and He was about to make us truly godlike and blessed. And these things He labored at with His own words, both gentle and wise, and not least, most necessary, concerning our characters and our ways. And not by words only, but now also by deeds in a certain way our impulses were governed by Him, by the very contemplation and understanding of the impulses and passions of the soul, from which, when it is most condemned, our soul is naturally set right from its discordance, and is transformed from a confused state to a discerning and well-ordered one; so that, as if looking at itself in a mirror, the very principles and roots of evils, all its irrational part, from which monstrous passions rise up against us; and again, how great is its best, rational part, by the rule of which it remains unharmed and without passion in itself; then having understood these things in itself accurately, all the things springing from the worse part, which either pour us out through intemperance or contract and suffocate us through abjectness, such as pleasures and desires or griefs and fears, and the whole series of evils which follows these kinds, these things it might cast out and put away, rising up against them while they are still beginning and just sprouting and not allowing them to grow even a little, but destroying and annihilating them; but whatever good things spring up for us from the better part, these it might nourish and preserve, both nursing them at their beginning and guarding them together until perfection. For thus might the divine virtues come to be in the soul, both prudence, which is first able to judge these very movements of the soul, from them and from the knowledge of goods and evils, if there are any, which concern our external circumstances; and temperance, the power which correctly chooses these things in their beginnings; and justice, which allots to each what is due; and the salvation of all these, courage. He did not, therefore, accustom us with delivered speeches, that prudence is a knowledge of goods and evils or of things to be done and not to be done; this indeed is an empty and useless lesson, if the word is without the works, and prudence is not doing the things to be done and turning away from the things not to be done, but providing knowledge of these things to those who possess it, of whom we see many. And temperance again, that it is a certain knowledge of things to be chosen and not to be chosen, which the other philosophers do not much teach, and especially the more recent ones, who are vigorous and powerful in their words (whom I have often admired, whenever they demonstrate that the virtue of God and of men is the same, and that on earth the wise man is equal to the first god), being able to hand down neither prudence, so that one might do the things of prudence, nor temperance, so that one might choose those things which one has learned; and likewise also concerning justice, and further, courage. Not in this way did this man go through for us the things concerning the virtues with words, but he urged us rather to deeds; and he urged more by his deeds than by what he said.

10 I ask both from the philosophers who now exist, as many as I myself have known and as many as I have heard others describe, and from all other men, to be without indignation toward the things now said by us. Nor let anyone either through friendship for the man or even still hating the other philosophers. (of whom, if any other, I myself also wish to be a lover on account of their words, and I myself wish to speak well of them and to hear others saying the best things about them; but for such are the circumstances, that the very name of philosophy is utterly insulted by almost everyone, and I nearly chose to live as a private citizen in every way, rather than to learn any of the things which these men report, whom on account of the rest of their life I thought it not even worthwhile to approach, perhaps not thinking rightly in this), except let no one suppose me to be saying these things out of some ambition either for praises for the man or for that other ambition against the outside philosophers; but let him be persuaded that we say things less than his works, lest we might seem to flatter, not providing for ourselves phrases and names and artful starting-points of encomiums; who not even when being a youth the popular rhetoric from a rhetorician

καὶ θεοειδεῖς ἤμελλεν ἡμᾶς ὄντως καὶ μακαρίους καταστήσεσθαι. Καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἐξεπονεῖτο λόγοις τε ἰδίοις πραΰνουσι καὶ σοφοῖς, οὐχ ἥκιστα καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτοις, περὶ τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ τῶν τρόπων ἡμῶν. Καὶ οὐ λόγοις μόνον, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ ἔργοις τρόπον τινὰ διεκυβερνᾶτο παρ' ἡμῶν τὰς ὁρμάς, αὐτῇ τῇ τῶν ὁρμῶν καὶ παθῶν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς θεωρίᾳ καὶ κατανοήσει, ἐξ ἧς μάλιστα κατεγνωσμένης κατορθοῦσθαι ἐξ ἀναρμο στίας πέφυκεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ κεκριμένον καὶ εὔτακτον ἐκ συγκεχυμένης μετατίθεσθαι· ἵν' ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἑαυτὴν θεωρήσασα αὐτὰς τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ῥίζας τῶν κακῶν, τὸ ἄλογον αὐτῆς πᾶν, ἐξ οὗ τὰ ἄτοπα ἡμῖν ἐπανίσταται πάθη· καὶ πάλιν ὅσον ἄριστον αὐτῆς μέρος λογικόν, ὑφ' οὗ κρατοῦντος μένει γε ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀπαθής· εἶτα ταῦτα ἐν αὑτῇ κατανοήσασα ἀκριβῶς, πάντα μὲν τὰ ἐκ τοῦ χείρονος ἐκφυόμενα, ἐκχέοντα ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἢ συστέλλοντα καὶ συμπνί γοντα ὑπὸ ταπεινότητος, οἷον ἡδονὰς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἢ λύπας καὶ φόβους, καὶ ὅσος τοῖς γένεσι τοῖσδε ἕπεται στοῖχος κακῶν, ταῦτα μὲν ἐκβάλλοι καὶ ἐκποδὼν ποιοῖτο, ἔτι ἀρχομένοις καὶ ἄρτι φυομένοις ἐπανισταμένη καὶ οὐκ ἐῶσα οὐδὲ μικρὸν αὔξειν, ἀλλ' ἀπολλύουσα καὶ ἐξα φανίζουσα· ὅσα δὲ ἐκ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀνατέλλει ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, ταῦτα ἐκτρέφοι τε καὶ διασώζοι, καὶ ἀρχόμενα τιθηνοῦσα καὶ συμφυλάττουσα ἄχρι τελειότητος. Οὕτω γὰρ ἄν ποτε παραγενέσθαι ψυχῇ τὰς θείας ἀρετάς, φρόνησίν τε τὴν αὐτὰ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ κινήματα κρίνειν πρῶτον δυναμένην, ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἔξω ἡμῶν, εἴ τινά ἐστιν, ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐπιστήμης γενομένης· καὶ σωφροσύνην τὴν ταῦτα ἐν ἀρχαῖς ὀρθῶς αἱρουμένην δύναμιν· καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἣ τὰ ἄξια ἑκάστοις ἀπονέμει· καὶ τὴν πάντων τούτων σωτηρίαν, ἀνδρείαν. Οὐ λόγοις τοίνυν ἀπαγγελλομένοις συνείθιζεν, ὡς δὴ εἴη ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἢ ποιητέων καὶ οὐ ποιητέων ἡ φρόνησις· τοῦτο δὴ τὸ κενὸν καὶ ἀνωφελὲς μάθημα, εἰ ὁ λόγος εἴη τῶν ἔργων δίχα, καὶ φρόνησις οὐχὶ ποιοῦσα τὰ ποιητὰ καὶ ἀποτρέπουσα τῶν οὐ ποιητῶν, γινώσκειν δὲ ταῦτα παρεχομένη τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτήν, οἵους πολλοὺς ὁρῶμεν. Ἡ δὲ σωφροσύνη πάλιν ὅτι δὴ εἴη τις ἐπιστήμη αἱρετῶν καὶ οὐχ αἱρετῶν, οὐ πάνυ τι διδασκόντων αὐτὴν τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων, καὶ μάλιστά γε τῶν νεωτέρων, ὄντων μὲν εὐτόνων καὶ ἐρρωμένων τοῖς λόγοις (οἵους ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα, ὅταν τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς τῷ πρώτῳ θεῷ ἴσον εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποδείξωσιν), οὔτε δὲ τὴν φρόνησιν, ὡς καὶ ποιοῖ τις τὰ φρονήσεως, οὔτε τὴν σωφρο σύνην, ὡς καὶ αἱροῖτό τις ταῦθ' ἅπερ ἔμαθε, παραδοῦναι δυναμένων· ὁμοίως δὲ κἀπὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ἔτι τῆς ἀνδρείας. Οὐχ οὕτως οὗτος τὰ περὶ ἀρετῶν ἡμῖν διεξῄει λόγοις, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἔργα μᾶλλον παρεκάλει· καὶ παρεκάλει πλέον τοῖς ἔργοις, ἢ οἷς ἔλεγεν.

10 Ἐξαιτοῦμαι δὲ παρά τε φιλοσόφων τῶν νῦν ὄντων, ὅσους αὐτὸς ἔγνων καὶ ὅσους ἄλλων διηγουμένων ἤκουσα, καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ἀνθρώπων, ἀνεμεσήτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν λεγόμενα. Μηδέ μέ τις ἢ φιλίᾳ τῇ πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα ἢ καὶ ἀπεχθανόμενον ἔτι τοῖς λοιποῖς φιλοσόφοις. (ὧν, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐραστής τε διὰ τοὺς λόγους εἶναι θέλω, καὶ εὐφημεῖν αὐτοὺς βούλομαι αὐτός τε καὶ ἑτέρων τὰ κάλλιστα λεγόντων περὶ αὐτῶν ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, ὡς εἰς ἔσχατον περιϋβρίζεσθαι μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων σχεδὸν καὶ τοὔνομα τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἐμὲ δὲ μικροῦ δεῖν ἰδιωτεύειν ἑλέσθαι πάντη, ἤπερ τι μαθεῖν ὧν οὗτοι ἀπαγγέλλουσιν, οἷς διὰ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον οὐδὲ προσιέναι ἄξιον εἶναι ἐδόκουν, ἴσως οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο φρονῶν), πλὴν μή μέ τις φιλοτιμίᾳ τινὶ ἤτοι τῶν εἰς τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπαίνων ἢ τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω φιλοσό φους ἄλλῃ ταύτῃ φιλοτιμίᾳ ταῦτα λέγειν ὑπονοησάτω· ἀλλὰ καὶ μικρότερα ἡμᾶς τῶν αὐτοῦ ἔργων, μὴ κολακεύειν δοκοίημεν, λέγειν πεπείσθω οὐχὶ ῥήματα καὶ ὀνόματα καὶ ἀφορμὰς ἐντέχνους ἐγκωμίων ἑαυτοῖς ἐκποριζομένοις· ὃς οὐδ' ὅτε μειράκιον ὢν τὴν δημώδη ῥητορικὴν ἐκ ῥήτορος