Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Objection 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Objection 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form.

On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.

I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Question 2, Article 3) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.

Reply to Objection 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.

Reply to Objection 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.

Reply to Objection 3: Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in deo sit compositio formae et materiae. Omne enim quod habet animam, est compositum ex materia et forma, quia anima est forma corporis.

Sed Scriptura attribuit animam deo, introducitur enim ad Hebr. X, ex persona dei, iustus autem meus ex fide vivit; quod si subtraxerit se, non placebit animae meae.

Ergo deus est compositus ex materia et forma.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, ira, gaudium, et huiusmodi, sunt passiones coniuncti, ut dicitur I de anima.

Sed huiusmodi attribuuntur deo in Scriptura dicitur enim in Psalmo, iratus est furore dominus in populum suum.

Ergo deus ex materia et forma est compositus.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, materia est principium individuationis.

Sed deus videtur esse individuum, non enim de multis praedicatur.

Ergo est compositus ex materia et forma.

Sed Contra

Sed contra, omne compositum ex materia et forma est corpus, quantitas enim dimensiva est quae primo inhaeret materiae.

Sed deus non est corpus, ut ostensum est.

Ergo deus non est compositus ex materia et forma.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est in deo esse materiam.

Primo quidem, quia materia est id quod est in potentia.

Ostensum est autem quod deus est purus actus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde impossibile est quod deus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Secundo, quia omne compositum ex materia et forma est perfectum et bonum per suam formam, unde oportet quod sit bonum per participationem, secundum quod materia participat formam. Primum autem quod est bonum et optimum, quod deus est, non est bonum per participationem, quia bonum per essentiam, prius est bono per participationem. Unde impossibile est quod deus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Tertio, quia unumquodque agens agit per suam formam, unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad suam formam, sic se habet ad hoc quod sit agens. Quod igitur primum est et per se agens, oportet quod sit primo et per se forma. Deus autem est primum agens, cum sit prima causa efficiens, ut ostensum est.

Est igitur per essentiam suam forma; et non compositus ex materia et forma.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima attribuitur deo per similitudinem actus. Quod enim volumus aliquid nobis, ex anima nostra est, unde illud dicitur esse placitum animae dei, quod est placitum voluntati ipsius.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod ira et huiusmodi attribuuntur deo secundum similitudinem effectus, quia enim proprium est irati punire, ira eius punitio metaphorice vocatur.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod formae quae sunt receptibiles in materia individuantur per materiam, quae non potest esse in alio, cum sit primum subiectum substans, forma vero, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud impediat, recipi potest a pluribus. Sed illa forma quae non est receptibilis in materia, sed est per se subsistens, ex hoc ipso individuatur, quod non potest recipi in alio, et huiusmodi forma est deus.

Unde non sequitur quod habeat materiam.