ARTICLE 9

In this article the question is: Whether virtues are acquired by acts.

It would seem that they are not.

             OBJECTIONS:

1. Augustine says in Contra Iulianum, that virtue is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously, of which no one can make a bad use, which God works in us without us." But God does not work in us that which we do by our own acts.

             2. Further, on the words of the Apostle, Rom. 14:23: "All that is not of faith is sin," Augustine remarks that: "The whole life of an unbeliever is sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery, even in the best behaved people." From this it is evident that there can be no virtue without faith. Now faith comes, not from any acts of ours, but from grace, as the Apostle clearly insists, in Ephes. 2:1: "By grace you are saved through faith: and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Therefore, virtue cannot be caused by any acts of ours.

             3. Further, Bernard says that a man labors in vain for virtue, unless he realizes that he must hope for it from God. Now what must be hoped for from God is not caused by our acts. Therefore, virtue is not caused by our acts.

             4. Further, continence is one of the lesser virtues, as the Philosopher points out, in the Ethics. But there is no continence in us save as a gift of God; for we read, in Wisd. 8:21: "And I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it." Therefore, we cannot acquire virtue from our own acts, but only from the hand of God.

             5. Further, Augustine says that a man cannot avoid sin without grace. But sin is avoided through virtue, for a man cannot be vicious and virtuous at the same time. Therefore, virtue cannot be had without grace: it cannot be acquired by our acts.

             6. Further, by virtue we attain beatitude, for happiness is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher says, in the Ethics. Therefore, if virtue may be acquired by our own acts, we are able, by these same acts, to attain to eternal life, the ultimate happiness of man, without grace. But this is contrary to what the Apostle says, in Rom. 6:23: "the grace of God, life everlasting."

             7. Further, according to Augustine, in his book De Libero Arbitrio, virtue is counted among the greatest goods, because no one can make bad use of virtue. But the highest goods are from God, as we are told in Jas. 1:17: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights." Therefore, it would seem that virtue is in us only by the gift of God.

             8. Further, as Augustine, says in De Libero Arbitrio, nothing can form itself. But virtue is a certain form in the soul. Therefore, a man cannot cause virtue in himself by his own acts.

             9. Further, just as the intellect is at first essentially in potency to knowledge, so is the affective power to virtue. But in order that the intellect, essentially in potency, be reduced to the actual possession of science, it needs an extrinsic mover, namely, a teacher. Similarly, that a man actually acquire virtue, he needs some extrinsic agent; his own acts are insufficient.

             10. Further, a thing is acquired by being received. But action takes place, not by reception but by the putting forth or performance of the action by the agent. Therefore, we do not acquire virtue by performing acts.

             11. Further, if virtue is acquired in us by some act of ours, this is either by one act or many. But it is not had by one; for a man is not made studious by studying only once, as we are reminded in the Ethics. Nor is virtue acquired by many acts; because several acts, since they are not simultaneous, cannot simultaneously bring about any determined effect. Therefore, it would seem that virtue is in no way caused in us by our acts.

             12. Further, Avicenna observes that virtue is a power essentially attributed to things, enabling them to perform their operations. But that which is essentially attributed to a thing is not caused by any of its acts. Therefore, virtue is not caused by the acts of one who possesses virtue.

             13. Further, if virtue is caused by our acts, this is either by virtuous or by vicious acts. It cannot be by vicious acts, because these rather destroy virtue; nor by virtuous acts, because these presuppose virtue. Therefore, virtue is in no way caused in us by our acts.

             14. But it might be objected that virtue may be caused by imperfect virtuous acts.--On the contrary, nothing can act beyond the powers of its nature. Therefore, if the acts preceding virtue are imperfect, it would seem that they can never cause perfect virtue.

             15. Further, virtue is the limit of a power, as it says in De Caelo. But a power is natural. Therefore, virtue is natural, and is not acquired by acts.

             16. Further, we read in the Ethics that virtue is that which makes its possessor good. But man is good in his very nature. Therefore, a man's virtue is his by nature, and is not acquired by acts.

             17. Further, no new habit is acquired by the frequent repetition of a natural act.

             18. Further, everything has its being from its form. But grace is the form of the virtues: for without grace the virtues are said to be uninformed. Therefore, the virtues are caused by grace, and not by acts.

             19. Further, according to the Apostle, 2 Cor. 2:19: "power is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is a passion rather than an action. Therefore, virtue is caused by a passion rather than by an action.

             20. Further, since virtue is a quality, a change in virtue would seem to be an alteration, for alteration is a change in quality. But alteration is a passion, which resides only in the sensitive part of the soul, as the Philosopher demonstrates in the Physics. Therefore, if virtue is acquired by our acts, through some sort of passion and alteration, it must follow that virtue is in the sensitive part: which is contrary to Augustine's statement that virtue is a good quality of the mind.

             21. Further, by virtue one chooses rightly concerning the end, as it says in the Ethics. But to choose rightly with respect to the end does not appear to be within our power: because as each man is, so does the end seem to him, as we read in the Ethics. But a man is what he is from some natural complexion in his make-up or from some impression of a heavenly body. Therefore, it is not in our power to acquire virtue; so that they are not caused by our acts.

             22. Further, we neither acquire by habit nor lose by neglect those things which are natural. But in some men there are natural inclinations, both to certain virtues and to certain vices. Consequently, such inclinations cannot be removed by habitually repeated acts. But as long as the evil inclinations remain in us, there can be no virtues in us. Therefore, we cannot acquire virtues by acts.

             ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Dionysius says, in De Divin. Nominibus, that good is more powerful than evil. But vicious habits are caused in us by evil actions. Therefore virtuous habits are caused in us by good acts.

             2. Further, according to the Philosopher, in the Ethics, we become studious by repeated acts. But studiousness is a virtue. Therefore, virtue is caused in us by acts.

             3. Further, generation and corruption are from contraries. But virtue is corrupted by bad acts. Therefore, it is engendered from good acts.

             I reply: Since virtue is the limit to which a power extends in operation, and which makes it a good operation, it is evident that the virtue (virtus) of anything is that by which is produces a good operation. But each thing is good insofar as it is rightly ordered to its end. Therefore, each thing is good and acts well through its own proper virtue.

             Now the good of one thing is not the same as the good of other things, for of diverse subjects capable of perfection, there are diverse perfections. Thus the good of man is different from the good of a horse or a stone. Even for man himself there are various kinds of goods, according to various considerations.

             For the good of man as man is not the same as his good insofar as he is a citizen.

             The good of man as such is that his reason be perfected by knowledge of the truth and that his lower appetites be subjected to the rule of reason, for man is human precisely because he is rational. However, the good of man as a citizen is that he serve, in society, the interests of the common good. Hence the Philosopher remarks, in the Politics, that it is not the same virtue which makes a man a good man and makes him a good citizen.

             Now a man is not only a citizen of an earthly state, but he is also a citizen of the heavenly Jerusalem, where the Lord rules, where the angels and all the saints are the citizens, whether they reign in glory and are at rest in their true country, or whether they are as yet pilgrims on this earth, according to the words of the Apostle, Eph. 2:19: "you are fellow-citizens of the saints and the domestics of God, etc." That a man be a citizen of this city, human nature of itself is inadequate, but he must be elevated to it by the grace of God. Clearly, those virtues which a man has insofar as he is a citizen of this heavenly city cannot be acquired by him through his own natural powers. Wherefore, they are not caused by our acts, but are infused into us by the gift of God.

             On the other hand, the virtues which a man has according to his human nature, or as he is a member of this earthly city, do not exceed the powers of human nature. Consequently, a man can acquire them by his own natural powers, from his own acts, as is clearly the case.

             For when a man has a natural aptitude for some perfection, if this aptitude be in a passive principle only, he can acquire the perfection, not by his own activity, but from the action of an exterior natural agent. Thus does the ether receive light from the sun. But if he has a natural aptitude for some perfection, and this aptitude be according to both an active and a passive principle at the same time, in this case he can attain the perfection through his own activity. Thus the body of a sick man has a natural aptitude for health: Because the subject is naturally receptive of health, on account of the natural active power which is in a man to heal him (or: to make him healthy), the sick man may gradually be healed, without the action of any external agent.

             It was shown in the preceding article that man has a natural aptitude for virtue in both an active and passive principle, which is apparent from the very order of the principles among themselves. For in the intellective part there is as it were a passive principle, namely, the possible intellect, which is perfected by the action of the agent intellect. The intellect in act moves the will, for the good of the intellect is an end which attracts the appetite. The will, moved by reason, in its turn naturally moves the sensitive appetite, i.e. the irascible and concupiscible powers which are ordered as to obey reason. Hence it is also evident that any virtue which makes a man's operations good has its own act in man, who can actively reduce this virtuous power to act, whether it be in the intellect, the will, or the irascible and concupiscible parts.

             Now virtue is reduced to act in diverse ways in the intellective and in the appetitive parts. The action of the intellect, and of every cognitive power, is in some manner an assimilation to the object of knowledge. Wherefore, intellectual virtue operates in the intellective part in such a way that by the agent intellect intelligible species are presented, either actually or habitually. The action of appetitive virtue consists in a certain inclination towards an appetible object. Therefore, in order that there be virtue in the appetitive part, an inclination must be given it to some determined object.

             It must be noted that the inclination of natural things follows upon their form; and it is to one object, in keeping with the exigency of the form. As long as this form remains, such an inclination cannot be removed, nor a contrary tendency introduced. For this reason, natural things neither acquire anything by habit, nor lose anything by loss of habit. For example, no matter how often a stone is thrown upwards, it never becomes habituated to this upward movement, but remains always inclined to a downward movement. But things which are indifferent to one or another object do not have a form which inclines them to one determined thing; they are directed to one object rather than another by their own proper movement. By this inclination they are to a certain extent disposed towards this particular object; and after they have been many times so disposed or determined, they become determined to this same object by their own proper movement. A determined inclination to it is established in them, so that this disposition, once received, is as it were a sort of form which tends, as nature would, to one thing. It is on this count that custom or habit is said to be a second nature.

             Because the appetitive power enjoys freedom of choice, it does not tend to one thing unless it be determined to it in some way by reason. When reason has frequently inclined the appetite to some one object, a certain disposition is acquired by and firmly fixed in the appetitive power (the will), whereby it is inclined to the one thing to which it has become habituated. This disposition thus established is a virtuous habit.

             Hence if the matter be correctly considered, the virtue of the appetitive part is nothing other than a certain disposition of form stamped and impressed in the appetitive power by reason. Consequently, no matter how strong a disposition in the appetite to some form may be, it cannot have the nature of a virtue unless there be something in it of reason. And so in the definition of virtue reason is included: for the Philosopher says, in the Ethics, that virtue is a habit of choosing, residing in the mind, of a determined nature such as a wise man will decide.

             REPLY TO OBJECTIONS:

1. Augustine is speaking of the virtues which are ordained to eternal beatitude.

             The same answer applies to the second, third, and fourth objections.

             5. An acquired virtue makes one turn away from sin, not always but in most cases, because those things which spring from nature turn out in most cases (ea quae naturaliter accidunt, ut in pluribus eveniunt). It does not follow from this that a man may be at the same time virtuous and vicious, for one act of a power does not destroy an acquired habit, whether it be vicious or virtuous. Nor can a man avoid all sin by an acquired virtue, for one cannot, by acquired virtue, avoid the sin of infidelity or the other sins which are opposed to the infused virtues.

             6. We do not attain heavenly beatitude through acquired virtues, but we do attain a certain happiness which man can acquire through his own natural powers. Here on earth this happiness it attained by an act of perfect virtue, of which Aristotle treats in his Metaphysics.

             7. Acquired virtue is not a supreme good absolutely, but supreme in the order of human goods; whereas infused virtue is a supreme good absolutely, since by it man is ordered to the Supreme Good, which is God.

             8. The same thing cannot form itself in its entirety. But when in anything there is an active and a passive principle, it can form itself according to certain of its parts, so that one part will be forming and another formed. Thus a thing moves itself in such a way that one of its parts is the mover and another is the thing moved, as it says in the Physics. Such is the case in the formation (generatione) of virtues, as has been shown.

             9. Just as the intellect acquires science, not only by invention but also by doctrine, which is received from another, so also in the acquisition of virtue man is aided by the correction and discipline imposed upon him by another. The more disposed a man is to virtue, the less does he need these extrinsic aids, just as, the keener a man's intellect is, so much the less does he need to be taught by another.

             10. The active and passive powers in man both concur in his operations. Insofar as they are active, powers give forth (fiat emissio) and receive nothing; on the contrary, it is proper to the passive powers as such to acquire something by reception. Hence in a power which is active only, e.g. the agent intellect, no habit is acquired by acts.

             11. The more efficacious is an agent's action, so much the more quickly does it produce a form. And so we see in intellectual operations that we acquire science by a single cogent demonstration; whereas opinion, although of less value than science, is not formed by one dialectical syllogism alone, but many are required, on account of their weakness.

             Thus in exterior actions the operations of the soul are not as efficacious as they are in matters of demonstration, because things to be done are contingent and only probable. Hence one act is not enough to cause virtue, but many acts are required. Although these several acts may not be simultaneous, still they are able to cause a virtuous habit, because the first act sets up a certain disposition, and the second act, finding the matter disposed, disposes it yet further, and the third act still more, and so the ultimate act, acting with the force of all the preceding acts behind it, completes the formation of virtue--as may be illustrated by the example of many drops of water hollowing out a rock.

             12. Avicenna's intention is to define natural virtue, which follows the form of man or his essential principle. Hence his definition does not apply here to our matter.

             13. Virtues are engendered from acts which are in one sense virtuous and in another sense not virtuous. For acts preceding virtue are virtuous as regards the effect they produce, so that a man does brave and just things. But they are not virtuous as regards their mode of action, because, before acquiring a virtuous habit, a man does not perform virtuous works in the same way as a virtuous man does, namely: promptly, without hesitation or difficulty, and with pleasure.

             14. Reason is nobler than a virtue formed in the appetitive part, since such a virtue is no more than a certain participation in reason. Therefore, an act which precedes virtue can cause virtue inasmuch as it is from reason, from which it derives whatever of perfection there is in it. Its imperfection is in the appetitive power, which has not as yet been informed by a habit whereby a man may follow the command of reason with pleasure and promptness.

             15. Virtue is said to be the limit of a power, not because it is always of the essence of a power; but because it inclines a power to the limit of its extent (ad id quod ultimo potentia potest).

             16. By his nature man is good to some extent, but not absolutely. That a thing be simply good, it must be completely perfect, just as, that something be simply beautiful, there must be no deformity or ugliness in any part of it. Now a man is said to be simply and wholly good from his having a good will, because by his will man controls all his other powers. Therefore, a good will makes a man good absolutely; and for this reason, a virtue of the appetitive part, whereby the will is made good, is that which makes its possessor good absolutely.

             17. Acts which precede virtue can indeed be called natural insofar as they proceed from natural reason, and as what is natural is distinguished from what is acquired; however, they cannot be called natural in the sense in which what is natural is opposed to what is from reason. Thus we say that we neither acquire by habit nor lose by neglect natural properties, in the sense in which nature is distinguished from reason.

             18. Grace is said to be the form of infused virtue, not in the sense that it gives virtue its specific being, but inasmuch as by grace the act of virtue is somehow informed. Hence it is not necessary that civic virtue result from the infusion of grace.

             19. Virtue is made perfect in infirmity, not because infirmity causes virtues, but because it provides the occasion for a certain virtue, namely, humility. It is also the matter of other virtues, such as patience and charity, as when one aids one's neighbor in his weakness. Furthermore, it is naturally a sign of virtue, because the soul is shown to be more virtuous (or stronger) the more difficulty it has in moving the body to an act of virtue.

             20. Properly speaking, a thing is not said to be altered when it acquires its proper perfection. Wherefore, since virtue is the proper perfection of man, a man is not said to be altered in acquiring it, unless perhaps accidentally, when a change in the sensible part of the soul, in which the passions are located, pertains to virtue.

             21. A man may be said to be such as he is either according to a certain quality of the intellective part: in which case he is not said to be such from the natural complexion of his body, or by the impression of a heavenly body, since the intellective part is independent of every body; or he may be said to be such as he is from a disposition in the sensitive part: which can indeed be from the natural constitution of his body, or from the impression of a heavenly body. However, because this latter part obeys reason, what a man is can by habit be diminished or completely erased.

             This last also provides the response to the twenty-second objection; for by this disposition in the sensitive part some men are said to have a natural inclination to vice or virtue, etc.