who credit opinions without intelligence and knowledge, with abandoning right and sound reason unwarrantably, and believing him who is a partner in falsehood. For to cheat one’s self of the truth is bad; but to speak the truth, and to hold as our opinions positive realities, is good.

Men are deprived of what is good unwillingly. Nevertheless they are deprived either by being deceived or beguiled, or by being compelled and not believing. He who believes not, has already made himself a willing captive; and he who changes his persuasion is cozened, while he forgets that time imperceptibly takes away some things, and reason others. And after an opinion has been entertained, pain and anguish, and on the other hand contentiousness and anger, compel. Above all, men are beguiled who are either bewitched by pleasure or terrified by fear. And all these are voluntary changes, but by none of these will knowledge ever be attained.

Ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ τέχνη, ἣν ἐζηλώκασιν Ἕλληνες, δύναμίς ἐστι φανταστική, διὰ λόγων δοξῶν ἐμποιητικὴ ψευδῶν ὡς ἀληθῶν· παρέχει γὰρ πρὸς μὲν πειθὼ τὴν ῥητορικήν, πρὸς τὸ ἀγωνιστικὸν δὲ τὴν ἐριστικήν. αἱ τοίνυν τέχναι [αὗται] ἐὰν μὴ μετὰ φιλοσοφίας γένωνται, βλαβερώτεραι παντί που εἶεν ἄν. ἄντικρυς γοῦν ὁ Πλάτων κακοτεχνίαν προσεῖπεν τὴν σοφιστικὴν ὅ τε Ἀριστοτέλης ἑπόμενος κλεπτικήν τινα αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνεται, ἅτε τὸ ὅλον τῆς σοφίας ἔργον πιθανῶς ὑφαιρουμένην καὶ ἐπαγγελλομένην σοφίαν ἣν οὐκ ἐμελέτησεν. ἐν βραχεῖ δὲ εἰπεῖν, καθάπερ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἀρχὴ μὲν τὸ πιθανόν, ἔργον δὲ τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ τέλος ἡ πειθώ, οὕτω τῆς ἐριστικῆς ἀρχὴ μὲν τὸ δόξαν, ἔργον δὲ τὸ ἀγώνισμα καὶ τέλος ἡ νίκη. τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον καὶ τῆς σοφιστικῆς ἀρχὴ μὲν τὸ φαινόμενον, ἔργον δὲ διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἐκ ῥητορικῆς διεξοδικὸν φαινομένον, τὸ δὲ ἐκ διαλεκτικῆς ἐρωτητικόν, τέλος δὲ αὐτῆς ἡ ἔκπληξις. ἥ τε αὖ θρυλουμένη κατὰ τὰς διατριβὰς διαλεκτικὴ γύμνασμα φιλοσόφου περὶ τὸ ἔνδοξον δείκνυται ἀντιλογικῆς ἕνεκεν δυνάμεως· οὐδαμοῦ δ' ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἀλήθεια. εἰκότως τοίνυν ὁ γενναῖος ἀπόστολος, ἐκφαυλίζων τὰς περιττὰς ταύτας τῶν λέξεων τέχνας, εἴ τις μὴ προσέρχεται ὑγιαίνουσι λόγοις φησί, διδασκαλίᾳ δέ τινι τετύφωται μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος, ἀλλὰ νοσῶν περὶ ζητήσεις καὶ λογομαχίας, ἐξ ὧν γίνεται ἔρις, φθόνος, βλασφημία, ὑπόνοιαι πονηραί, διαπαρατριβαὶ διεφθαρμένων ἀνθρώπων τὸν νοῦν καὶ ἀπεστερημένων τῆς ἀληθείας. ὁρᾷς ὅπως πρὸς αὐτοὺς κεκίνηται, νόσον ὀνομάζων τὴν λογικὴν τέχνην αὐτῶν, ἐφ' ᾗ σεμνύνονται οἷς φίλη ἡ στωμύλος αὕτη κακοτεχνία, εἴτε Ἕλληνες εἶεν εἴτε καὶ βάρβαροι σοφισταί. παγκάλως οὖν ὁ τραγικὸς Εὐριπίδης ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις λέγει· ὁ δὲ ἄδικος λόγος νοσῶν ἐν αὑτῷ φαρμάκων δεῖται σοφῶν. ὑγιαίνων μὲν γὰρ ὁ σωτήριος εἴρηται λόγος αὐτὸς ὢν ἀλήθεια, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον αἰεὶ ἀθάνατον μένει, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τε καὶ θείου διάκρισις ἀθεότης τε καὶ πάθος θανατηφόρον. λύκοι οὗτοι ἅρπαγες προβάτων κῳδίοις ἐγκεκρυμμένοι, ἀνδραποδισταί τε καὶ ψυχαγωγοὶ εὔγλωσσοι, κλέπτοντες μὲν ἀφανῶς, διελεγχόμενοι δὲ λῃσταί, αἱρεῖν ἀγωνιζόμενοι καὶ δόλῳ καὶ βίᾳ ἡμᾶς δὴ τοὺς ἀπερίττους, ὡς ἂν εἰπεῖν ἀδυνατωτέρους. ἀγλωσσίᾳ δὲ πολλάκις ληφθεὶς ἀνὴρ δίκαια λέξας ἧσσον εὐγλώσσου φέρει. νῦν δ' εὐρόοισι στόμασι τἀληθέστατα κλέπτουσιν, ὥστε μὴ δοκεῖν ἃ χρὴ δοκεῖν, ἡ τραγῳδία λέγει. τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐριστικοὶ οὗτοι εἴτε αἱρέσεις μετίοιεν εἴτε καὶ διαλεκτικὰ συνασκοῖεν τεχνύδρια, οὗτοι οἱ τὰ κατάρτια κατασπῶντες καὶ μηθὲν ὑφαίνοντες, φησὶν ἡ γραφή, ματαιοπονίαν ἐζηλωκότες, ἣν κυβείαν ἀνθρώπων ὁ ἀπόστολος ἐκάλεσεν καὶ πανουργίαν, πρὸς τὴν μεθοδείαν τῆς πλάνης ἐπιτήδειον. εἰσὶ γάρ, φησί, πολλοὶ ἀνυπότακτοι, ματαιολόγοι, φρεναπατοῦντες. οὔκουν οὐ πᾶσιν εἴρηται· ὑμεῖς ἐστε οἱ ἅλες τῆς γῆς. εἰσὶ γάρ τινες τῶν καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἐπακηκοότων τοῖς ἰχθύσι τοῖς θαλασσίοις ἐοικότες, οἳ δὴ ἐν ἅλμῃ ἐκ γενετῆς τρεφόμενοι ἁλῶν ὅμως πρὸς τὴν σκευασίαν δέονται. ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι τὴν τραγῳδίαν λέγουσαν· ὦ παῖ, γένοιντ' ἂν εὖ λελεγμένοι λόγοι ψευδεῖς, ἐπῶν δὲ κάλλεσι[ν] νικῷεν ἂν τἀληθές· ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο τἀκριβέστατον, ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις καὶ τοὐρθόν· ὃς δὲ εὐγλωσσίᾳ νικᾷ, σοφὸς μέν, ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὰ πράγματα κρείσσω νομίζω τῶν λόγων ἀεί ποτε. οὔποτε ἄρα ὀρεκτέον τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνους ἥδει, οὐκ ἀσκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς· ἃ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν, μακράν ἐστι τῆς ἐκείνων διαθέσεως. μὴ γινώμεθα κενόδοξοι, φησὶν ὁ ἀπόστολος, ἀλλήλους προκαλούμενοι, ἀλλήλους φθονοῦντες. ταύτῃ τοι ὁ φιλαλήθης Πλάτων οἷον θεοφορούμενος ὡς ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος φησίν, ὁποῖος οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἢ τῷ λόγῳ πείθεσθαι, ὃς ἄν μοι σκοπουμένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνοιτο. αἰτιᾶται γοῦν τοὺς ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δόξαις πιστεύοντας, ὡς μὴ προσῆκον ἀφεμένους τοῦ ὀρθοῦ καὶ ὑγιοῦς λόγου τῷ κοινωνοῦντι τοῦ ψεύδους πιστεύειν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐψεῦσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας κακόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθεύειν καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἀγαθόν. τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν ἀκουσίως μὲν στέρονται ἄνθρωποι, στέρονται δὲ ὅμως ἢ κλαπέντες ἢ γοητευθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες καὶ εἰκῆ πιστεύσαντες. ὁ μὲν δὴ πιστεύσας ἑκὼν ἤδη παραναλίσκεται· κλέπτεται δὲ ὁ μεταπεισθεὶς [καὶ ὁ] ἐκλαθόμενος, ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὁ χρόνος, τῶν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐξαιρούμενος λανθάνει· βιάζεταί τε πολλάκις ὀδύνη τε καὶ ἀλγηδὼν φιλονικία τε αὖ καὶ θυμὸς μεταδοξάσαι, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι γοητεύονται οἱ ἤτοι ὑφ' ἡδονῆς κηληθέντες ἢ ὑπὸ φόβου δείσαντες· πᾶσαι δὲ ἀκούσιοι τροπαί, καὶ τούτων οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε ἐπιστήμην ἐκβάλοι.