OF THE HOLY JUSTIN, PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR

 power, which is absurd for what is in time is corruptible. But if, being able long ago to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would b

 form, but ignorance of God which has spoken the falsehood which is a third form of the greatest evil, resulting for them from the voluntary disobedie

 For, he says, ignorance is often given to men for their good at any rate we see in many cases that it often happens that things known are despised mo

 the religions of the earth differ from the religion that holds the true doctrine simply by falsehood, but from each other in the differences of falseh

 the creator and God ordained the day, on which he makes an abolition of all the evils in the world arising from unbelief and disobedience to God, acco

 to God, the creator of the world, they name the parts of the world, and without the act of creating, they attribute to God the name of creator, so tha

 and in actuality which is absurd. He who remains the same, therefore, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, always ordering it, and th

 become significant and affirmative of God that all the works of God are temporal with him, it is clear that he absurdly supposed that nothing temporal

 of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly,

 the sun in its substance, or according to one act of creation He made its substance and according to another act of creation its motion, and having ma

 Is not God, in respect to the powers He has but according to which He does not act, corruptible according to the judgment of the one who answered? But

 or the denial to be true, how did the respondent posit both for the generation of the world, both the affirmation and the denial, saying it is both cr

 makes different things. Let us not consider God in human terms. For not as we, who previously are one way and later change into another, are said to m

 will. How then is the will the same as the essence, when that which is willed and the will are one thing and another, just as the sensible and sensati

 by essence. But if it is essence, he who wills does not exist, but if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another for that wh

 makes of themselves, in the same way also God, being ungenerated, ungeneratedly makes all things, not becoming but co-existing, and by the infinity of

 can. But let us not consider God's creating in a human way. For not as we, who previously are one way, and later changing into another, are said to cr

 of milk, but nature in no way makes substance all at once. How then is the respondent not using an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to re

 For first the simple, but later the composite. Just as God is beyond reproach for the weakness of power, because he did not make more worlds, but havi

 having come to its manifestation, how is it not that in the work of God all the parts of time exist? Fourth Christian question to the Greeks. If it is

 of the known ones of the world he dogmatized its ungeneratedness, nor did he establish this through proof, but only according to his own authority did

 It is clear from this, that the world is not a relative term to the creator insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a creation

 is, he ought also to say that the creation is uncreated, since its creator is uncreated for they necessarily follow one another, the uncreated with t

 kinds, of which it is a common feature for one to be spoken of sometimes in potentiality for what they are called, and sometimes in actuality, while o

 Fifth Christian question to the Hellenes. If heaven is uncreated and God is uncreated and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted dwelling in th

 and having made it and to say that the world, without interval, eternally co-exists with God, the world which received its existence from the Creat

 

of each other? For 'He has not so much made as He makes' is not a negation of 'to have made', but rather an affirmation of 'He has made'. But clearly, all the temporal things that he negated from God in the preface of the second response, these he left for Him here: As God has nothing fleeting, but always does the same things on account of His perfect and immutable power and activity. He who negates temporal things does not affirm temporal things. How then, if according to the respondent there is nothing temporal with God, does God do the same things? For 'He does' cannot be conceived outside of the present tense. And how does God have perfect power and activity, if indeed He unceasingly does the same things? For if on this account motion is called an imperfect activity, because it is always in motion, if God also were acting in imitation of this, His activity would be imperfect and not perfect; for perfect activity is observed in the work already completed and not in the uncompleted. But if the respondent says God has made nothing on account of the imperfection of the activity and on account of the most imperfect reason, he will not speak truly, saying that God's activity is perfect, which has completed nothing either in the whole or in part. And if, with the work not completed, it is impossible for the activity of the doer to be perfect, it is clear that God does not have perfect activity either, always making what is being made. He makes, therefore, the world in that very thing which it is, providing it with unceasing motion, by illumining it through the age. If in the provision of motion God makes the world, it is clear that He makes the world temporally; for motion, provided to the world by God for its own motion, is not without time. If, therefore, 'to make' is of the present time and motion is temporal, how is it not false that 'There is nothing temporal with God'? And how is it possible for the world to be moved, not yet having come into being, but being in the state of being made, with God making timelessly, but the world being made in time? For it is necessary that, just as the maker makes, so what is being made is made timelessly. But if God makes the world by the provision of motion, and it is not fitting to say of Him that He has made the world, then neither is it fitting for the world to have been moved. If the thing being moved is one thing, and the motion is another, as for example let the thing being moved be the sun, and its motion is a change of place by locomotion, and the motion does not provide the sun with its substance, but provides it with being moved by locomotion, it is clear that the sun has two makings, one of its substance, and another of its motion; for example, the sun is a condensed body, aethereal in substance, brilliant in appearance, spherical in shape, none of which the sun has through motion. But if the sun has none of these things through motion, it is clear that it does not have them through the making which is from God. But if God makes the sun, which is part of the world, by the provision of unceasing motion, just as He makes the whole world, and it is necessary for the movable thing to be first and the motion second, then it is unmade

λήλων; Oὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναίρεσίς ἐστι τοῦ πεποιηκέναι τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον πεποίηκεν ἢ ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ θέσις μᾶλλον τοῦ πεποίηκεν. Ἀλλὰ προδήλως πάντα ὅσα ἀνεῖλεν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τὰ ἔγχρονα ἐν τῷ προοιμίῳ τῆς δευτέρας ἀποκρίσεως, ταῦτα αὐτῷ κατέλιπεν ἐνταῦθα· Ὡς οὐδὲν ῥευστὸν ἔχοντος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀεὶ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ ποιοῦντος διὰ τὴν τελείαν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον δύναμίν τε καὶ ἐνέργειαν. Ὁ ἀναιρῶν τὰ ἔγχρονα οὐ τίθησι τὰ ἔγχρονα. Πῶς οὖν, εἰ κατὰ τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον μηδὲν ἔγχρονον παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ποιεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ θεός; Τὸ γὰρ ποιεῖ ἀδύνατον νοηθῆναι τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος χρόνου ἐκτός. Πῶς δὲ ἔχει τελείαν δύναμίν τε καὶ ἐνέργειαν ὁ θεός, εἰ δὴ ἀπαύστως ποιεῖ τὰ αὐτά; Eἰ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖ σθαι, ἧς εἰ κατὰ μίμησιν καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐποίει, ἀτελὴς ἔσται ἡ αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ οὐ τελεία· ἡ γὰρ τελεία ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ἤδη ἀποτελεσθέντι ἔργῳ θεωρεῖται καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀτελέστῳ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ἀτελὲς τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀτελέστατον τοῦ λόγου λέγει τὸν θεὸν μηδὲν πεποιηκέναι ὁ ἀποκρινάμενος, οὐκ ἀληθεύσει, λέγων τελείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ θεοῦ, τὴν μηδὲν οὔτε τῷ ὅλῳ οὔτε τῷ μέρει τελέσασαν. Eἰ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου μὴ τελεσθέντος ἀδύνατον τελείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ ποι οῦντος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁ θεὸς ἔχει τελείαν ἐνέργειαν, ἀεὶ ποιῶν τὸ ποιούμενον. Ποιεῖ τοίνυν τὸν κόσμον ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ ὅπερ ἐστί, τὴν κίνησιν αὐτῷ ἄπαυστον παρέχων, τῷ ἐλλάμπειν αὐτὸν δι' αἰῶνος. Eἰ ἐν τῇ παροχῇ τῆς κινήσεως ποιεῖ τὸν κόσμον ὁ θεός, δῆλον ὅτι ἔγχρονον ποιεῖ τὸν κόσμον· οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ χρό νου ἡ κίνησις ἡ τῷ κόσμῳ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ κί νησιν παρεχομένη. Eἰ τοίνυν τὸ ποιεῖν τοῦ ἐνεστῶτός ἐστι χρόνου καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἔγχρονός ἐστι, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὲς τὸ Oὐδὲν ἔγχρονόν ἐστι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ; Πῶς δὲ δυνατὸν κινεῖσθαι τὸν κόσμον τὸν μήπω γεγονότα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖσθαι ὄντα, τῷ τὸν μὲν θεὸν ποιεῖν ἀχρόνως, τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ποιεῖσθαι; Ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὥσπερ ποιεῖ ὁ ποιῶν, οὕτως ποιεῖσθαι τὸ ποιούμενον ἀχρόνως. Eἰ δὲ τῇ παροχῇ τῆς κι νήσεως ποιεῖ τὸν κόσμον ὁ θεός, καὶ οὐχ ἁρμόττει τὸ λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ πεποίηκε τὸν κόσμον, οὐδ' ἄρα τῷ κόσμῳ ἁρ μόττει τὸ κινηθῆναι. Eἰ ἕτερον μὲν τὸ κινούμενον, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ κίνησις, οἷον ἔστω τὸ μὲν κινούμενον ὁ ἥλιος, ἡ δὲ κίνησις αὐτοῦ μετάστασις κατὰ φορὰν ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, καὶ ἡ κί νησις οὐ παρέχει μὲν τῷ ἡλίῳ τὴν οὐσίαν, παρέχει δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ κινεῖσθαι κατὰ φοράν, δῆλον ὅτι δύο ποιήσεις ἔχει ὁ ἥλιος, μίαν μὲν τῆς οὐσίας, ἑτέραν δὲ τῆς κινήσεως· οἷόν ἐστιν ὁ ἥλιος πίλημα, αἰθεροειδὴς τῇ οὐσίᾳ, λαμπρὸς τῷ εἴδει, σφαιροειδὴς τῷ σχήματι, ὧν οὐδὲν διὰ κινήσεως ἔχει ὁ ἥλιος. Ἀλλ' εἰ μηδὲν τούτων διὰ τῆς κινήσεως ἔχει ὁ ἥλιος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ διὰ τῆς ποιήσεως τῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ. Eἰ δὲ τῇ παροχῇ τῆς ἀπαύστου κινήσεως ποιεῖ τὸν ἥλιον ὁ θεός, τὸν ὄντα μέρος τοῦ κόσμου, ὥσπερ ποιεῖ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ δεῖ πρῶτον εἶναι τὸ κινητὸν καὶ ὕστερον τὴν κίνησιν, ἢ ἄρα ἀποίητός ἐστιν