LESSON V

[iii. 6. 1278b7-1279a22]

             384 After having treated of the citizen, from the knowledge of whom we can discover what the city is, the Philosopher seeks next to divide the regime into its species. This section is divided into three parts. In the first, he distinguishes the regimes. In the second, he shows what is just in each regime. In the third, he shows which regime is preferable. Concerning the first point, he does three things. First, he states his intention. Secondly, he shows what a regime is. Thirdly, he divides the regimes.

             He says then, first of all, that, now that these things have been determined, it remains to consider whether there is only one regime or whether there are several and, if several, how many there are, and what they are, and how they differ from one another.

             385 Then he shows what a commonwealth is. He says that a commonwealth is nothing other than the disposition of a city with respect to all the rules that are found in it but principally with respect to the highest rule, which governs all the others. This is so because the imposition of order in a city resides entirely with the person who rules over the city; and such an imposition of order is the commonwealth itself. Hence the commonwealth consists principally in the order of the highest rule, according to the diversity of which commonwealths are diversified. Thus in a popular state the people rule and in a state of the few a few rich men. From this stems the diversity of these regimes. We must speak in the same way about the other regimes.

             386 Then he distinguishes the regimes. First, he states how just regimes are distinguished from unjust regimes, and secondly, how true regimes are distinguished among themselves. Concerning the first point, he does three things. First, he shows to what the city is ordered. Secondly, he shows how the rules are distinguished from one another. Thirdly, he infers the difference between just and unjust regimes. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he states his intention. Secondly, he begins to carry out his proposal.

             He says then, first of all, that, since we must distinguish the regimes from one another, we should begin by premising two things, the first being the reason for which the city was founded, and the second, the fact that there are differences of rules dealing with all the things that pertain to the community of life. For from these two things we shall be able to see the difference between just and unjust regimes.

             387 Then he shows what the end of the city or of the regime is. He says that it was stated in Book I, in [137] which the question of domestic and despotic rule was treated, that man is by nature a political animal and, therefore, that men desire to live with one another and not be alone. Even if one man did not have need of another for anything in order to lead a political life, there is nevertheless a great common benefit in the sharing of social life, and this with reference to two things. First, it is indeed so with reference to living well, to which each man contributes his share. For example, in any society we see that one person serves the society by performing one function, another by performing another function, and in this manner all live well together. This, then, namely, to live well, is above all else the end of the city or of the regime, both collectively with reference to all and severally with reference to each individual. Secondly, the common life is beneficial even for mere existence, since among those who share a common life one comes to the aid of another to sustain his life and preserve him against the dangers that threaten it. For this reason men come together and maintain a political association, for even mere living considered in itself without the things that are conducive to living well is a good and desirable thing, unless perhaps a man suffers some exceedingly grave and cruel evils in his life. This is clear from the fact that, even if they bear many evils, men nevertheless persevere in their will to live and are attracted to the desire of life by a certain natural sweetness, as if life possessed in itself a certain solace and natural sweetness.

             388 Then he distinguishes the species of rule, first in domestic matters, and secondly in political matters. He says that it is easy to distinguish the modes of rule that are said to exist, because he himself has made mention of them in other treatises that were not primarily concerned with them, as in Book VIII of the Ethics and above in Book II.

             In domestic affairs there is a twofold rule. One is the same as that of master over slave and is called domination. Although, according to the truth of the matter, the same thing benefits the man who is by nature a slave and the man who is by nature a master, namely, that the former be ruled by the latter, the fact remains that the master rules the slave for the benefit of the master and not for the benefit of the slave, except perhaps incidentally, in so far as when the slave dies the dominion ceases to exist. The other rule is that over free men, like that over sons, wife, and the entire family, and it is called domestic rule. What is sought in this rule is the benefit of the subjects or even the benefit common to both, but essentially and primarily the benefit of the subjects, as we see in the other arts, such as the art of medicine, which seeks principally the benefit of those who are healed, and the art of gymnastics, which seeks principally the benefit of those who exercise. Incidentally, however, it happens that the benefit redounds to those who possess the art. For he who exercises boys is also at the same time exercising himself; he, too, is sometimes among the number of those who exercise, just as the pilot is one of the crew who sail a ship. Accordingly, the exerciser of boys and the pilot of a ship consider per se the benefit of the subjects. But because they themselves are among the number of those who exercise or sail, they both share incidentally in the common benefit that they procure. In like manner, the father shares in the benefit of the household that he procures.

             389 Then, in accordance with what was said, he distinguishes the political rules. He says that, since the rule over free men is primarily for the benefit of the subjects, it is therefore considered fitting that citizens particularly be governed according to political rules when they have been established in conformity with the equality and similarity of the citizens. For then it seems fitting that some persons should rule for one period of time and others for another period. It would be otherwise, however, if some of the citizens greatly surpassed others in goodness. For then it would be fitting for them to rule all of the time, as will be said below.

             Concerning this question of fittingness, however, the judgment of men differs according to different times. For in the beginning, those who ruled by serving others thought it fitting, as indeed it was, that they themselves should serve others for a time by seeking their benefit and that in turn someone else should rule for a time and seek their benefit, just as they themselves had previously sought the good of others. Afterwards, however, because of the benefits accruing from the common goods that rulers usurp for themselves and also from the very right of sovereignty, men wish to rule always, as if to rule were to be healthy and not to rule to be sick. Thus men seem to desire rulership as the sick desire health.

             390 Then from what has been said he infers the distinction between just and unjust regimes. For, since it is true that the rule of free men should be for the benefit of the subjects, it is evident that any regime in which the ruler seeks the common benefit is a just regime according to absolute justice, while any regime in which the sole benefit of the ruler is sought is an unjust regime and a corruption of some sort of the just regime. For in such cases that which is simply just does not exist but only that which is just in a relative sense, as will be said later. For they rule by dominating the city and make use of the citizens as slaves, that is to say, for their own benefit. This is contrary to justice, because a city is an association of free men and a slave is not a citizen, as was said earlier.