Two books of soliloquies.

 As I had been long revolving with myself matters many and various, and had been for many days sedulously inquiring both concerning myself and my chief

 2. O God, Framer of the universe, grant me first rightly to invoke Thee then to show myself worthy to be heard by Thee lastly, deign to set me free.

 3. Thee I invoke, O God, the Truth, in whom and from whom and through whom all things are true which anywhere are true. God, the Wisdom, in whom and f

 4. Whatever has been said by me, Thou the only God, do Thou come to my help, the one true and eternal substance, where is no discord, no confusion, no

 5. Henceforth Thee alone do I love, Thee alone I follow, Thee alone I seek, Thee alone am I prepared to serve, for Thou alone art Lord by a just title

 Translation absent.

 7. A . Behold I have prayed to God. R A R A R A R A R A R A R A R A R A

 8. R . I allow so much: but yet if any one should say to thee, I will give thee to know God as well as thou dost know Alypius, wouldst thou not give t

 9. But let that go, and now answer to this: if those things which Plato and Plotinus have said concerning God are true, is it enough for thee to know

 10. R. It is then plain to you that a line cannot possibly be longitudinally divided into two? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 11. A. Pardon me, however vehemently thou urge and argue, yet I dare not say that I wish so to know God as I know these things. For not only the objec

 12. R. Thou art moved to good effect. For the Reason which is talking with thee promises so to demonstrate God to thy mind, as the sun demonstrates hi

 13. When therefore the mind has come to have sound eyes, what next? A. That she look. R.

 14. Therefore when the soul has obtained to see, that is, to apprehend God, let us see whether those three things are still necessary to her. Why shou

 15. Now listen, so far as the present time requires, while from that similitude of sensible things I now teach also something concerning God. Namely,

 16. But why do we delay? Let us set out: but first let us see (for this comes first) whether we are in a sound state. A. Do thou see to it, if either

 17. R. Do you not see that these eyes of the body, even when sound, are often so smitten by the light of this visible sun, as to be compelled to turn

 18. R. Thou hast made great progress: yet those things which remain in order to the seeing of that light, very greatly impede. But I am aiming at some

 19. R. You speak as if I were now inquiring what you hope. I am not inquiring what, denied, delights not, but what delights, obtained. For an extingui

 20. But I ask of thee, why thou dost desire, either that the persons whom thou affectest should live, or that they should live with thee. A. That toge

 21. R. We have pain of body left, which perhaps moves thee of its proper force. A. R.

 22. Now let us inquire concerning this, what sort of lover of wisdom thou art, whom thou desirest to behold with most chaste view and embrace, and to

 23. R. Such lovers assuredly it is, whom Wisdom ought to have. Such lovers does she seek, the love of whom has in it nothing but what is pure. But the

 24. And, another day having come, A. Give now, I pray, if thou canst, that order. Lead by what way thou wilt, through what things thou wilt, how thou

 25. R. In this way too the bodily eye might say: I shall not love the darkness, when I shall have seen the sun. For this too seems, as it were, to per

 26. A. Peace, I pray thee, peace. Why tormentest thou me? Why diggest thou so remorselessly and descendest so deep? Now I weep intolerably, henceforth

 27. R. Let us conclude, if you will, this first volume, that in a second we may attempt some such way as may commodiously offer itself. For this dispo

 28. R. What? When a chaste person dies, do you judge that Chastity dies also? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 29. R. Does this proposition seem to you to be true: Whatever is, is compelled to be somewhere? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 30. A. I thank thee much, and will diligently and cautiously review these things in my own mind, and moreover with thee, when we are in quiet, if no d

 Book II.

 1. A. Long enough has our work been intermitted, and impatient is Love, nor have tears a measure, unless to Love is given what is loved: wherefore, le

 2. A. I see a very plain and compendious order. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 3. R. Now I will have you answer me, does the soul seem to you to feel and perceive, or the body? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R

 4. R. Give answer now to this, whether it appears to you possible that at some time hereafter falsity should not be. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 5. A. O leaden dagger! For thou mightest conclude that man is immortal if I had granted thee that this universe can never be without man, and that thi

 6. R. Do any corporeal, that is, sensible things, appear to you to be capable of comprehension in the intellect? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 7. R. Give now still greater heed. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 8. R. Define therefore the True. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 9. R. God, to whom we have commended ourselves, without doubt will render help, and set us free from these straits, if only we believe, and entreat Hi

 10. R. First let us again and yet again ventilate this question, What is falsity? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 11. R. But all this forest of facts, unless I am mistaken, may be divided into two kinds. For it lies partly in equal, partly in inferior things. They

 12. R. We must, however, wait patiently, until the remaining senses also make report to us that falsity dwells in the similitude of the true. For in t

 13. R. Now give heed, while we run over the same things once more, that what we are endeavoring to show may come more plainly to view. A. R. A. R. A.

 14. R. It is ridiculous if you are ashamed, as if it were not for this very reason that we have chosen this mode of discourse: which, since we are tal

 15. A. Thou speakest rightly but what I have granted amiss I altogether fail to see: unless perchance that that is rightly called false which has som

 16. R. Attend rather for never can I be persuaded, that we have implored the Divine aid in vain. For I see that, having tried all things as far as we

 17. A. Proceed, I pray for now perchance thou hast begun to teach concerning falsities not falsely: but now I am considering of what sort that class

 18. A. Thou speakest rightly but I wonder why thou wouldst separate from this class those poems and jests, and other imitative trifles. R. A. R. A. R

 19. R. What then think you? Is the science of debate true, or false? A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 20. R. How as to Grammar itself? if it is true, is it not so far true as it is a discipline? For the name of Discipline signifies something to be lear

 21. R. Tell me now what science contains the principles of definitions, divisions and partitions. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 22. R. Attend therefore to the few things that remain. A. R. A. R. A.

 23. But as to thy question, who would grant, or to whom could it appear possible, that that which is in the subject should remain, while the subject p

 24. R. Groan not, the human mind is immortal. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 25. A. And now I am ready to plunge into the expected joys, but yet I am held hesitating by two thoughts. For, first, it makes me uneasy that we have

 26. R. Thou mayest note that it is not for naught that our reasoning has taken so wide a round. For we were inquiring what is Truth, which not even no

 27. What shall we say to this, that we have entreated God and do entreat, that He will show us a way, not to riches, not to bodily pleasures, not to p

 28. R. From this truth, as I remember, that Truth cannot perish, we have concluded, that not only if the whole world should perish, but even if Truth

 29. R. Is Truth then so called for any other reason than as being that by which everything is true which is true? A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 30. R. You apprehend the matter well. But consider this, whether we can also with propriety call silver by the name of false lead. A. R. A. R. A. R.

 31. A. Go on to what remains for of this I am well convinced. R A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A R. A. R. A. R. A.

 32. R. What sayest thou concerning the rest? A. R. A R. A. R. A. R. A. R. A.

 33. R. What need is there any longer than that we should inquire concerning the science of disputation? For whether the figures of Geometry are in the

 34. A. It is as thou sayest, and I willingly yield compliance with thine injunctions. But this at least I would entreat, before thou decreest a term t

 35. R. Such are those who are well instructed in the liberal arts since they by learning disinter them, buried in oblivion, doubtless, within themsel

 36. These points will be treated with more pains and greater subtilty, when we shall have begun to discuss the faculty of intelligence, which part of

9. But let that go, and now answer to this: if those things which Plato and Plotinus have said concerning God are true, is it enough for thee to know God as they knew him? A. Even allowing that those things which they have said are true, does it follow at once that they knew them? For many copiously utter what they do not know, as I myself have said that I desired to know all those things for which I prayed, which I should not desire if I knew them already: yet I was none the less able to enumerate them all. For I have enumerated not what I intellectually comprehended, but things which I have gathered from all sides and entrusted to my memory, and to which I yield as ample a faith as I am able: but to know is another thing. R. Tell me, I pray, do you at least know in geometry what a line is? A. So much I certainly know. R. Nor in professing so do you stand in awe of the Academicians? A. In no wise. For they, as wise men, would not run the risk of erring: but I am not wise. Therefore as yet I do not shrink from professing the knowledge of those things which I have come to know. But if, as I desire, I should ever have attained to wisdom, I will do what I may find her to suggest. R. I except not thereto: but, I had begun to inquire, as you know a line, do you also know a ball, or, as they say, a sphere? A. I do. R. Both alike, or one more, one less? A. Just alike. I am altogether certain of both. R. Have you grasped these by the senses or the intellect? A. Nay, I have essayed the senses in this matter as a ship. For after they had carried me to the place I was aiming for, and I had dismissed them, and was now, as it were, left on dry ground, where I began to turn these things over in thought, the oscillations of the senses long continued to swim in my brain. Wherefore it seems to me that it would be easier to sail on dry land, than to learn geometry by the senses, although young beginners seem to derive some help from them. R. Then you do not hesitate to call whatever acquaintance you have with such things, Knowledge? A. Not if the Stoics permit, who attribute knowledge only to the Wise Man. Certainly I maintain myself to have the perception of these things, which they concede even to folly: but neither am I at all in any great fear of the stoics: unquestionably I hold those things which thou hast questioned me of in knowledge: proceed now till I see to what end thou questionest me of them. R. Be not too eager, we are not pressed for time. But give strict heed, lest you should make some rash concession. I would fain give thee the joy of things wherein thou fearest not to slip, and dost thou enjoin haste, as in a matter of no moment? A. God grant the event as thou forecastest it. Therefore question at thy will, and rebuke me more sharply if I err so again.

CAPUT IV. Certa scientia quae.

9. Sed quid ad nos? Nunc illud responde: si ea quae de Deo dixerunt Plato et Plotinus vera sunt, satisne tibi est ita Deum scire, ut illi sciebant? A. Non continuo, si ea quae dixerunt, vera sunt, etiam scisse illos ea necesse est. Nam multi copiose dicunt quae nesciunt, ut ego ipse omnia quae oravi, me dixi scire cupere, quod non cuperem si jam scirem: num igitur eo minus illa dicere potui? Dixi enim non quae intellectu comprehendi, sed quae undecumque collecta memoriae mandavi, et quibus accommodavi quantam potui fidem: scire autem aliud est. R. Dic, quaeso, scisne saltem in geometrica disciplina quid sit linea? A. Istud plane scio. R. Nec in ista professione vereris Academicos? A. Non omnino. Illi enim sapientem errare noluerunt; ego autem sapiens non sum. Itaque adhuc non vereor earum rerum quas novi, scientiam profiteri. Quod si, ut cupio, pervenero ad sapientiam, faciam quod illa monuerit. R. Nihil renuo: sed, ut quaerere coeperam, ita ut lineam nosti, nosti etiam pilam quam sphaeram nominant? A. Novi. R. Aeque utrumque nosti, an aliud alio magis aut minus? A. Aeque prorsus. Nam in utroque nihil fallor. R. Quid haec, sensibusne percepisti, an intellectu? A. Imo sensus in hoc negotio quasi navim sum expertus. Nam cum ipsi me ad locum quo tendebam pervexerint, ubi eos dimisi, et jam velut in solo positus coepi cogitatione ista volvere, diu mihi vestigia titubarunt. Quare citius mihi videtur in terra posse navigari, quam geometricam sensibus percipi, quamvis primo discentes aliquantum adjuvare videantur. R. Ergo istarum rerum disciplinam, si qua tibi est, non dubitas vocari scientiam? A. Non, si Stoici sinant, qui scientiam tribuunt nulli, nisi sapienti. Perceptionem sane istorum me habere non nego, quam etiam stultitiae concedunt: sed nec istos quidquam pertimesco. Prorsus haec quae interrogasti scientia teneo: perge modo; videam quorsum ista quaeris. R. Ne propera, otiosi sumus. Intentus tantum accipe, ne quid temere concedas. Gaudentem te studeo reddere de rebus quibus nullum casum pertimescas, et quasi parvum negotium sit, praecipitare jubes? A. Ita Deus faxit, ut dicis. Itaque arbitrio tuo rogato, et objurgato gravius, si quidquam tale posthac.