The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make something from the eternally uncreated, but not able to from that which is simply non-existent? But clearly the disbelief in God's ability to make something from non-being drove the first philosophers to a denial of all generation of beings from matter, and drove Aristotle, who corrected this, to a refutation of the generation of matter. If there is something that comes to be and there is something that this becomes, as he said in the preceding, then matter is none of these things, if it is uncreated and indestructible. If matter is uncreated and indestructible, it is necessarily uncreated according to each mode of uncreatedness; therefore neither does anything come to be from it, nor is anything destroyed in it. How then is privation destroyed in what is indestructible? If matter is one, but the things coming to be from it are many and different, how is it necessary for matter to remain uncreated, when that which is always divisible in it cannot remain indivisible? If matter is one in number, but two in form, and is uncreated and indestructible, then either the whole of it is uncreated and indestructible or half of it is. But if the whole of it is uncreated and indestructible, it is clear that half of it is also such; but if half of it is uncreated and indestructible and half of it is not such, then the contradiction concerning the same thing will be true, which is impossible. If that which receives the form either becomes that form or comes to be from that form, how is matter, which receives the form, uncreated? If it belongs to beings to be uncreated and indestructible, how is it that matter is both not a being and is uncreated and indestructible? If that which is uncreatedly in the uncreated is also itself uncreated, how does privation, which is uncreated in matter, come to be and be destroyed? If, as has been said, one of the contraries is sufficient by its own presence and absence to effect the change, what is it that changes, since matter is uncreated and indestructible? If the uncreated and indestructible is considered in respect to the substance of the uncreated and indestructible being, where is the uncreated and indestructible quality of matter, since matter is not a substance? If the bronze were not generable according to its prior generation, neither would the statue have come to be. How then does matter come to be or anything from matter, since matter has not been previously generated? If the bronze were not destroyed, neither would the bronze object be destroyed. How then is the material object destroyed, since matter is indestructible? If a body is not composed from incorporeal things, how has a body come to be from matter and form, which are in themselves incorporeal? If by a necessity of nature indivisibility and immutability follow upon the uncreated and indestructible, how is uncreated and indestructible matter in the forms divided according to genera, and how do things that change according to matter come to be by alteration, as he determined in the exposition of the modes of generation in the preceding? 8. From the second book of Aristotle's Physics. In one way, then, nature is so called, the primary underlying matter of each of those things which have in themselves a principle of motion

αὐτὴν ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀϊδίως ἀγένητον πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τέχνην. Πῶς οὖν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἀϊ δίως ἀγενήτου ἠδυνήθη ὁ θεὸς ποιῆσαί τι, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἁπλῶς μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἠδυνήθη; Ἀλλὰ προδήλως ἡ ἀπιστία τοῦ δύ νασθαι τὸν θεὸν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ποιῆσαί τι τοὺς μὲν πρώτους φιλοσόφους εἰς ἄρνησιν πάσης τῶν ὄντων ἐκ τῆς ὕλης γενέ σεως ἀπώσατο, τὸν δὲ τοῦτο διορθωσάμενον Ἀριστοτέλην εἰς ἀναίρεσιν τῆς γενέσεως τῆς ὕλης. Eἰ ἔστι τι γιγνόμενον καὶ ἔστι τι ὃ τοῦτο γίγνεται, καθὰ εἶπεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω, οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη, εἰ ἀγένητός ἐστι καὶ ἄφθαρτος. Eἰ ἀγένητός ἐστιν ὕλη καὶ ἄφθαρτος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καθ' ἑκά τερον τὸν τῆς ἀγενεσίας τρόπον ἀγένητός ἐστιν· οὔτ' ἄρα γίνεταί τι ἐξ αὐτῆς οὔτε φθείρεται ἐν αὐτῇ. Πῶς οὖν φθεί ρεται ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ ἡ στέρησις; Eἰ μία ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ διάφορα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς γιγνόμενα, πῶς ἀνάγκη μένειν τὴν ὕλην ἀγένητον, τοῦ ἀεὶ διαιρετοῦ αὐτῆς μὴ δυναμένου μένειν ἀδιαιρέτου; Eἰ ἀριθμῷ μὲν μία ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη, εἴδει δὲ δύο, καὶ ἔστιν ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος, ἢ ἄρα ὅλη ἐστὶν ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτῆς. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅλη ἐστὶν ἀγένη τος καὶ ἄφθαρτος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτῆς τοιοῦτον· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτῆς οὐ τοιοῦτον, ἔσται ἄρα ἡ ἀντίφασις περὶ τοῦ αὐ τοῦ ἀληθής· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. Eἰ τὸ δεχόμενον τὸ εἶδος ἢ ἐκεῖνο γίγνεται ἢ ἐξ ἐκείνου γίγνεται, πῶς ἀγένητος ἡ ὕλη τὸ εἶδος δεχομένη; Eἰ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγένητον εἶναι καὶ ἄφθαρτον, πῶς ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὂν οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρ τός ἐστιν; Eἰ τὸ ἀγενήτως ὂν ἐν τῷ ἀγενήτῳ ἀγένητον καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς ἡ ἀγένητος οὖσα ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ στέρησις γίνεται καὶ φθείρεται; Eἰ, καθὼς εἴρηται, ἱκανὸν τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων τῇ ἑαυτοῦ παρουσίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπουσίᾳ ποιεῖν τὴν μεταβολήν, τί τὸ μεταβαλλόμενον τῆς ὕλης ἀγενήτου καὶ ἀφθάρτου οὔσης; Eἰ τὸ ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν θεωρεῖται τοῦ ἀγενήτου καὶ ἀφθάρτου ὄντος, ποῦ τὸ ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον τῆς ὕλης, οὐσίας μὴ οὔσης τῆς ὕλης; Eἰ μὴ ἦν γενητὸς ὁ χαλκὸς κατὰ τὴν προγεγονυῖαν αὐτοῦ γένεσιν, οὐδὲ ἀνδριὰς ἐγίνετο. Πῶς τοίνυν γίνεται ἡ ὕλη ἢ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης τι, τῆς ὕλης μὴ προγεγονυίας; Eἰ μὴ ἐφθείρετο ὁ χαλκός, οὐδὲ τὸ χαλκοῦν ἐφθείρετο. Πῶς τοίνυν φθείρεται τὸ ὑλικόν, τῆς ὕλης ἀφθάρ του οὔσης; Eἰ ἐκ τῶν ἀσωμάτων σῶμα οὐκ ἀποτελεῖται, πῶς γέγονε σῶμα ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους, καθ' αὑτὰ ἀσωμά των ὄντων; Eἰ φυσικῇ ἀνάγκῃ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ τὸ ἄτρεπτον, πῶς ἐν τοῖς διῃρη μένοις κατὰ γένη εἴδεσίν ἐστιν ἡ ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος ὕλη, καὶ πῶς κατὰ ἀλλοίωσιν γίνεται τὰ τρεπόμενα κατὰ τὴν ὕλην, καθὼς ἐν τῇ ἐκθέσει τῶν τῆς γενέσεως τρόπων διωρίσατο ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω; η. Ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου λόγου τῆς Φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως Ἀριστοτέλους. Ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον ἡ φύσις οὕτω λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἑκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως